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NEWS, VIEWS and ISSUES

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Governmental Affairs

U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
13 October 1975

Rockefeller Talks About His Job and Future

*Exclusive Interview With
The Vice President*

EXCERPTS

ON CIA: "WE ARE IMPEDING IF NOT DESTROYING" VITAL U.S. AGENCY

Mr. Rockefeller was chairman of a White House commission that investigated and reported on Central Intelligence Agency activities inside the United States. From his U.S. News & World Report interview:

Q Mr. Vice President, are the investigations by Congress into the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency hampering the Agency's effectiveness?

A I think they are seriously jeopardizing both the current activities of the CIA and its sources. A lot of sources abroad are very hesitant now to co-operate with the Agency, because if they should be identified, they could well be shot or bumped off. That's one damaging effect.

Another area is the CIA's methods of operation: Once methods of collecting information are known, they can be counteracted if they are understood by the opposition.

This is a very serious and adverse moment for the effectiveness of our intelligence at a time when we need it more than ever. Let's face it: The Soviets have an intelligence effort that must be 2 to 4 times as big as ours. And all the things we worry about the CIA doing in this country—listening to our phones, and so on—are being done by the Russians.

Q In this country?

A Sure, all over the country. They can listen from a mile away to our conversation in this room by focusing a device on that windowpane. Or they can pick up everything on point-to-point telephone broadcasts anywhere in the country—and this includes secret plans that the Defense Department may be working on with a contractor.

Q Do you think the public has lost confidence in the CIA and the Government's intelligence operations?

A No, I really don't think so. I think the public is fed up with the investigations. I think it is terribly disturbed that secrets about many CIA activities are being brought out and that we are impeding if not destroying one of the most effective parts of our national defense.

Frankly, I think the course of the investigations and attacks on the CIA is just about running out.

Q In retrospect, do you regret that the Administration's commission to probe the CIA, which you headed, did not go beyond the narrow scope of its investigation—perhaps as deep as Congress is doing?

A And put on a competitive three-ring circus? No.

Q There are some who feel a broader investigation by your commission might have headed off the two committees

Q Do you clear your travel and your speeches with him?

A On my first trip for him, to make a speech in Chicago, there was quite a big press corps. I was sitting in the plane with the reporters, and they said, "Were you given a speech?" And I said, "No."

And they said, "Did the President tell you what he wanted you to say?" And I said, "No, he never talked about it. He just said he wanted me to make a speech."

And then they asked, "Well, did you get instructions from his staff?" And I said, "No. He just asked me to make the speech."

And he's asked me to make a lot of them. He's never said what he wanted me to say or not say. He's never given me any instructions except when he wants me to do something, like working on the CIA Commission. We have an extraordinary relationship.

Q Could you cite several of the things you're working on?

A Sure. Bicentennial, CIA follow-up, the Capitol Hill Club—

of Congress and their televised hearings—

A No, you couldn't head off the committees of Congress. This is a hot issue, and they were going to grab it. There was no question of that.

The allegations that started this whole thing were that there were massive violations or infringements of civil rights and of statutes barring the CIA from domestic activities. We investigated those allegations. We did a thorough job. We came up with recommendations that, if carried out, would protect the public in those areas.

Should we have gone further? The Administration feels—and I think a large percentage of the American people feel—that to go backwards over nearly 30 years of CIA operations, to go into activities relating to covert actions abroad, would serve no useful purpose. Sure, those activities were all dramatic. We all watch those television spy shows, and they're exciting. And you can make a good show out of CIA activities. But is it in our national interest? I think not.

Q Some people want to reshape the CIA to eliminate or reduce its covert activities. How do you answer that?

A There are certain elements of national intelligence that involve gathering information either by human intelligence or by technical means. And then you analyze and interpret the information. Few would argue about that function.

Then there are certain actions that are known as covert—actions that fall between the worlds of diplomatic action and of war. If diplomatic action fails, and you don't want to go to war, and our national interests are involved, then there is this gray area which the public had been aware of only through television shows. That goes on, and now it comes out that it was just as exciting as TV—only it is real life.

This gray area is there. It offends all of us. But it is a reality. The alternative may be war. Covert actions are better than war. These are the sort of tough realities of the situation that we must face up to.

Let me give you another example of the tough realities we face: One of the big issues is keeping files on Americans. But now we are all worried about people shooting at the President. Well, how are you going to know who is about to do that if you don't know about the people who belong to dangerous organizations, who are dedicated to violence or who are unbalanced—unless you've got files?

We're in a very interesting period in this country where we have to know everything that is going on, and at the same time we urge privacy

as never before. Those two goals run in different directions.

Q The latest charges against CIA deal with opening the mail of private citizens, including prominent Americans—

A Let me put that in perspective. There were 4 million letters a year that were under illegal supervision. Our commission pointed that out in its report. We traced the history of it. We made it public. It had been stopped before we got there, and we suggested methods to prevent anything of that kind in the future.

Now what has happened? They pick out names of 2 or 3 or 4 people or foundations whose mail was opened. This is an exciting headline. But what does it all prove? We were there to protect the American people's interest in their freedom and their rights and their liberties and also to protect the effective functioning of an organization which represents American national interests.

Q Mr. Rockefeller, you have been involved with intelligence activities for many years—working with Presidents, serving on advisory committees. Do you think any major CIA action was undertaken without the knowledge of the President?

A I've got to say to you that, in my opinion, no major action was undertaken by the CIA that wasn't either known or approved by the White House, directly or indirectly.

This is something that's a little hard for people to face up to. Everybody would like to slide away from that conclusion and say, "Here's this wild organization—the CIA—off by itself, doing these terrible things." But that's not the real truth.

Q You talk of "White House" knowledge, not the Presi-

VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Norfolk

19 September 1975

The Crippled CIA

The Central Intelligence Agency's ability to conduct covert operations in foreign countries on behalf of the United States Government has been compromised beyond repair by the revelations elicited in the ongoing inquiries into the U.S. intelligence community's foreign and domestic activities. The Ford Administration has no choice but to deprive the CIA of responsibility for conducting such operations and assign it to another—perhaps new—arm of the Federal Government.

In this less than best of all possible worlds, Washington must retain an apparatus for conducting covert operations in foreign lands, primarily to counter the foreign political activities of the Soviet Union and its allies. But these should be authorized only at the highest level, sharply limited in number, and kept under tight control. On the evidence, many middle- and lower-level CIA operatives have been uncontrollable and not a few of them unstable. Apparent attempts by some CIA representatives to enlist the American underworld in attempts on the life of Cuban dictator Fidel Castro may or may not have been directed from the top, but the secreting of poisons in seeming defiance of two Presidential directives requiring their destruction has the look of insubordination.

the United States, opened Americans' mail, experimented recklessly with LSD, and assisted, however minimally, the Nixon White House's burglary of the office of Dr. Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist.

At the time of its creation shortly after the end of World War II, the CIA contained within itself the seeds for abuses small and monstrous. Among the duties of the CIA enumerated in the National Security Act of 1947 was the duty of performing "such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct." Moreover, the subsequent Central Intelligence Agency Act exempted the CIA from all Federal laws requiring disclosure of the "functions, names, official titles, salaries, or numbers of personnel employed by the Agency" and gave the CIA Director power to spend money "without regard to the provisions of law and regulations relating to the expenditure of Government funds. . . . such expenditures to be accounted for solely on the certificate of the director [which] shall be deemed sufficient voucher."

The "other functions and duties" clause in the National Security Act permitted the CIA to run a secret war in Laos, launch the Bay of Pigs debacle,

dent's. Are you choosing those words intentionally?

A That's right. I've worked for six Presidents. And it was always the feeling that where an action could be misinterpreted, it was better for the President to be in a position to be able to say that he did not know about it, or to deny it. Now, that can be accomplished in many different ways—delegating authority to somebody, for instance.

Q When you talk about advance White House knowledge, do you include assassinations?

A Our commission got into that matter, and we couldn't produce any hard evidence that would give us the justification to come to conclusions that we could prove. Therefore, we didn't comment.

Q Are the CIA investigations a partisan matter?

A This business of going back and trying to pin the tail on the donkey—or pin the trunk on the elephant—really is ex post facto. I don't know what it proves. This hasn't anything to do with Democrats or Republicans. This is a very unhappy phase of the world we live in. It is a tough reality.

Q Is there any truth to charges that the CIA investigations in Congress are being used to divert attention from delays in coming to grips with other national problems?

A It is a diversion as far as the public is concerned, but I'm not sure that it is the reason for inaction on the part of the Congress.

In any case, airing of the CIA issue is healthy because that is the way a democracy works. We've got to go through it until we sort it out. Only a democracy, and only the United States, would do what we are doing. This country is strong enough to absorb it.

intervene in the Congo and Chile, and engage in other similar enterprises. It was disingenuous of President Truman and Senator Stuart Symington (D-Missouri) and others to disclaim in later years that they had intended for the CIA to become involved in peacetime cloak-and-dagger operations. The CIA started up such operations during the Truman Administration—and in doing so it simply extended traditions established by the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) during World War II.

The truth is that the CIA has done what it has done largely at the bidding of Republican and Democratic Administrations and with the indulgence of successive Congresses. It has had successes and failures. But now its cover has been blown. William E. Colby, who operated in Nazi-occupied Europe as a young U.S. Army officer assigned to OSS, did not become Director of the CIA to preside over its dismantling, but its dismantling may have begun. The CIA should survive as an organization dedicated to collection and analysis of information—functions for which it is superbly staffed and equipped—but only if it is transformed into an accountable and highly disciplined intelligence service. At the moment, it seems to be neither.

Restructuring of the CIA is desirable as well as unavoidable. The CIA has been embarrassed fatally by the disclosures that it spied upon

THE NEW YORK TIMES, FRIDAY, OCTOBER 10, 1975

Intelligence Hearings: Inquiries Seem Mired in Data After 9 Months, With Goals Unclear

By NICHOLAS M. HORROCK

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 9—After nine months of delving into the activities of United States intelligence agencies, Congressional investigators seem adrift in a sea of information, stunned by the magnitude of the task and less sure of their objective than when they started, interviews in both the Senate and House disclosed.

The objectives last January appeared clear enough. Information uncovered in the Watergate investigation and a report in The New York Times suggested that the intelligence agencies had conducted a large, and probably illegal, domestic surveillance operation in the late nineteen-sixties and early nineteen-seventies.

These allegations provided the impetus for a Presidential commission and two Congressional investigations, one by a select committee in the Senate, another by a select committee in the House.

The Presidential commission, headed by Vice President Rockefeller, took a narrow scope. It investigated wrongdoing by the Central Intelligence Agency alone and issued a report in June, finding vast intrusions on privacy as well as specific violations of the law and of the C.I.A.'s jurisdiction under the National Security Act of 1947.

The Congressional investigations were given broader mandates covering foreign and domestic intelligence activities. To the sophisticated in Washington intelligence circles, it seemed an impossible task.

Foreign Operations

The foreign intelligence operations of the United States alone cost nearly \$7-billion a year, according to reliable reports, and encompass the activities of the C.I.A., Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, State Department intelligence, Federal Bureau of Investigation and intelligence units of the armed forces.

Domestic intelligence has included all or some of the above, as well as the Internal Revenue Service, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms Bureau and the Secret Service.

Already the files and records gathered in the Senate investigation are larger than any single investigation previously conducted by the Senate. The Senate has a staff of over 100, the House committee, another 40 or so.

The investigations have either directly, or by their pressure, produced a startling pattern of disclosures about the methods of the various agencies. These include the following:

• The C.I.A. was involved in several attempts to kill Fidel Castro, Premier of Cuba; had a peripheral involvement in the death of Rafael Leonidas Tujillo Molina, strongman of the Dominican Republic and once plotted to poison the Congolese leader, Patrice Lumumba.

• Indeed, assassinations apparently became so accepted a policy theme that the C.I.A. set up a permanent section to plan them, called "the Executive Action Group."

• The C.I.A., the F.B.I. and the National Security Agency have conducted extensive intrusions on either telephone, cable, or mail communications or on all three.

• Intelligence agencies have lied to Congress almost routinely. In one case, the statements of a former C.I.A. director, Richard Helms, on the coup d'etat in Chile were reviewed by the department of justice to see if they constituted perjury. No prosecution was recommended.

• Lawlessness under the guise of national security seemed to have become almost commonplace during and after World War II. The F.B.I. admitted 238 burglaries aimed at American citizens; the I.R.S. audited persons whose politics it did not like, and forgery of letters, anonymous threats and other forms of coercion became standard tools in the F.B.I.'s counterintelligence operations.

• But the disclosures—and list is long—are scattered shots and without theme.

"This is very unlike the Watergate investigation," said one Senator, "because this is not a simple conspiracy. There is no single band of lawbreakers or single group of people who made bad judgments. This has gone on for 30 years."

The disclosures are not for the sake of disclosure alone, most Congressional sources agree. Senator Frank Church, chairman of the Senate select committee on intelligence, has said that he believed disclosure was necessary so the public could see for itself whether there had been a pattern of unacceptable behavior.

"It is for this public support that Congress draws the power to pass legislation to meet these problems," he said.

But his critics argue that Senator Church has made decisions that defeat his own strategy and retard the investigation. In one instance, last spring, President Ford threw the hot potato of C.I.A. political assassination plots to the Church committee.

Many persons on the committee privately believe that by focusing on the plots, the panel has allowed the rest of the investigation to drown. They fault Mr. Church on two counts; one that he tied up the commission counsel, F.A.O.

William Miller, on the subject far longer than its importance justified, and second that by keeping the discussion of the plots behind closed doors, he cut the public off from the very kind of information that might have helped it form a view of the intelligence community.

"As you will remember," one member of the committee said privately, "we were going to have completed most of our public hearings and be preparing our recommendations by this point. We have not, done either."

Senator Church has publicly stuck to his decisions. He said he believed that televised public hearings on assassinations would have done irreparable harm to the American image abroad and not served truth.

Whether it has been distracted by the assassination matter, or by other problems, the Church committee is far behind schedule. It has had three brief spurts of public hearings in the last several weeks. Hearings on the N.S.A. were postponed this week at the request of President Ford, and the committee may not open others until the end of the month.

Several staff members privately contend that the committee might just as well write an authoritative report now and forgo televised public sessions.

"The idea that every Senate investigation is another Watergate is a myth," one senior staff member said in an interview. "The question is—can you get good legislation anyway? I think you can."

Part of Senator Church's technique has been to avoid confrontation and to negotiate for each piece of evidence from the intelligence community. He believes that Congress has an absolute right to the information, but that it is better to obtain the material without the time delays of court fights.

His House counterpart, Representative Otis G. Pike, a tart-tongued Suffolk County Democrat, believes differently. Mr. Pike took over the House committee last summer after a membership mutiny dislodged the previous chairman, Lucien N. Nedzi, a Michigan Democrat.

Mr. Pike's committee voted to make public secret national security information without the approval of the executive branch, thus precipitating a confrontation over whether Congress or the President controls national secrets.

But after two weeks of sword-rattling by both sides, Mr. Pike and the White House settled the issue—access to some secret intelligence evaluations on the Tet offensive in 1968—without settling the fundamental question. Mr. Pike's critics thought that Congressional prerogatives were

confrontation was avoided.

However, the Pike committee has begun to establish a body of evidence indicating that the \$7-billion-a-year intelligence apparatus may not, in fact, be very efficient. In recent public hearings he has called authoritative witnesses who contend that the intelligence agencies failed to predict any of the major crises of the last decade.

No one yet appears able to evaluate how this nine-month scrutiny has affected the intelligence agencies. Publicly, intelligence officials have said that the disclosures have harmed the United States and made their task harder.

But privately, many of them tell a more sanguine tale. The bulk of the disclosures were already known to foreign intelligence services and the new details can mainly be used to fill in gaps in knowledge, responsible intelligence officers admit.

In fact, there is some feeling that the intelligence community—with the help of President Ford and his able lawyers—has "staved off the worst," as one source put it. In other words, the agencies are surviving what many had thought would never come, a full Congressional investigation.

The upcoming confrontations will not be on further disclosure, sources in Congress and the executive suggest, but on the issue of "oversight."

In general, the intelligence agencies regard self-regulation, inspector general style of introspection backed up by executive orders, as optimum. White House and intelligence sources have talked about this privately for some time.

They rest their case on the fact that many of the instances of wrongdoing were dug up by C.I.A. itself in May, 1973, without Congressional oversight.

Mr. Church's committee, however, has already raised serious questions about the C.I.A.'s ability at self-regulation. It has uncovered instances where even middle-level C.I.A. officials were apparently able to disobey with impunity a Presidential order to destroy deadly poisons.

Most persons interviewed believed that the committee will propose and receive support for a Congressional oversight committee, probably a joint committee and that the real battleground will emerge over the subtleties of its powers.

Will it be able to subpoena officials and documents of the entire intelligence community and call for contempt citations against those who do not comply? Will it have a well-paid and adequate permanent staff to conduct investigations? These are the "gut" issues, several sources said.

Mr. Church has worried many on Capitol Hill is whether the Con-

PHILADELPHIA BULLETIN
29 September 1975

For the record

Different perspective on CIA

The papers have been filled lately with letters and statements from various people about the CIA, all of which have one thing in common — their authors, some of whom are quite highly placed, don't know what they are talking about. On December 31, 1973, I took early retirement from CIA after over 22 years' service; therefore, I think I know whereof I speak.

It is not that there is not plenty wrong with the CIA, because there is. Its promotion and transfer policies are frightful beyond description. Twenty years ago, to get anywhere in CIA one almost had to be an Ivy League graduate. Today the pendulum has swung so far in the other direction that this background is considered a hindrance.

To get ahead today one has to be willing to be transferred anywhere. On the other hand, one way CIA gets rid of people it doesn't want is to offer them transfers to Timbuctu or similar places. If they refuse, this is valid grounds for dismissal. CIA also forces retirements at age 60 although Civil Service regulations say that 65 is the retirement age.

However, this kind of thing is comparatively unimportant. All Government agencies are monuments of confusion and CIA is probably run better than most of them.

What everyone has forgotten, or never knew, is the reason for the CIA's existence: to oppose the moves of our Communist enemies, particu-

larly the USSR, on a global scale. What CIA did in Chile, for instance, is held up as a colossal example of perfidy. Actually, it was perhaps CIA's most brilliant coup in years. A little background is in order.

It has been said that Allende was a democratically elected President. In actual fact he squeaked in with only a drop over one third of the vote. The two other candidates split the anti-Communist vote in half because they were both too stubborn to bow out. Between them they had two thirds of the vote but neither one had quite as many votes as Allende. In many other countries this election would have resulted in the man with the lowest number of votes being eliminated and a rerun taking place between the two.

In Chile this would certainly have resulted in a conservative victory. People forget that Allende had massive Soviet support in his campaign including, some think, a successful Soviet undercover effort to keep both other candidates in the race so that his opposition would be split.

Upon taking office Allende at once seized the Chilean subsidiaries of Anaconda Copper, Kennecott Copper, Bethlehem Steel, International Telephone and Telegraph etc., in fact the Chilean assets of all U.S. companies. This seizure of billions of dollars worth of property was countered by the CIA with the allocation of the very small sum of \$5 million to help the truck drivers union continue their

strike against the Allende Government. It was used mainly to feed them and their families during this period.

When conditions finally became completely chaotic the Chilean Army seized power, an event that the CIA did not plan, although it did hope that Allende and his Communist supporters would be overthrown by the anti-Communist majority.

I personally approve of such actions on the part of CIA. I was involved in the Chilean affair in a somewhat remote way because I collected information from a large company that was in the process of having its Chilean properties seized. It kept me, and, through me, CIA and the U.S. Government, informed on a daily basis. This is the sort of thing I did for 22 years and I was proud of my contributions to our country's security. Upon leaving CIA I at once began working as a foreign political consultant to a large U.S. oil company and after one year shifted to a second oil company in the same capacity. There is virtually no country in the world on which I do not consider myself well informed, due to my CIA training.

Have I, however, wasted my life? I think not and hope not. May the CIA flourish as the guardian of our country in the future as it has in the past when I was privileged to contribute in a small way to its success.

Richard Parry
Philadelphia

BALTIMORE SUN
9 October 1975

Levi weighing CIA wrongdoing

Washington (AP)—Edward H. Levi, the Attorney General, expects to decide early next year whether to prosecute Central Intelligence Agency officials involved in illegal domestic activities, a Justice Department spokesman said yesterday.

The decision may hinge on whether there is evidence that any President authorized such activities, a top department official involved in the investigation said.

gressional investigations have established a record of sufficient wrongdoing to lay the groundwork for Congress to vote a tough, permanent oversight panel for the intelligence community, that question cannot be answered until the investigations are complete.

The Washington Star

Wednesday, October 8, 1975

Ford Considers Shultz For Role in Intelligence

United Press International

President Ford is seriously considering giving former Nixon Cabinet official George P. Shultz a major role in a revised intelligence operation, it was learned today.

Shultz, President of the Bechtel Corp. of San Francisco, is reluctant to return to government service.

Both Ford and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger reportedly feel Shultz has the proper qualifications for a sensitive position.

Sources speculated that Shultz might be named to head the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, which will probably be strengthened in its oversight of the CIA and other intelligence agencies when the President makes public a plan for overhauling U.S. intelligence-gathering.

Ford has been planning to shake up the CIA since the Rockefeller Commission and congressional

investigations have revealed major improprieties in the agency's operations over the years. But Ford apparently is in no hurry to replace CIA Director William Colby, who has cooperated in disclosing past improprieties.

According to sources, Shultz has the "strong personality" needed to handle the job. Shultz headed the University of Chicago business school and has served as secretary of labor, director of the White House Office of Management and Budget, and secretary of the Treasury.

He is respected on Capitol Hill and is all the more acceptable because he has "no political ambitions," sources said.

Shultz is currently the President's representative at planning sessions for international economic monetary meetings in Paris later this year.

SATURDAY REVIEW
9 August 1975

American Traditions and Secret Police

America's fast-approaching Bicentennial Year furnishes a useful backdrop for the widening debate over the CIA. The main issues growing out of an American undercover organization were anticipated by the handful of young men who were later to be called "America's Founding Fathers."

Both in their arguments against Great Britain in the struggle for independence and in their exploration of ideas at the Philadelphia Constitutional Convention, the young founders rejected the notion that there could be any justification for interfering in the internal affairs of other countries. When the American Revolutionary leaders told Great Britain to respect our right to self-determination, they thereby fixed our own obligation to respect that same right for others. They would have found ludicrous and absurd the argument used in 1947 to justify the creation of the CIA; namely, that the United States could deal with Soviet intrigue in the world only by playing the same international game. That game eventually involved the use of secret U.S. agents for manipulating or subverting or overthrowing the policies and institutions of other countries.

It is a mistake to say that no one can possibly know how leaders of the American independence movement and the U.S. Constitutional Convention would react to current situations. They made known their full views on almost every question involving the issues of power. Their field of expertise was the interaction of politics and history. It is doubtful whether, before or since, any group of men articulated more thoroughly the lessons of historical experience, especially as they pertain to the abuses of authority. The leaders of the Philadelphia Convention were conscious of the propensity of nations to subvert or undermine one another. They realized that competition among nations can become as irrational as it is predatory, and that men in government all too readily set aside moral codes in order to serve a national advantage.

One need not speculate, therefore, on the attitude of the American founders toward the National Security Act of 1947 creating an agency to deal in undercover activities—an agency that eventually was to fight and finance wars without authorization by Congress, and that was to engage in political assassination. The main point the founders would have made here is that leaders of any government would have to be naive indeed to believe they could engage in such outrages without precipitating retaliatory action.

Let us suppose that the American

people in 1947 had some way of knowing all the things that would happen as the result of the establishment of the CIA. Suppose they knew in advance that the CIA, operating abroad with billions of dollars, would be charged ultimately with indirect involvement in the assassination of an American President; or that it would figure prominently in undeclared wars in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia with a toll of 55,000 American lives and 30 times as many Indo-Chinese lives; or that it would spy on Americans and violate their constitutional rights. Obviously, if the American people in 1947 knew all this might happen, they would have split the sky with their wrath.

The American Founding Fathers would not have been surprised at the train of events that followed the creation of the CIA. They would have thought it childish of U.S. government leaders not to expect such an agency would become a secret police or that its activities could be kept at a distance. As for the argument that our secret agents were justified in trying to assassinate Castro because he was a dictator, the Founding Fathers would have pointed out that this line of thought and action tends to lead to dictatorship at home.

LONDON TIMES
26 September 1975

Lisbon Socialist leader denies getting CIA aid

Paris, Sept. 25.—Dr. Mario Soares, the Portuguese Socialist leader, today denied a press report that his party had been receiving millions of dollars in aid from the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

In an interview with the French state-run television system, Dr. Soares, now visiting Paris, called such suggestions "journalistic speculation."

He was asked to comment on a report in *The New York Times* today saying that the CIA was sending millions of dollars to the Portuguese Socialist Party through West European socialist parties and trade unions. "We have never received aid of that sort, even less so from the United States. That is quite clear," he said.

"We have no solidarity links with any party in the United States that would place us in such a position. It is journalistic speculation."

The New York Times report said the Soviet Union was pouring similar amounts of money into Portugal in support of the Communist Party. Dr. Soares merely noted that Portuguese Communist leaders had always denied receiving money from Moscow.

In Brussels, a spokesman for the Belgian Socialist Party said the party had received no money from the CIA for passage. "It's not true, in our case anyway," the spokesman said.—Reuters

They would have been appalled at the original secret decision of the United States to block the first nationwide free election in Vietnam, as required under the Geneva Treaty of 1954, because the results might not be to our liking. And they would have been amazed that the American leaders who made this decision should have broken so drastically with their own early history and with the ideas that went into the founding of their own country.

As for the argument that because the Soviet Union engages in venal undertakings we have no choice except to employ the same methods, the American founders would have pointed out what would have seemed to them to be painfully obvious: imitation of the enemy is the easiest way to make him the victor. They would have said, against the background of their own wide study of history, that the requirements of a free society are absolute and do not lend themselves to convenient manipulation or trimming—even in the name of national advantage or national security.

After 200 years of independence, the time has come not for super-celebrations and spectacular fireworks but for a refresher course in what this government was designed to be, and what must be done to preserve it. N.C.

ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH
28 September 1975

CIA And Portugal

Apparently because Russia is supposed to have been sending \$10,000,000 a month to the Portuguese Communists, the Central Intelligence Agency is said by Administration officials to have been funneling an equal amount to the Portuguese Socialist Party through foreign Socialist parties.

Americans may wonder why the Ford Administration feels it is necessary to copy the Kremlin so baldly, how this use of the CIA fits President Ford's complaint that the agency was not able to act in Portugal because congressional investigations had weakened it, and why a conservative Administration hardly known to have supported Socialists anywhere chose to do so in Portugal. At least the answer to the last question is that Portugal's Socialists as the largest party offer the best hope of blocking Communist infiltration of the military government.

But these questions are less important than whether the CIA's assistance may not be self-defeating. That agency has become known world-wide for helping right-wing regimes. Its aid has to be totally embarrassing to the Portuguese Socialists whose leader, Mario Soares, immediately denied receiving it. West European governments, many of them Socialist, are said to be giving even more funds to the Portuguese Socialists. They can do so without raising suspicions of antidemocratic intervention, and they should have been left alone with the task.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, FRIDAY, OCTOBER 10, 1975

New Doubts Raised Over the Warren Report by Lack of Reference to a Purported Soviet Defector

By JOHN M. CREWDSON

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 9—Key United States intelligence officials have long had doubts about the reliability of a purported Soviet defector whose statements apparently influenced the Warren Commission's conclusion that there had been no foreign involvement in President Kennedy's assassination, according to intelligence sources.

But neither the name of the defector, Lieut. Col. Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko, nor the suspicions of some officials about the legitimacy of his motives appear in the commission's final report or in any of the volumes of testimony and exhibits that accompanied it, according to Senate investigators who are re-examining the commission's inquiry.

An internal working memorandum of the commission, now in the hands of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, recounts in detail Mr. Nosenko's assurances that the K.G.B., the Soviet intelligence service, never tried to recruit Lee Harvey Oswald, Mr. Kennedy's assassin, during Oswald's residence in the Soviet Union.

Doubts about the Warren Commission's conclusion that Oswald acted alone have existed in some minds almost from the moment that the panel released its final report in September, 1964. But as internal commission documents like the working memorandum have become declassified in recent months, new questions have been raised in the Senate and elsewhere about the thoroughness of its investigation.

One of these questions, typified by the Nosenko matter, is the dual concern of whether the commission was fully informed by other Federal agencies of all of the relevant details surrounding the Kennedy assassination, and of how it weighed the information it did receive in reaching its conclusion.

"The statements of Nosenko," according to the memorandum's authors, W. David Slawson and William T. Coleman Jr., "if true, would certainly go a long way toward showing that the Soviet Union had no part in the assassination" of President Kennedy.

Nothing in that memorandum, however, or in the nine-page interview of Mr. Nosenko by the Federal Bureau of Investigation on which it is based, reflects the considerable doubts that, the sources said, existed in the American intelligence community at the time about the legitimacy of the Soviet officer's motives for having come to the United States.

Two sources familiar with the Warren Commission's investigation said that while the panel had received no formal assertions of doubt about the colonel's legitimacy as a defector,

the commission staff had been informally cautioned "that this man might have been sent over to allay our suspicions" about possible Soviet involvement in the Kennedy assassination.

One source declined to say from where such a cautionary advice had come, but the other said that he believed it had been offered by Richard Helms, the then Deputy Director of Central Intelligence who is now the American Ambassador to Iran.

John A. McCone was the Director of Central Intelligence at the time of the Kennedy assassination, on Nov. 22, 1963, and he was asked last May in an interview with CBS News why neither he nor Mr. Helms had cited Mr. Nosenko's assertions in their formal testimony before the Warren Commission.

Mr. McCone replied that it was a tradition among intelligence agencies not to accept a defector's statements "until we have proven beyond any doubt that the man is legitimate and the information is correct."

He added that "the bona fides of the man," which "were not known at the time of the testimony," had subsequently been established by the Central Intelligence Agency.

One former high-ranking American intelligence official took exception recently to that assertion, saying that the official doubts about Mr. Nosenko's motives, far from having been resolved, had increased as time went on.

"No doubt about it," a second former official said in a recent interview. "Nosenko was a phony. Nosenko was a notorious deception—he really screwed up everything."

This official said that his conclusions, which had been shared by the C.I.A.'s counterintelligence section, were based on a number of factors, including Mr. Nosenko's identification of an American television correspondent as a Soviet intelligence agent, an allegation that was later proved to be false.

A third source, one familiar with the F.B.I.'s investigation and debriefing of Mr. Nosenko after his arrival in the United States, recalled that "we did have some doubts about him, and they're probably recorded in the bureau—but we didn't let it out anywhere."

At the least, he said, the F.B.I. should have told the Warren Commission that "this information comes from a man of unknown reliability."

Neither the C.I.A. nor the F.B.I. would comment on the sources' assertions.

Other persons familiar with the record of the Warren Commission's investigation of the Kennedy assassination pointed out what they said were some oddities and anomalies that cast further doubt on the validity of Mr. Nosenko's approach to

representatives of the American Government with a request for asylum, they said, came in Geneva on Feb. 4, 1964, barely 10 weeks after Mr. Kennedy was shot to death while riding in a motorcade in Dallas.

Although the colonel was identified at the time as a Soviet "disarmament expert" at a multinational conference there, he told the F.B.I. that in October, 1959, when Oswald arrived in Moscow with the intention of becoming a Soviet citizen, he had been in charge of the K.G.B. department that oversaw American tourists.

In that position, he said, he had been made privy to the details of the K.G.B.'s decision shortly after his arrival that Oswald was too emotionally and politically unreliable to warrant cultivation by the Soviet intelligence service.

Mr. Nosenko said he had understood that some other agencies of the Soviet Government, including the Red Cross, had then taken the disgruntled American in hand. Intelligence sources pointed out, however, that the Soviet Red Cross is itself believed to be an arm of the K.G.B.

They also questioned Mr. Nosenko's assertion that Soviet citizens with whom Oswald had hunted rabbits during his nearly three years in the Soviet Union had reported that the man was an "extremely poor shot."

The Senate intelligence committee recently designated two of its members, Richard S.

Schweiker, Republican of Pennsylvania, and Gary Hart, Democrat of Colorado, to look into the growing number of questions about the circumstances surrounding the Kennedy assassination and the thoroughness of the Warren Commission's investigation.

Senator Schweiker said through a spokesman today that he personally favored an extensive investigation by he select committee of all of the questions raised thus far about the scope of the Warren Commission's inquiry. Those questions are expected to include the extent to which the commission was apprised of the official doubts about Mr. Nosenko and the consideration it gave that information.

Meanwhile, two interviews with Oswald by the F.B.I. in the summer of 1962, shortly after he returned from the Soviet Union, were reported today.

In each instance, according to the interview reports, Oswald agreed to the agents' request that, if he were to be sought out by Soviet intelligence operatives in this country for any reason, he would report the contact to the F.B.I.

Although the F.B.I. interviews with Oswald were provided by the bureau to the Warren Commission staff, the commission concluded in its report that "Oswald was not an informant or agent of the F.B.I." and that "no attempt was made" by it "to recruit him in any capacity."

ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH

22 September 1975

Premature

President Ford is being premature if, as he reportedly told the *Chicago Sun-Times*, he is planning to send Congress soon a package of recommendations for reorganizing the Central Intelligence Agency. All that the President has now as a major basis for legislative recommendations on the CIA is the report of his own Rockefeller Commission. But that commission, by its mandate and by its own admission, covered only part of the ground in its inquiry. And two congressional investigating committees are still at work trying to find out what reforms in the intelligence community are needed.

If President Ford should send proposals on the CIA to Congress soon, it would not be in a position to act in an informed manner. The lawmakers should have their own committee reports in hand before undertaking new legislation on the CIA. Any recommendations from the President now could only be viewed as an attempt to undercut or take the sting out of congressional recommendations.

The Washington Star

Thursday, October 9, 1975

IN FOCUS The CIA Historians' Ivory Tower Has a Cyclone Fence

By Lance Gay

Washington Star Staff Writer

If a historian works for the CIA, to whom does he owe primary allegiance: to Clio — the Muse of history — or to William Colby?

A rather arcane debate on the question is now sweeping offices of the American Historical Association. The issue raised by some historians has reverberated through the ivory towers of American higher education as historians and others debate the issue of the ethics of working for government in the 1970s.

The debate comes in the wake of the post-World War II disclosures and of the recent revelations of CIA involvement in domestic activities which have inspired some intellectuals to argue that it would be a betrayal of professional ethics for intellectuals to work for the government in these days and these times.

Take Prof. Ronald Radosh, associate professor of history at Queensboro Community College in New York City, for example.

RADOSH DRAWS a philosophical analogy between Americans working for the CIA today and Germans who worked for the Schutzstaffel under Hitler's regime.

"Scholars worked for the SS in World War II and rationalized their work as being done in a separate bureau, divorced from what the SS was doing. Of course, we know better than that now," he argues.

"As a historian, I have to make a distinction between a historian as a historian and a historian as a citizen. . . . I think it's dangerous for a historian to work for government."

Different people see things through different eyes, of course, and a spokesman for the CIA, who pleaded anonymity from his offices in the headquarters at Langley, said the issue comes down to whether a historian is a citizen or not. "The basic answer is that all of them are Americans. . . . Americans must be willing to assist their government."

The debate within the AHA was sparked after John F. Devlin, deputy director of political research for the CIA, appeared at the AHA convention in Chicago last December to recruit historians for the agency. The CIA has recruited historians through advertisements in the past, but before the Chicago convention assumed a rather low-key posture.

However, Devlin appeared in Chicago with a badge on his lapel identifying himself as being from the CIA the week after the first revela-

tions of CIA domestic spying activity appeared in newspapers. Some of the historians who spotted the badge thought it was a joke, but Devlin, a soft-spoken, mild-mannered man with a trim white beard, who himself is an expert in Colonial history, proved to be the real article at the job conference for historians.

DEVLIN TOLD the historians he was looking for applicants to work in fields in modern Middle Eastern and Western European history and insisted at the meeting that the work done by historians hired by the CIA would be proper, scholarly and "distinct from the covert action one associates with the agency," according to Radosh.

Devlin, who could not be reached at his office at Langley after repeated calls, did not dispute Radosh when given the opportunity to reply to his article in a recent issue of the AHA Newsletter.

The only elements Devlin disputed about the meeting was Radosh's description of a confrontation that erupted on the floor of the Conrad

Hilton conference room towards the close of the meeting. When Radosh got to his feet to argue that the AHA should be ashamed of offering its facilities to a CIA recruitment officer, "a fellow historian ran down the aisle brandishing an umbrella whose pointed end he thrust at my face. As I ducked, I thought to myself that perhaps this young man understood the proper relationship between the CIA's theory and practice, and that he had passed the first part of his job interview."

Devlin devoted the second paragraph of a two-paragraph reply to answer this point, arguing that the umbrella incident "was somewhat less dramatic than Mr. Radosh described. I started forward to restrain the person with the umbrella, but he returned to his seat before I could reach him. And to my knowledge, he did not apply for a job."

However, some historians did apply and the AHA Council is now finding itself in the middle of a heated debate over the ethics and working for the CIA.

PROF. NATALIE DAVIS, a historian at the University of California, Berkeley, who specializes in preindustrial French histo-

ry, said she expects the council to tackle the problem of the ethics of historians sometime later this year and come up with some sort of policy on the issue in the form of a historian's bill of rights and responsibilities.

In an article that appeared first in the magazine The Nation and was reprinted in the AHA Newsletter this summer, Radosh argued that any of the assembled historians who gained a job with the CIA through the convention, "would then become, in essence, scholar-spies. The research they undertook would be dictated and defined by the agency and put to such use as the CIA saw fit. Such research is meant to serve the goals of covert action."

The professor of modern American history had argued on the floor that any academic studies the historian might pursue would be used as legwork "for the policies to be put into action by the operational branch. A study of the Chilean legislature in 1969, for example, might well have allowed the agency to determine which legislators to bribe to vote against Allende in the 1970 elections — a job for which the CIA doled out \$350,000. Similar acquaintance with the politics of Italian communism could serve a like task should a covert program be put into practice if Italy shifts left."

Radosh extends his arguments beyond the CIA to historians working for any intelligence-connected branch of the government, such as the State Department. He recalled that historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr. once said of his role in the Kennedy administration during the Bay of Pigs, "I would be willing to lie for the government, if needs be."

"THAT'S WHAT HAPPENS to the professional in government," Radosh argues. "I would not accept any position in a government program. . . . The role of an intellectual is to be in opposition to the government. I suppose that if there were a government in office that was following positive policy, I would agree that intellectuals should work for it, but it's

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ernment that will pursue that kind of policy."

Furthermore, he argues, he does not agree with the concept that intellectuals are needed in government to keep political policies straight. "The scientific community claimed that it joined the war effort to work from within to make war more humane and to prevent militaristic elements from having their way. So they made The Bomb. I could never see that logic, I don't think it's true."

For what purpose the CIA wants historians it isn't directly saying. A spokesman denied the agency wanted them to write an official history of the agency but said the historians are prized for their "analytical" abilities and training in research.

The CIA has recruited in several other fields and has even thrown anthropologists into a turmoil after an article in The New York Review of Books recently disclosed that anthropological research into tribes in Southeast Asia was used by the Pentagon and the CIA as a part of a plan of counterinsurgency in the Vietnam War.

SIMILAR DISPUTES have been touched off in the geographical fraternity over the CIA use of geographers and cartographers and within the English community over hiring of linguistic experts. Other disputes have arisen from the CIA's Domestic Collection Department, which emerges from behind the cyclone fences at Langley to ask various professionals to share their observations and information with the agency voluntarily.

"These people are free to voice their objections, but I look at it as Americans who, as citizens, should be willing to share their knowledge," said the CIA spokesman.

"Where would we be if, as a matter of principle, the CIA was denied the use of scholars," he added, noting that the CIA is reputed to have representatives of so many diverse fields on its payroll that the agency is a veritable mini-university. "Scholars have contributed to make this a more effective agency in every field."

Davis said she does not favor excluding historians from government agencies or any fields. "But in no case should historians compromise their standards of truthfulness and in no case should they compromise their professional standards or use their professional

Bob Wiedrich

CIA's entitled to kinder suicide

CYANIDE CAN REQUIRE up to 15 minutes to kill. It causes an agonizingly painful death by asphyxiation. Spies on both sides in World War II used it on themselves as a last resort.

"Agents didn't want to face that kind of fate," Director William Colby of the Central Intelligence Agency said when a Senate committee asked him why the search for a substitute for the cyanide L-pill was started in 1952.

Bluntly, American intelligence operatives wanted to die as quickly and painlessly as possible if it became necessary in the battle they wage in the back alleys of the world. They did not wish to lie, suffering and gasping for breath in a cruel paroxysm of death.

IMPLICIT IN THE words Colby spoke so calmly last month, was the harsh reality of the kind of decision that sometimes faces frontline CIA agents and the people they hire in foreign lands.

Nobody claims their work is clean or honorable in execution. Colby and others admit that though it is vital to the security of the nation, it is often dirty.

And if one examines what Colby said, it becomes clear that it does not matter whether one prefers suicide over torture and eventual death by other means.

What does count is that in this world of diminished values there remains a small band of human beings so dedicated to a duty or an ideal that they will accept death at their own hands rather than divulge information damaging to their nation, that to such people death over dishonor retains a special meaning.

And what matters further is that there really does exist in the backwaters of the globe a clandestine warfare in which men and women of many nations are pitted against one another with death as the ultimate mechanism of escape from the consequences of being captured by an enemy bent on extracting information.

In short, there exist people with a special kind of guts that few of us will ever have to call on, much less comprehend. And the CIA feels that such operatives should have a more comfortable option in taking their own lives.

That's pretty harsh. But so is the business of intelligence gathering in the far corners of a divided world.

Not long ago we heard of a CIA agent in his late 30s, with a family back home and a devout love of country, who spent months hiding in a jungle cave overlooking the Ho Chi Minh Trail as he report-

ed on North Vietnamese military traffic through Laos. Capture as a civilian would have meant certain torture and death for him.

We know of others who endured similar ordeals in the mountains of northern Thailand, monitoring Communist rebel movements in the days when Southeast Asia intelligence was an American priority.

And there is yet another we know of who is buried behind the facade of a successful exporter in a major Far Eastern city that serves as a crossroads of diplomatic, economic, and military information.

Each has faced his own private hell. Each should at least be afforded a painless method of dying if that ever becomes necessary in an assignment.

Colby's attempt at justifying the hush-hush CIA toxic research program of 1952 came under Senate questioning about small quantities of shellfish toxin and cobra venom kept in a CIA storehouse in defiance of a presidential order to destroy the stuff. Neither he nor former CIA chief Richard Helms sought to excuse the fact that the poisons were saved.

Nor is this column intended as a justification of the excesses, bad judgments, and domestic violations of law committed by the agency.

But like so many other things, the CIA grew like Topsy after its 1947 birth. With little congressional supervision and a succession of Presidents who looked the other way, the CIA conducted its operations through Cold War and actual war, spy scandals, atomic secret thefts, and an epidemic of assassinations by foreign operatives that persists around the world to this day.

IF ANYONE WAS remiss, it was Congress itself. It gave the CIA virtually unlimited funds. It kissed off its constitutional duty of oversight. It, like the men in the White House, took a duck rather than know the grisly details of what was going on in the unending battle for intelligence information.

Now the CIA is getting raked over the coals for getting out of hand. We believe most of those charged with the duty of supervision on Capitol Hill will seek to refashion the agency in conformity with democratic ideals rather than destroy it.

But we hope they will keep in mind the cruel reality of some of the tasks accepted by the CIA's personnel — and also recognize that some of those tasks are necessary to our national survival.

status for covert spying," she said.

"We can't ignore everything that is outside our little classroom or our little society, but we shouldn't serve government blindly or blindly follow its dictates," she added.

Davis, who has been closely following the debate in the historical society, said she feels it would compromise a historian's ethics to work for an agency that concealed his work and did not share it with the rest of the community.

The NATION
4 October 1975

Written in Blood

Richard Helms, former CIA Director, now Ambassador to Iran, leads a charmed life. He enjoys the best possible protection against the misadventures that can unhorse even the luckiest and most highly placed personnel in the bureaucratic jungles of Washington. He knows too much. He cannot therefore be made to walk the plank or sip shellfish toxin or the quietus developed from cobra venom. On his several recent appearances before Congressional committees it has been difficult to accept his testimony at face value, but his most recent performance, before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, can be described only as inventive kidding or leg pulling.

A Presidential order was issued on November 25, 1969 that stockpiles of deadly poisons be destroyed. The purpose was to show compliance with a solemn treaty outlawing biological agents—perhaps the first genuine disarmament treaty. President Nixon clarified his order on February 14, 1970, by removing any doubt that it was intended to cover all deadly toxins, whether biological or chemical. Helms had no doubt, or so he says, that the stocks of such substances held or controlled by the CIA fell within the order and should be destroyed, and he issued an "oral" order to this effect. It was delivered to his deputy for covert operations, Thomas Karamessines, who passed it along, orally of course, to Dr. Sidney Gottlieb, then head of the CIA's Technical Services Division, who orally transmitted it to Dr. Nathan Gordon, who apparently decided on his own to store the forbidden poisons in a vault without telling his superiors—who, if they had known, might have passed word back up the chain of command to the Commander in Chief. This testimony is not only preposterous; it is artless and inherently unbelievable. Helms assured the committee that CIA employees were trained to accept oral commands as "orders written in blood" and that he therefore spurned the notion of ink and paper. Nor did it occur to him or to his deputy or to the next man in the chain of command to verify that a Presidential order of this importance had in fact been carried out. "Does anybody really believe," asks Frank

Jackman in the *New York Daily News*, "that a GS-15 government employee out at Fort Detrick, Md., took it upon himself to save that deadly shellfish toxin from destruction, in direct contravention of the orders of the President of the United States? Does anybody really believe that, in a matter of such importance, then-CIA chief Helms merely gave an oral, not a written, order to destroy these poisonous materials?" If so, the nation is in more serious trouble than it yet realizes, for the facts would show the existence of a dangerous degree of insubordination among CIA employees. Helms had kind words, in television interviews, for Gordon who, in his view, had simply yielded "on the impulse of the greater good." The suggestion, in this context, is so incredible as to be impudent. But Helms will make it stick. Nothing will happen to him. However, William Colby, his successor, is probably in trouble; he has already talked too much.

This latest insight into the workings of the intelligence bureaucracy underscores an issue of major importance: how can a Congressional committee find out for certain exactly what the CIA has done and then fix responsibility for the deed? How can a secret agency be made accountable? As Sen. Walter Mondale commented: "The situation always is something happened and nobody did it." The lack of accountability can have serious consequences. In this instance, the government has narrowly escaped being branded a treaty violator, thanks to some inventive testimony, but the other parties to the treaty will no doubt harbor continuing doubts about our good faith in such matters. A few elements in the Congress now recognize the importance of recapturing powers which were allowed to gravitate to the military and intelligence establishment during the cold-war period. House and Senate are moving to curb peacetime emergency powers and to check the use of "executive agreements" as a way to circumvent the need for disclosure that formal treaty ratification would require. But Congress has a long way to go before it manages to recapture powers which it has, over the years, negligently allowed to be pre-empted by various agencies of the military-intelligence, national-security apparatus.

THE NEW YORK DAILY NEWS
6 October 1975

We'd Know of Sneak Attacks: Colby

Washington, Oct. 5 (UPI)—CIA Director William Colby, disputing congressional critics, said today that the American people could rest assured that the nation's intelligence system would alert the government to any potential attack.

Colby appeared on TV's "Face the Nation" program as Sen. Frank Church (D-Idaho, chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, was interviewed on "issues and answers." Church said some CIA activities uncovered by his panel had been "clearly illegal."

Pike's Prediction

Colby conceded that the Central Intelligence Agency has gone wrong at times, but added: "I think we have the best intelligence in the world, and the American people can be assured that we can (alert our government of potential attack or other kinds of problems that we face." Last week, Rep. Otis Pike (D-N.Y.) predicted that the nation

would not know if an attack was about to be launched against it.

Pike said later that he thought it was "a shame" that Colby had "to go all the way back to 1962 to find a situation in which we were correct." He asked where American intelligence had been before the North Korean attack on the U.S. Navy ship Pueblo, the 1958 Tet offensive in Vietnam when leaders were "just plain shocked" by lack of information, the 1973 Yom Kippur war and the 1974 Cyprus coup.

Colby said the CIA did not "run a crystal ball," but worked in probabilities. "The easiest thing after any crisis is to find

that single report predicting it would happen," Colby said.

He did not respond directly to questions about his future as CIA director, but suggested that the fact that he still held the post could be viewed as a measure of success in dealing with opposing factions, who either want to maintain total secrecy or to make more information public about the agency's activities.

Justice Is Informed

Church, said that the Justice Department had requested and received access to all findings of his intelligence panel.

He emphasized that it would be up to the Justice Department

to decide whether there should be criminal prosecution of any CIA officials or others in connection with the inquiry.

But when asked if he felt that there had been illegal acts that might warrant criminal prosecution, he replied: "Yes, indeed."

"Opening the mail is clearly illegal," the senator said, referring to the CIA's admitted interception and inspection of letters to and from top government officials.

He said it was questionable whether plots or attempts against the lives of foreign leaders had been a violation of federal law, and that one of his committee's main recommendations would be for legislation to define clearly such activity as a criminal act.

AFRICA, London
October 1975

SPECIAL REPORTS

DID CIA KILL
LUMUMBA?

by Peter Enahoro

A decision to dispose of Lumumba need not necessarily have come from the White House. In 1961, liquidation of foreign leaders judged inimical to US interests was considered a legitimate assignment for the CIA.

There have been surprisingly few comments in the Black African press about the allegations, now being investigated by a United States Senate Committee, implicating the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in plots to assassinate foreign leaders. Among the leaders named is Patrice Lumumba, first Prime Minister of Zaire, who was murdered in 1961.

Fourteen years ago reaction to the charge would have been different, for Lumumba was the first indigenously acclaimed continent-wide political martyr in Africa. When he first began to emerge upon the political scene of the Belgian Congo (which became Zaire) he was not the fiery brand that Africa was later to know and revere. His book, *Congo, My Country*, written in 1957 and published in English by Praeger in 1962, is revealing.

Lumumba, a Stanleyville (now Kisangani) postal clerk, wrote that his purpose was "to collaborate with the Belgians whose task it is to civilise and industrialise the Congo." He expressed gratitude for the "civilising mission" of the Belgians who had saved the Congo from "blood thirsty Arabs". He was even prepared, in 1957, to accept that universal suffrage should await universal literacy, a condition which he saw as "very distant." However, this early political blueprint urged the Belgians to "avoid psychological and political errors which may make Jomo Kenyatta — leaders of revolt — out of Congolese university students." The Belgians did not exercise the counselled political foresight and Lumumba himself became a leader of revolt.

The dramatic change came in 1958, at the All African People's Conference in Accra. Lumumba met Nkrumah and was completely bowled over. On his return home he called for independence. Lumumba's Congolese National Movement was the nearest to a national party. It called for a non-federal state with executive powers in the hands of an elected President. Opposing him was Joseph Kasavubu's ABAKO party which sought a federal constitution. The ABAKO's influence was limited to the lower region of the country and Kasavubu hoped to preserve his political base under a federal political system.

But the man who really set the

ablaze was Moise Tshombe who laid a disputable claim to control of the mineral-rich south-eastern province, Katanga. Tshombe's Confederation des Associations du Katanga (CONAKAT) advocated a confederation of the Congo. At the time of independence there were 65 rival political parties in the Congo.

Lumumba became Prime Minister at the head of a coalition government. Soon after independence on June 30, 1960, Congo's undisciplined army, the Force Publique, mutinied. The Belgians who bore the brunt of the rebellion flew in paratroopers. On July 11, Katanga announced its secession and one of the bitterest and most terrible chapters in the history of post-independence Africa began to be written.

Lumumba appealed to the USA and then to the UN to help him crush Tshombe's secession and restore order, but the powerful international forces ranged against him were already at work. In the subsequent accounts immediately following the end of the first phase of the Congo's long strife, the Belgian subsidiary, Union Miniere, came to carry the blame for all the conspiracies against Lumumba. Union Miniere produced 8 per cent of the world's copper, 60 per cent of its cobalt. It also produced zinc, silver, etc. But Union Miniere was a subsidiary of the Brussels-based conglomerate, Societe Generale, which had partners such as the British-dominated Tanganyika Concessions Ltd., for example, with 14½ per cent shares in Union Miniere. And given the complex nature of international finance there was no telling where other silent partners were scattered.

Frustrated by the poor response to his appeals for help, Lumumba threatened to invite Soviet armed intervention. There were fierce arguments at the United Nations where the threat had put their backs up. Lumumba was threatening to introduce the raging storms of the Cold War into Africa!

The Prime Minister made one last-ditch diplomatic effort to patch up the split in his country. He flew to New York via Accra, and London, en route, he retracted his threat to invite armed Soviet aid, and even described the

Belgians as "our friends." On two points, however, he would not compromise: Katanga must end its secession and the Belgians must withdraw their paratroopers from Congo. He repeatedly denied that he was a Communist. Denials of this kind were necessary for world leaders who wanted to stay friends with the US, fourteen years ago.

The international atmosphere was nothing like it is today. There was no *detente*. There was no Helsinki Charter. With several African colonies rapidly achieving independence the US and the West were determined that Russia should not gain a permanent foothold in the continent. The Congo's geographical location placed it at the heart of Africa and under no circumstances would the Soviet Union be permitted to obtain a friendly base in the country from which it could then "foment trouble and spread its evil propaganda throughout the continent." Besides, the uranium for America's first atom bomb had come from Katanga's Shinkolobwe mines. It was too rich a plum to be risked to Soviet influence, not to mention control, through a friendly Lumumba.

Lumumba returned home on August 2 1960. On September 5, Kasavubu dismissed him as Prime Minister. Lumumba, the President said in his radio broadcast, had "plunged the nation into fratricidal warfare". There was now more than just Tshombe's secession. In Kasai, Albert Kalonji was claiming independence; and in Equator province, home of most of the Force Publique, Jean Bolinkago called himself President.

One and a half hours after Kasavubu sacked Lumumba, the Prime Minister went on the air to declare the "Kasavubu is no longer Chief of State." But on September 7, a session of the National Assembly declared both dismissals void. There were other manoeuvres to follow, but in the end it was Kasavubu, not Lumumba, who won the day. Lumumba was arrested and kept in custody in a military prison in Thysville. In New York the UN voted to sit Kasavubu's delegation. Lumumba's fate was sealed.

On January 17, 1961, under the eyes of UN troops who were ordered not to intervene, Lumumba was taken out of the Thysville camp, his hands tied behind

with a rope, and as the Prime Minister of the Congo was repeatedly beaten, he was taken to an aircraft and flown to Jadotville, in Katanga, to be delivered into the hands of his bitterest foe, Moïse Tshombe. On February 13, just under a month after they were flown to Katanga, Moïse Tshombe's secessionist Government announced that Lumumba and his two fellow prisoners — Youth Minister Maurice Mpolo and Senate Vice-President Joseph Okito — were dead.

"If people accuse us of killing Lumumba, I will reply 'Prove it,'" said God-froid Munungo, Katanga's Interior Minister. Munungo's tale of the circumstances of Lumumba's death was too ordinary to be funny.

The three prisoners, he said, had tunnelled their way out of their farmhouse prison with steel spikes, clubbed their guards senseless with sticks of firewood, stolen a car and headed for the Angolan border. But the car ran out of petrol after only 45 miles, the fugitives overturned the car in a ditch and began to walk the rest of the journey that would have taken them into the neighbouring Portuguese colony.

But, alas, said Munungo, they ran into the "inhabitants of a small village" who "assassinated" the three men. The action of the villagers was precipitate but "excusable" and they would receive the reward of \$8,000 placed on Lumumba's head three days earlier when the escape was announced. Munungo could not disclose the name of the village for fear of "eventual reprisals" nor would he disclose where the bodies were buried for fear of later "pilgrimages to the scene."

Reactions to Lumumba's murder were violent and deeply emotional throughout the world. Black American demonstrators stormed the Security Council session discussing the killing shouting 'Assassins!' Belgian and US embassies were ransacked by grief-stricken demonstrations in Accra, in Lagos, in New Delhi, Colombo, even in Rome, Teheran, Melbourne, and in many other capitals of the world. The Russians re-named Moscow's Friendship University after him. In the Congo itself Kasavubu described Lumumba as a "sincere patriot who got involved with bad foreigners." Several months later, a UN investigating committee concluded that Lumumba was shot the very next night after his arrival at the Jadotville jail.

Where could the CIA have come into all this? America's involvement in the Congo crisis was deep. As earlier stated, in the prevailing cold war atmosphere of the time Russian influence in Africa was being fought every inch of the way and despite Lumumba's protests he was seen

as a dangerous fellow-traveller. But if the CIA had anything to do with Lumumba's death the clue to why this final solution was chosen may be found in what the late UN Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjöld, said of the Prime Minister. Lumumba, he said, commanded "a position in wide sections of the public which would make any solution arrived at without him unworkable." That recognition could also have been a sentence of death.

Lumumba had refused to yield on his constitutional position. He had insisted that the Belgians should withdraw their troops and that Katanga's secession must end. Meanwhile, the Congo crisis had created another intolerable international condition. The very existence of the UN was threatened. Russia had seized on the crisis to put forward its demand that there should be three Secretary-Generals of the UN — one representing the West, one representing the Communist bloc, and one to represent the Third World. The "troika" proposal was being pushed while the current of emotion swirled around the US's role in the Congo crisis and the apparent ineffectiveness of Swedish-born Dag Hammarskjöld.

The risks to the UN, to Africa, and to the Congo, were too much, just because out there in the heart of Africa there was this ex-postal worker, who was once convicted of embezzling postal funds, who now commanded a position in wide sections of the public and without whose consent any solution arrived at to end the Congo crisis would be unworkable. Lumumba's life would have seemed to conscientious CIA agents a small price to pay to end this international deadlock.

At that time also it may not have been necessary for the CIA agents to obtain approval for their action from the appropriate Government source in Washington. For one of the questions which Senator Frank Church's Senate Committee seeks to answer is to what extent the CIA acted independently of Government. Originally established as America's secret service designed strictly to further the US intelligence service abroad, the story now is that the CIA became a law unto itself, so much so that it even began to spy on Americans at home, including leading political figures. A decision to dispose of Lumumba need not necessarily have come from the White House, and in 1961, liquidation of foreign leaders judged inimical to US interests was considered a legitimate assignment for the CIA.

After the murder, Moïse Tshombe commented: "The fuss over this evil man will soon die down. The people have no memories here. *C'est fini*." But Tshombe was wrong again. Today,

fourteen years after his death, the ghost of Lumumba still haunts the conscience of his country. Recently, four White students were kidnapped from an animal study camp in Tanzania and taken into Zaire. The kidnappers wanted to draw attention to their long guerrilla war against President Mobutu Sese Seko's central Government. Mobutu was commander of the army when Lumumba was sent to Jadotville.

Mobutu wrote to his newspaper in June this year that the United States had tried to have him assassinated. There were demonstrations in Kinshasa in support of the President and another loyal Kinshasa newspaper gave the juicy detail that the plot was the work of CIA brain power. It is of course not hard to imagine that there was a plot to murder Mobutu. One would have thought that plots against his life were fairly frequent.

President Mobutu has been continuously in power since 1965. He first tasted power when he briefly sacked both Lumumba and Kasavubu. Even later, after he became President, Mobutu did a fair bit of head plucking himself to put certain opponents permanently out of circulation. People tend to have stubborn and vengeful memories about such things. All of which means that there must be quite a few Zaireans around who do not necessarily pray for Mobutu's safety when they go to bed at night. But if President Mobutu says that it is the CIA which planned to murder him, perhaps, he, more than any other leader alive today in Zaire, should know.

Tshombe himself went to suffer both adulation and humiliation. He became the Congo's Premier after the defeat of Katanga's secession. But when he tried to lead his country's delegation to the OAU Summit in Cairo in 1964 he was put under house arrest. He brought in his favoured White mercenaries again to put down the continued rebellions against the central government, but he was deposed and while in exile in Spain he was sentenced to death for high treason by a military court in Kinshasa.

There were always stories that Tshombe was planning to return at the rear of an invading White mercenary force. On June 30, 1967, seven years to the day of Congo's independence, Tshombe's charter flight was plucked out of the skies and forced to land in Algeria. There, in an undisclosed prison hospital, he died of heart failure on June 29, 1969, on the eve of the second anniversary of his detention. Tshombe was 49. His body lies buried at the Protestant Church of Chainp-de-Mars in Belgium, and thus has the grave in a foreign land written its own epitaph to Moïse Tshombe's career.

The Washington Star

Saturday, October 4, 1975

Helms Confirms Roles**CIA Death Targets:
Lamumba and Castro**By Norman Kempster
Washington Star Staff Writer

A member of the Senate Intelligence Committee said yesterday former CIA Director Richard Helms confirmed during secret hearings that the agency attempted to murder Cuban Premier Fidel Castro and developed a "capability" for killing Congo Premier Patrice Lumumba.

But the senator, Walter F. Mondale, D-Minn., said that attempting to establish the lines of responsibility for the assassination plans was "like nailing jello to the wall."

The committee conducted more than three months of secret meetings on the assassination issue. Chairman Frank Church, D-Idaho, has said a report on the matter will be made public within the next several weeks.

Although CIA plots against Castro's life have been well documented, Mondale's speech apparently marked the first time a member of the committee has said that Helms had confirmed the agency's activities. In public Helms has heatedly denied that the CIA ever tried to use assassination as an instrument of foreign policy.

THERE HAVE been frequent reports that the CIA considered killing Lumumba — who was assassinated apparently by other enemies — but Mondale's account is the most authoritative.

In a speech prepared for delivery at Denison University in Granville, Ohio, Mondale suggested that the secretary of state should be made directly responsible for all secret intelligence activities. The director of central intelligence, he said, should be limited to the task of analyzing information and supervising "technical" devices such as spy satellites.

"In the case of assassination, former director of the CIA, Richard Helms, and Richard Bissell, former deputy director for operation (covert activity), both have claimed that they had 'higher level' authorization for the attempts on Castro, for developing capabilities against Lumumba, and for setting up and running an institutionalized assassination capability within the CIA called 'executive action,'" Mondale said.

"BUT WHEN WE pressed them, neither Helms nor Bissell would say that any president, or anyone representing a president, ever gave specific orders to undertake an assassination or develop assassination plans and capabilities," he said.

But Mondale seemed reluctant to embrace the theory — popular among some liberal Democrats — that the plots, hatched during the Kennedy administration, were without White House approval.

"The truth is that the system is designed so that it is too often impossible to ascertain the truth," Mondale said. "The truth is that the system is unacceptable."

To make sure that the buck can always be made to stop somewhere, Mondale suggested legislation to move responsibility for covert activities from the CIA to the secretary of state.

The covert category includes both undercover intelligence gathering — the usual meaning of the word spying — and clandestine attempts to undermine foreign governments.

"A NEW CABINET-level body, chaired by the secretary of state, should sign off on all our clandestine activities abroad, including intelligence and counterintelligence, which at present receive no systematic high-level review," Mondale

said.

Mondale also said the U.S. ambassador to a nation should be given responsibility for intelligence activities in that country. At the present time, ambassadors often are kept in the dark about CIA programs.

"Some might argue that there are certain ambassadors who can't be trusted with this kind of information," Mondale said. "Well, my view is that maybe this will lead to a better class of ambassadors and end the practice of using our overseas posts for political pay-offs."

Mondale also said Congress should approve specific charters for all intelligence agencies. He said the agencies should be prohibited from undertaking tasks not spelled out by the charter with criminal penalties for violations.

Most current CIA operations are justified by a catch-all authorization to

perform tasks assigned by the National Security Council.

Mondale insisted that his plan was not intended to smother the CIA.

"In today's world it clearly is necessary for us to collect intelligence abroad, to analyze it carefully, and to make it available to our senior policy makers," Mondale said.

But he said present CIA operations sometime cross the line between intelligence and the creation of foreign policy.

"THE RESORT to clandestine instruments of manipulation, coercion and interference in the affairs of other countries may have been essential to our security at one time," he said. "But over the years it has become increasingly marginal. Today we find it has damaged our credibility, tarnished our prestige and undermined our power in the world."

"CIA support for the most odious dictatorships and 'destabilizing' efforts aimed at democratic governments have undermined popular American support for our involvement in foreign affairs," he said. "If that is what is meant by shouldering world responsibilities, many Americans would rather not."

NEW YORK TIMES
10 October 1975**Senate Unit Gets Details
On C.I.A. Lumumba Plot**

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 9—A former Central Intelligence Agency biochemist gave the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence today important details on a plot to poison Patrice Lumumba, the first Premier of the Republic of the Congo (now Zaire), according to the committee chairman.

Senator Frank Church, an Idaho Democrat who heads the committee, said he had important information on several cases, including one involving Mr. Lumumba.

Today's testimony came from Dr. Sidney Gottlieb, until 1973 chief of the agency's super-secret technical services division that produced equipment for covert operations. He testified for more than four hours in a closed session of the committee.

Testimony Called Useful

Later, Mr. Church to discuss Dr. Gottlieb's testimony in detail. According to authoritative intelligence sources, quoted in earlier press accounts, the agency once plotted to kill Mr. Lumumba with a poison substance. Mr. Lumumba later died in a coup.

Mr. Church said that Dr.

Gottlieb's testimony would be useful as the committee drew together its report on the agency's involvement in plots and attempts to kill foreign leaders.

He said a subcommittee was now preparing a final draft of the report and that it might be delivered to the full committee by mid-October.

On another matter, Mr. Church said that Attorney General Edward H. Levi asked the committee not to conduct open hearings on the National Security Agency on grounds

"other than" national security alone. The implication, according to several observers, was that Mr. Levi might have warned the committee that the Department of Justice was conducting an active investigation of security agency's activities.

Mr. Church confirmed press reports that President Ford had called him and asked him to give Mr. Levi a chance to come before the committee and plead the case for not having public sessions on the security agency.

Mr. Church said he believed the committee could conduct the hearings without compromising the needs for secrecy set out by the Attorney General. A subcommittee of the Senate group is now studying whether public hearings should be held.

U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
13 October 1975

Word leaking out of closed sessions of the CIA investigation in Congress is that there's widespread low morale in the Agency, a wave of retirements and hard going in getting recruits with specialized skills.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, SUNDAY, OCTOBER 5, 1975

C.I.A. Assassination Unit Described

WASHINGTON, Oct. 3 (AP) — The Central Intelligence Agency established an official group during the early nineteen-sixties to develop plans for removing foreign leaders by means that included assassination, two Senators and two former intelligence officials said Friday.

Senator Frank Church, chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence, confirmed the existence of the group, but he said that the plans it developed were never carried out. A member of the committee staff said that the group "petered out" in 1963.

There was no evidence that President Kennedy, who was in office at the time, knew of or approved of the group.

Mr. Church, an Idaho Democrat, refused to provide details about the unit, but he made it clear that the plans it developed were separate from the C.I.A.'s alleged plot to poison Premier Fidel Castro of Cuba in 1961 in connection with the Bay of Pigs invasion.

"This capability had no connection with the Castro business," Senator Church said. "It was a separate mission." He said that other details should not be made public until the committee releases its report on alleged C.I.A. assassination plots. The report is expected to be made public this month.

A former high official of the intelligence agency, who de-

clined to be identified, acknowledged in an interview the existence of an "executive action" group that probably included no more than three persons. He said that they developed methods for the removal of unfriendly foreign leaders. He said that in addition to assassination, the means could have included coups or shipping foreign leaders "off to the Riviera."

A second former C.I.A. official said the planning effort had begun in the wake of the alleged attempt to poison Premier Castro and was intended to maintain an "assassination capability" in case it was needed for use against other foreign leaders.

The first hint of the group's existence came in the prepared text of a speech by Senator Walter F. Mondale, the Minnesota Democrat, at Denison College in Granville, Ohio.

In that speech, Senator Mondale, a member of the intelligence committee, said that Richard M. Helms, a former C.I.A. director, and Richard Bissell, a former head of the agency's clandestine operations, "have claimed that they had 'higher-level' authorization . . . for setting up and running an institutionalized assassination capability within the C.I.A. called 'executive action.'"

But, Mr. Mondale said, "when we pressed them, neither Helms nor Bissell would say that any

president, or anyone representing a president ever gave specific orders to undertake an assassination or develop assassination plans and capabilities."

Neither Mr. Helms, now the United States Ambassador to Iran, nor Mr. Bissell, now a business consultant in Hartford, Conn., could be reached immediately for comment.

David Aaron, a member of the intelligence committee's staff who was traveling with Mr. Mondale, confirmed the accuracy of the text of the Senator's speech.

Mr. Aaron identified the head of the alleged planning group as William K. Harvey, whose name has also figured in press

accounts of C.I.A. plots against Premier Castro.

Mr. Harvey, now a lawyer in Indianapolis, has repeatedly declined to comment on reports about his role in assassination plots.

Mr. Aaron said the planning group "existed for 'two or three years'" and "petered out" sometime in 1963, when Mr. Harvey was transferred to the C.I.A. station in Rome.

The former high official in the intelligence agency said: "In the early days of the Kennedy Administration, there was a request made that the C.I.A. develop an 'executive action' plan." He said he did not know where the request had originated, but suggested that the group was set up before the alleged plot against Premier Castro.

WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
15 OCTOBER 1975

SIC TRANSIT JUST ABOUT EVERYTHING . . . Ear hears that Mitchell Rogovan, Washington hotshot legal eagle now representing the CIA, got a shock the other day. In spite of his years of uncomplaining toil for Uncle Sam for these many years, his name turned up on the 8,000-name IRS enemies list. It was a double shock, Earwigs: Rogovan was once, in the long-ago LBJ era, special assistant to the IRS commissioner. So, sadly, he sent a little note to the present IRS commissioner, Don Alexander: "Say it ain't so." It's so, Mitch,

CIA to assist in one such plot.

Senator Church appeared to dispute a statement made during another television interview yesterday by William E. Colby, director of the CIA, who contended that no agency employee is likely to be convicted of a crime.

Mr. Colby based that opinion on grounds that when CIA employees made admitted mistakes, they made them "in the belief that these actions were right, that there was justification in law for what they did."

Senator Church noted that the Justice Department is now "examining very carefully" the massive evidence gathered by the Senate committee on CIA activities. He suggested that while the congressional committee has no prosecutorial power, the Justice Department does and might take a different position.

Mr. Colby defended the CIA from those who recently criticized the agency for intelligence failures preceding the 1973 Arab-Israeli war and regarding North Vietnamese strength during the Tet offensive.

The director suggested that it be kept in mind that the CIA did not "operate a crystal ball." The agency, he said, tried to improve government understanding of contributory factors in a situation, and tried to analyze the contents of various reports it received. But the CIA did not, he emphasized make predictions.

BALTIMORE SUN
6 October 1975

Castro murder plots spanned three presidents, Church says

By MURIEL DOBBIN
Washington Bureau of The Sun
Washington—Senator Frank Church said yesterday that the Senate intelligence committee has evidence that CIA attempts to assassinate Cuban Premier Fidel Castro stretched through three administrations; but that it still has no hard evidence of presidential orders for such a murder plot.

Senator Church (D., Idaho), the chairman of the Senate's Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, said on ABC's Issues and Answers program that Richard M. Helms, former director of the Central Intelligence Agency, now ambassador to Iran, had confirmed to congressional investigators the extent of the plots against Premier Castro.

"These 'plans and attempts,'" said Senator Church, had begun in the Eisenhower administration, continued through the Kennedy administration and ended during the Johnson administration.

He admitted that despite the

"detailed and thorough" efforts of the committee, the question of responsibility in such plots was still unclear.

"We have no hard evidence directly relating this activity to any order by any president," said Mr. Church.

The Senate committee report on political assassination is due to be issued this month and, according to the chairman, it will "lay out all the evidence in detail for the American people."

Senator Church conceded that the idea that a president would have been unaware of such plans, "strains credibility."

But he said that much of the evidence that had been uncovered during the committee's investigation strained credibility.

"This is what this investigation was all about—to find out why command and control were so loose in the intelligence community," declared the senator.

He added that the evidence indicated that there were times when even the CIA director was unaware of all the activities

that were being carried out by the agency.

Senator Church referred to the committee's discoveries that the CIA had maintained an illegal stockpile of lethal toxins against presidential orders, and to the agency's maintenance of an illegal mail-opening plan.

The chairman said he concurred with a recent statement made by Senator Walter F. Mondale (D., Minn.), a member of the intelligence committee, that trying to establish lines of responsibility for assassination plots was "like nailing jello to the wall."

Any leak of information has been relatively unusual on the Senate intelligence panel, but Senator Mondale disclosed in a speech last week, that the committee had received confirmation from Mr. Helms that the CIA had tried to kill Premier Castro, and had developed a "capability" for killing Congo Premier Patrice Lumumba.

There have been considerable documentation of attempts on Premier Castro's life, including testimony that Mafia

THE WASHINGTON TIMES
26 Sept. - 9 Oct. 1975
Washington, D. C.

Candid of the CIA:

Still Under- exposed

Robert L. Borosage has been the head of the Center for National Security Studies since it began last September. He does not advocate an end to the CIA, but merely to its covert activities. The Center is an independent research group organized to educate the public in the abuses that have been and are still being committed in the name of national security. It is supported through grants from the Stern Foundation, the Abelson Foundation, and the Veatch Committee. The following article was edited from an interview with Borosage by Richard Cowington.

What we saw in Watergate and in Vietnam was that over the last 25 years since World War II, a series of Presidents, both Democratic and Republican, have developed the notion that in national security matters or what they define to be national security matters, they can pretty much do what they will, through various executive agencies, in secret, without really either informing the Congress or the people. And certainly without restraints by the Congress or the people. And for the most part of the 25 years, the Presidents essentially did these activities without fanfare, without claiming the right to them—they just went ahead and did them.

So the Center's concern is to look at presidential prerogative and these claims of national security—look at the abuses that are connected with them and try to set up a series of guidelines that will bring the Presidency back into the boundaries of the Constitution—back into checks and balances.

The first areas of focus have been on the intelligence community. The flood of revelations about the CIA, FBI and the National Security Agency, and military intelligence

has revealed that each of these agencies have committed illegal acts or abused their authority and committed surveillance of American citizens which they were really not authorized to do. And kind of lost in the flood of specifics that the CIA contracted with the Mafia, or gave LSD to a citizen and killed him, or series of specifics are the themes that are clear from what we now know.

The themes in my view, are kind of the following: One is that, for the most part, the illegal activities of the military intelligence groups spying on Americans of NSA, of the CIA and of the FBI were not isolated instances of an agent going berserk and exceeding his powers and overreacting to a situation and committing an illegal act. But rather, the extraordinary thing is that they were all full-fledged illegal programs—programs designed by either high level officials in the bureaucracy or by the President himself. So that middle and low level officials, although they're instruments of illegality, are not the cause of it.

They weren't isolated reactions to events, they weren't aberrations, they were ongoing bureaucratic programs. So, for instance, military intelligence went from 1967 to 1972 or '73 when they were stopped, and their files included over 200,000 names of American citizens. The CIA—for 22 years that no one knew about—illegally opened the mail of American citizens, against a specific statutory law.

It's not clear that Presidents knew about all this. It's clear that all the CIA Directors knew about it, all the Post Office Directors knew about it, and I suspect the Forty Committee (CIA's executive review) knew about it. It's not clear, really, what was told the President in any of this stuff. We know that Johnson, for instance, ordered all the intelligence committees to focus on domestic dissent around '65-'67, and they all geared up programs to meet the presidential wish. But it's not clear what a President really knows in terms of what comes back to him about what's really being done. That's one theme—that these are not isolated instances, but ongoing programs of illegal activities in each of the intelligence communities.

The second theme goes to the question of control. Church has said that the CIA was a rogue elephant thrashing around in the jungle on its own. But what's clear is that all of the formal controls don't work or haven't worked. That is, legislative oversight was always something of a myth because congressmen didn't want to oversee the intelligence community. But even in those instances where they tried, it didn't work, because the intelligence officials were thoroughly prepared to lie or to not appear before Congress if necessary. So when Ervin, for instance, went after military intelligence and really set out to stop the program with a bill that said they could not spy any longer on citizens, his attempt was thoroughly frustrated. First of all, he could never find out who ordered the program because the two commanding generals refused to appear before his committee, and the Nixon Administration said that they were protected by executive privilege.

Secondly, Ervin got a promise from the defense department that all the documents would be destroyed, that all the computer files would be destroyed. Just this year we discovered that the lists and the names went out to 23 federal agencies before destruction. It came out about two months ago, the revelations. So, legislative

hasn't worked even when the overseers wanted to oversee it. Now in the case of the CIA, Congress never wanted to find out anything. They only met once a year. They didn't even know the CIA was carrying on a secret war with 100,000 people in Laos. But that was more a question of will. But even when you have the will, when legislators want something to stop, they can't stop it if the military or if the bureaucracy, the secret bureaucracies want to keep it going.

The second thing is the Executive. The internal oversight mechanisms of the different bureaucracies don't work, so that the CIA has an inspector general who supposedly has access to all documents in the agency and all programs and inspects any violations or abuses. So the CIA in 1957 starts this drug program, testing LSD on unwitting people. In the first year of the program, a guy is given LSD and dies. The inspector general of the CIA, that is, their own internal inspectors organization, doesn't find out about it until 1967—ten years later—with the drug program continuing for that ten years without stop. It goes on for four more years under more restrictive guidelines, before it's finally ended because of the fear of the upcoming investigations.

One of the results of the inspector general's work in the CIA is that when Colby became the director, he limited the I.G.'s authority to investigate CIA programs. Because, although the inspector general's office had found out little, it had found out too much. He wanted that to end. So, the first thing Colby did was limit the office and transfer some of its men to other divisions.

So the other thing that's interesting about each of the intelligence agencies, is that all of them have very unclear charters—legislative and executive charters.

The executive charters are still secret. We really don't know their internal directives. But the legislative charters of the FBI, CIA and military intelligence are very vague, very broad and sometimes non-existent. The programs have all grown up through bureaucratic accretion, so that you find that all of them when asked, "What's your authority for this?" refer back to some slim clause in a legislative charter, which they have totally exceeded.

The other thing that's interesting about each of the programs is how all of them have come to public attention. It's not because the directors have reported them to the President, and the President reported them to the Congress or the people, not because the legislative overseers have reported them to the people, but because middle level officials or low level officials in the bureaucracies, who have some pride in their real work—the intelligence work—get queasy or turned off by the ongoing illegal activities and finally either go public or leak them to Seymour Hirsch or Christopher Pyle. So military intelligence becomes public when Chris Pyle, a former military intelligence agent, starts writing articles on what the military is doing toward American citizens.

The CIA's domestic stuff gets revealed when middle level CIA officials tell the story to Sy Hirsch. The CIA overseas activities are detailed by Marchetti and Agee who leave the bureaucracy to talk about what they've done and report on it and for that Marchetti gets his book censored and himself under a permanent injunction to have all his writings approved by CIA. Agee's afraid to return to the country—he thinks he's going to jail at this point anyway.

the only way the programs become public is by the low level officials leaking them or going public themselves and writing about them. The interesting thing about the reaction of Colby to all of the exposes about the CIA is that both Colby and the Rockefeller Report have always called only for one piece of legislation. That one piece of legislation is an official secrets act to make it a crime for middle or low level officials to leak any information about the bureaucracy or to go public about the information and write about it. And so the one lesson that the Rockefeller Commission takes from the revelations is that you've got to stop the revelations. And the one thing they call on Congress to do to reform the intelligence community after all that has come out, is to pass an official secrets act so that now the information won't leak out.

So now, at this point, the revelations have produced the congressional investigations. The congressional investigations are going to be limited. The House has been, as you know, in confusion from the beginning. First there was the fight between Harrington and Nedzi. Then Harrington and Nedzi left the committee, and Oris Pike has taken over the committee. The House has this position—they're going to do a report by December, when their charter ends. They don't want to extend it. To do a report by December you've got to start writing it by about the middle of November at the latest. They haven't started their hearings until now, they had no staff until the middle of August, so it takes them two months to get a staff together—that's August to September to October. They have one month of actual staff time working and in November, they have to start writing their report.

So their statement right off the top is: we're going to go for a joint oversight committee. That's the legislation we want and what we're going to do is hold hearings which prove the need for more oversight. They've done some good things in their short tenure. Pike issued the first subpoena of any of the committees, and he seems to be ready to force the intelligence agencies to give him the material, and that's very different from the Church committee. So he's been good in that. The point is, that they just don't have the time or the staff to do anything extensive in terms of investigation. So all they're going to do is have some kind of brief moments in the sun, expose a few things in addition to what we know, and call for joint oversight.

The Senate Committee, which has worked harder, has a better staff, has gone on longer, will go on longer—at least until February 29th—and is doing the assassination report, a study of Chile, and a study of some of the more interesting areas in the intelligence community, is being held back by a couple things. One is that Church is clearly, according to everyone I talk to up here on Capitol Hill, concerned about not discrediting the Kennedys. And to talk, for instance, about the assassination programs of the CIA gets you right into the Kennedy vendetta against Castro. Church doesn't want to take this on. He understands the national myth about the Kennedys and doesn't want to expose them.

The second thing is that Church is very close to Secretary Kissinger, so that when Kissinger says he needs covert action to give the President the necessary flexibility to run a foreign policy, Church, although his public postures are very good, doesn't really disagree with him. So what the Senate Committee is going to come out with is a report on covert action which says essentially we've done too much of it, and we've done too many extensive things and it's

also need joint oversight in the Congress. Now the executive, Colby for instance, claims that CIA has never taken on a covert action abroad that wasn't in the national interest, and wasn't for purposes of national security. So for them, that kind of language is no different from what they've been doing. So what I expect to come out of the investigations is more facts. We'll learn more about what the intelligence communities have done than we know now, not much more, but we'll learn something, and both the House and the Senate will come out for a joint oversight committee.

A call for joint oversight is a perfect solution for the Congress because it does a number of things. One is it looks like they're making a substantial recommendation. Second, they don't have to tackle any hard problems. It doesn't offend anyone to have joint oversight, not even Colby. It looks like they're doing something, when in fact, they're not. The third thing is that it announces to the public that Congress is going to continue to monitor these agencies so it provides the public with an image of an active Congress, so for that it's a very seductive concept to legislators. The great irony here is that the Congress gets a better seat backstage. But the result is that Congress legitimates activities that it can't control. So it will always learn about covert activities either after they occur, because they have to remain covert. Or they will learn about them even before, but in such a context that it has no independent source of information so that it can say that you shouldn't do this. And so it becomes a legitimating instrument for the executive. So in the future when we learn that the United States has covertly destabilized a democratically elected government abroad, the president, instead of saying the Forty Committee did it, I authorize it and I'm going to continue to do it, will be able to say, the Forty Committee did it and was approved by the joint oversight committee of the Congress.

The other thing is that the legislators all face what is now known as the Harrington problem. When you get classified information from the executive, it is under the condition that you not tell it to anybody. So Lucien Nedzi knew about the assassination attempts and didn't tell anybody; knew about the domestic operations, were not sure they were ended, and didn't tell anybody; knew about Chile, wasn't sure that it was going to go on anymore, and didn't tell anybody, and that's called oversight. The result is that they can continue to do activities that they either admit or don't admit are illegal, or improper, inform the Congress, and the Congress cannot inform the citizens. The oversight increasingly represents, not the citizenry, but the executive agencies that it's supposedly overseeing.

So I'm not very hopeful at this point about that process. Now, there is an alternative. That is, Ralph Nader, in operating against or in monitoring the social service agencies, has increasingly started to come to the conclusion that the only way to control bureaucracies is through personal liability of bureaucrats, both criminal liability through the statutory law and civil liability. Increasingly there is a move to do two or three things that may make a difference. One is to try to promulgate criminal codes of personal responsibility for bureaucrats in the national security agencies so that it's plainly illegal for the CIA to surveil any American citizen. Any agent that gets that order from his superior, knows that he is personally criminally responsible if he carries out that order. And

if you can set up some kind of an independent federal prosecutor for national security agencies, you can then enforce that kind of criminal liability in a way that will have a deterrent effect on officials.

The other thing you can do is: set up a code that gives that lower level official the right to take an order that he thinks is illegal or improper and go either to a Congressman or to a federal prosecutor to get a review on that order. At present, middle level officials when they get an illegal order from their superior, are caught within the secrecy system. They can't object outside the bureaucracy now and don't have any personal responsibility that would give them an incentive to object and cause trouble for their superior.

Now whether or not you can get Congress to set up that kind of an apparatus at this point is doubtful. That depends a lot more on whether the country as a whole gets concerned about the revelations or whether the debate is limited to Washington. And although there's been a flood of revelations, there hasn't been much public discussion about what they mean or alternative ways of controlling these agencies.

I mean I think the CIA is one of the more un-American institutions in the country. That is, it's secret, it's imperial, it's involved all over the world, it is more foreign to Americans and their ideas of how the country ought to be run and what the country is about than the Communist party. It engages in all the classic activities that they accuse the Communist party of. It subverts organizations, it infiltrates informers, it murders, poisons, does economic sabotage. All the things that we have all along learned that the Soviet Union was engaged in, our CIA is engaged in. If you actually could go out and say to the American people, "what about all these activities, do you want them to go on?" you'd get an overwhelming response saying no. But I don't think that there's any mobilized sentiment at this point saying this has got to stop, this has to be limited, we're not going to put up with it anymore. After the reports on the Chilean coup, after it was reported that the CIA had brought down the government of Salvador Allende, there was a poll done, by Lou Harris on some 1,000 people. Some 60 to 75% said that the CIA should not have overthrown the Allende government. And some 65% also said the CIA was doing a fine job. So I think that the national image of the CIA as an intelligence collection agency that protects America from a future Pearl Harbor is very hard to overcome. And while all of us would agree that we ought to have intelligence and ought to have protection against any surprise attack, making people understand that there is a difference between that and the kinds of activities that the CIA has been involved in is difficult. You get conflicting stories.

A provision in the agency's 1947 charter stated that the CIA shall have no domestic, internal security, law enforcement, or police functions. This came out of a fear of a domestic gestapo that was running high in early post-Hitler years. Yet in spite of that, two years later the CIA began its mail opening campaign against American citizens, and that expanded in 1967 to extensive file keeping and surveillance of American citizens. And the Agency's argument is that all this was legal because what they were really looking for was the foreign connections of domestic protestors, or foreign intelligence information in the mail of American citizens. And so once again you have, in this case, a very clear provision in the legislative charter that you're not to do

this absolutely ignored by the kind of growing bureaucratic programs justified under a different provision.

The budget of the CIA is secret. Only about eight congressmen and eight senators see the figures, even now. And they spend about an hour on the intelligence community budget which includes the CIA, the NSA, all the military intelligence agencies. We know this because we talked to the staff aides about their budgeting review process. You know, because it's a subcommittee of the Armed Forces Committee and of the Appropriations Committee, those two subcommittees oversee the intelligence committees' budgets. But they are faced with the mammoth budgets of the military which take up their attention and also attract public debate. Naturally the intelligence community budgets, which are not that big—six billion dollars compared to a hundred billion, and not public, so they don't attract public concern—don't get reviewed to any great extent.

The Center definitely thinks that the charter of any agency, that is, those secret executive orders, be made public and that the budgets also become public. The secret budget of the CIA and other intelligence activities is a direct flagrant violation of the Constitution. It was litigated to the Supreme Court, and an appellate court found it a flagrant violation. The Supreme Court, on appeal, threw the case out, claiming that a taxpayer didn't have standing to bring a suit and it did not make any decision on the merits of whether or not it was illegal. We're trying to bring the case now under the Freedom of Information Act demanding a copy of the budget.

Colby has been claiming, and Ford, both claim that the CIA has been doing nothing around the world lately, in terms of covert action, not intelligence, because they have this new reporting function, where they have

to report it to the Senate and House committees. They say that if the president has to report covert operations to those committees it becomes public, and so they just can't do anything. So they claim, for instance, that in Portugal the CIA has been totally inactive. In fact, I think that that's probably untrue, that the Agency has had its agents in place and they've continued the kind of day to day activities that Agee writes about in his book where they really control; you know, the bribe infrastructure of third world countries, in various places. And I think what they haven't done is mounted huge programs. I suspect that they had some kind of a program in Portugal to get money for people that we supported, but I don't think they've mounted the kind of program they mounted in Chile for instance or the kind of program they mounted in Laos while the war was going on.

Agee has written an article, an open letter to the press which stated what he considered to be the CIA's activities in Portugal. And he's been in London and in fairly close touch with people in Portugal. He said that the mission, our Embassy in London, had expanded twofold, I think, since the events had taken place. And it was his theory that a lot of those people were CIA agents. He thinks that we've been putting in money to the social democrats and arms to get at the right wing in Portugal. I haven't seen any proof that I can say that that is true. The interesting thing about the Ambassador to Portugal, Carlucci, is that he was kicked out of Zaire for allegedly being a CIA agent when he was Chief of Mission there. Michael Harrington did go to the Senate and laid out the record of Carlucci but they didn't ask those questions. They didn't want to know.

See we don't know really what happens at the low levels, but it is very clear that CIA

agents use multinational corporations as cover abroad. John McCloy comes from the board of directors of ITT to Henry Kissinger and says we want to give you a million dollars to run CIA operations in Chile, to overthrow Allende. Kissinger does not report this as a bribe, he sends him to William Brody, who is the head of CIA clandestine services for the western hemisphere. Brody says, well, we're not ready to do that yet, we're developing our own plans. I'll be in touch. And eventually the kind of coordination of multinational policy, American economic policy towards Chile, and the covert operations of the CIA was done through kind of close contact, I'm sure, with the directors of multinational corporations concerned.

Miles Coplan, who makes his living as kind of a PR flack for the agency, has written a book called "With Cloak and Dagger," and in it he says that, in the future, the CIA will increasingly relate closely to multinational corporations, both for cover and because they have a mutuality of interests.

If you want to operate in the grand manner around the world, if you want to maintain America as the world policeman, as meddling in societies throughout the world, then you probably want to have a CIA to do something about it. You certainly want to be able to do it in secret. So it's tough unless politicians become willing to challenge the basic assumption of America as the great imperium. Still, Church will campaign, as will every presidential candidate, I'm sure, on the intelligence committee as being irresponsible and claim it's not going to happen in the future. No more assassination; we'll have congressional oversight. People will accept that the same mistakes won't happen anymore, when in fact that'll be a myth.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
24 September 1975
Roscoe Drummond

The CIA isn't all bad

Washington

Someone ought to say a few kind words in behalf of the CIA—I'm willing.

This doesn't mean justifying any of its improper, illegal, or unauthorized actions during the Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon administrations. Congress has good reason to investigate the operation, management, and oversight of the Central Intelligence Agency. It is all to the good that it is doing so.

But it does need to be understood that it is impossible for the agency to put its publicized failures and shortcomings into perspective since its significant successes cannot be publicized. Intelligence gathering has to be a secret operation and its defenders cannot publicize work well done without impairing its future effectiveness.

The first president of the United States warned his chief of intelligence that "secrecy is essential," and President Truman put truth with characteristic directness 175 years later:

"It matters not to the United States," he said, "whether its secrets become known through publication in the media or through the activities of spies. The damage to the United States is the same in both cases. I, for one, do not believe that the best interests of our country are served by going on the principle that everybody has the right to know everything."

The congressional investigators are certainly not setting out intentionally to destroy the intelligence arm of the American Government.

The point I am making is that the congressional investigations, which are truly needed, may do so unintentionally by the recklessness and carelessness of some of the committee, or by irresponsible leaks.

It is beginning to happen.

Rep. Michael Harrington (D) of Massachusetts was given access to classified CIA documents which Congress itself had decided should not be made public. Harrington violated his written oath by making parts of them public. Thus a single member of Congress declassified intelligence information which Congress was holding as classified. When Congress cannot compel obedience to its own rules by its own members, no wonder the President is reluctant to turn over highly secret material to it.

The House Intelligence Investigating Com-

mittee under the chairmanship of Rep. Otis Pike (D) of New York asked President Ford to turn over certain classified CIA information. He did so. The committee then made public, over the earnest objections of the White House, phrases from those documents which disclosed that the U.S. had penetrated the communications of two important nations. Through this congressional publicity, these two countries now know that they must alter the communications security.

Helpful to them but not to the U.S.

Frank Church, chairman of the Senate's CIA investigation, stated that its inquiry into covert intelligence matters would be secret in the interest of not impairing its U.S. intelligence operations. Whereupon, a member of his committee or a member of its staff started to leak the testimony it was taking.

One headline read: "Senators Hear CIA Sent Poison to Kill Lumumba." There was no attributed source for the story since the source did not dare identify himself. There was no indication whether the testimony had been rebutted. In any event it is always difficult for rebuttal to catch up with fleet and alluring rumors.

The CIA has a duty to handle itself better than it has in the past. But hasn't Congress a duty to handle its investigation of the CIA better than it has so far?

THE NEW YORK TIMES, THURSDAY, OCTOBER 2, 1975

House Rejects, 267-147, Move to Disclose C.I.A. Budget to

the Public

By DAVID E. ROSENBAUM
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 1—The House of Representatives decided overwhelmingly today to continue to keep the budget of the Central Intelligence Agency secret from the public.

By a vote of 267 to 147, the House rejected an amendment to a \$112-billion military appropriation bill that would have permitted the total expenditures of the intelligence agency to be published for the first time.

The House also defeated an attempt to delete from the bill money for the development of the controversial F-18 fighter aircraft.

Final passage of the over-all measure was put off until tomorrow.

The bill would reduce the Ford Administration's request for military programs in the fiscal year that began July 1 by 7.6-billion. However, more than \$2-billion of that reduction involves requested money for the Indochina War and for shipbuilding contracts that have been deferred since the budget was sent to Congress.

The Senate Appropriations Committee is expected to re-

store some of the cuts made by the House.

Representative Robert N. Giaino, Democrat of Connecticut, who led the effort to publish the C.I.A. budget, said the rejection of his amendment showed that the House was not ready "to assume the responsibility" for overseeing the activities of the intelligence community.

Since the creation of the C.I.A., Congress has kept the agency's budget secret by concealing the figure in the appropriation for other agencies. This year, according to Mr. Giaino, the appropriation for the intelligence agency is part of a \$2-billion line-item in the budget described as "other procurement, Air Force."

Publication of the intelligence agency's budget was one of the principal recommendations of the Presidential commission headed by Vice President Rockefeller that investigated the C.I.A. earlier this year.

Until this year, the budget request of the agency and the amount eventually appropriated was known only to a handful of Congressmen.

This year, however, under pressure from Mr. Giaino and

others, Representative George H. Mahon, chairman of the Appropriations Committee, permitted all members of his defense subcommittee to interrogate C.I.A. witnesses about the agency's budget.

Moreover, Mr. Mahon, a Texas Democrat, agreed last week to permit all House members to read the testimony from agency officials and to see the budget as long as they agreed not to take notes or divulge the material to outsiders.

Mr. Giaino called these actions "significant steps" but said they were not enough. Addressing the House, he declared:

"There is a balance in all secrecy matters. There are goals, and there are losses in defending ourselves against possible aggression from the outside. However, we must be careful that the very instruments which we create to defend us do not cause us to lose our liberties."

Mr. Giaino said that he only wanted to publish the total appropriation for the agency, not the individual allotments for various activities. The overall figure, he said, would in no way compromise the nation's security.

Reliable Congressional source

ces who have seen the budget figures over the years have placed the appropriation at between \$750-million and \$1-billion. That information has been widely published in the press, but has never been confirmed officially.

Mr. Giaino's contention that the budget information would not compromise security was challenged by representatives from both parties.

Mr. Mahon said that official publication of the budget was "not a favor which we should be doing to the U.S.S.R. and the Communist conspiracy."

Representative Robert F. Sikes, a Florida Democrat, said that publication of the over-all budget figure would eventually lead to "full disclosure of anything and everything, we've tried to keep secret from our enemies."

Representative Thomas P. O'Neill Jr. of Massachusetts, the majority leader, and Representative John J. McFall, of California, the Democratic whip, were among those who voted to keep the budget secret.

SUN-COMMERCIAL, Vincennes
18 September 1975

The Unidentifiable Bureaucrat

Congress has found that direct orders from former President Nixon to the Central Intelligence Agency were delivered but not obeyed. As a result, President Ford now is considering proposals to change the structure of the huge agency with such diverse responsibility and power.

What has happened is that Congress has uncovered, once more, the most dangerous figure in federal government, the unidentifiable civil servant working away in the middle and lower levels of bureaucracy. What is needed is a change of attitude, a practical impossibility in the present state of national government. What can happen is that a great deal of paper, desks, chairs and offices will be shuffled around, and nothing of genuine substance will happen.

The nation needs the Central Intelligence Agency in order to protect the interests of all the people. If the CIA is dispersed through a variety of other administrative and executive arms of government, a situation something akin to the days before World War II could be created when each military service guarded its own information first from the other United States military services. That, and Pearl Harbor, helped generate the favorable climate in which the CIA was conceived and grew.

Over a period of time, bureaucracy took a general authorization and began to adjust it to what career members of the CIA felt was best for the nation. There no longer is much doubt that former Presi-

dent Nixon was trying to gain control of the CIA, not to create his personal dictatorship which is the theory dearest to the heart of all truly believing liberals: but in order to get the intelligence agency to conform to policies set by duly elected officials. In its wisdom, the unidentifiable bureaucrats knew that Nixon and his Administration were not good for the nation, so his orders were lost as they trickled down through the side channels and backwaters of the agency. It is ironic that Nixon, who was hated by liberals, made a manful effort to achieve what his opponents want, and that he failed.

There will be no material change in the CIA or any other established federal agency unless there is a massive alteration in the manner in which power is distributed within the executive arm of government. Once power is delivered by Congress and the President to one of these bureaus, both President and Congress are all but powerless to direct implementation of policy. Perhaps the only way in which an administrative agency can be brought to heel is to abolish it, an undertaking that ranks with the mythical and impossible tasks described by the ancient Greeks.

The unidentifiable bureaucrat is the cause of current distrust and discontent among the American people with their government. Members of Congress and Presidents come and go, but the bureaucrats go on forever. It is a system that must change, or it will destroy itself and the nation.

TIME Magazine
20 October 1975

No CIA Dabbling

Your assertion that the CIA was "dabbling in Chilean politics" [Sept. 29] is outrageously misleading. The CIA is no amateur group, but a highly professional (and dangerous) organization that devoted millions of dollars and tremendous manpower toward the overthrow of the popularly elected Allende government without the knowledge of the American people. The CIA must come under direct congressional supervision.

James Brooke
New Haven, Conn.

If Otis Pike and his committee have not "released" anything that "jeopardizes national security," could he, or TIME, explain what the hell is left to publish about our security?

Ricardo Chirinos Mondolf
Rio de Janeiro

Wednesday, October 1, 1975

The Washington Star

The CIA and Ex-Agents' Rights

By John Fialka

Washington Star Staff Writer

Washington's intelligence community is troubled over the issue of how to remove the stigma from a man who has served his country as a CIA agent and wants to seek other employment.

Although there have been recent reports of job discrimination against former CIA agents and their families in the wake of bad publicity the agency has been receiving, ARIO, the organization recently established to defend the CIA and intelligence agents, has delayed implementing a "civil rights" program for former intelligence officers.

ARIO stands for Association of Retired Intelligence Officers. It has, according to David Phillips, one of the group's founders, 460 members, the majority of them former CIA employees.

AT A RECENT organizing meeting in Alexandria, ARIO members voted approval of 12 committee reports setting the basic role of their organization as an educational one, rather like a nonprofit trade association.

A 13th report, one calling for pressure on the CIA to implement a meaningful re-employment program for former intelligence officers, was tabled for further study.

According to Phillips, ARIO hesitated because "we find ourselves with a new problem, one that we don't understand well. We're accustomed to checking our sources carefully and we're on unfamiliar ground here."

So far, according to Phillips, the group has received about 20 reports of discrimination. Some of them involve discrimination against school children when their peers learn that their father is an ex-agent. Another, he said, involves the wife of a former agent who was turned down for a job because of her husband's intelligence background.

ARIO, HE said, has scheduled a meeting with the New York office of the American Civil Liberties Union to get legal advice on how to proceed in the civil rights area. It also plans to send out a questionnaire in an attempt to document more cases.

Eric H. Biddle Jr., a former CIA officer who helped draw up the civil rights report that was tabled by ARIO, contends that there was a "yawning lack of interest" in the problem at the meeting as well as some hostility toward defining the problem as a civil rights problem.

Biddle said that when he attempted to raise the issue during the closed meeting, several members complained loudly. One man, he said, characterized his report as "whining." Another exclaimed "so that's what civil rights means."

The meeting's leadership, according to Biddle, shut off debate on the subject and chose not to distribute a questionnaire he had prepared on the matter. In protest, Biddle has re-

signed from ARIO, charging in a letter to Phillips that, of all the issues before the group, job discrimination is the problem "of most immediate importance to current and future employees of the intelligence community."

"IN FACT," charged Biddle, "it seemed that the only concern the ARIO leadership had was that our report not get out to the press." Biddle, whose experiences and problems in trying to obtain employment with a variety of federal agencies were detailed recently by The Washington Star, later told a reporter:

"One of the great truths is that this is the most closed shop in Washington. They have tired blood. A lot of older employees would like to get out, but they know they'll have problems in the private job market so they stay on."

"One of the ways you stop it from being a closed shop is to make it possible for those who want to leave to leave and then the agency will be able to attract more young people to fill those positions. The whole thing is that people shouldn't be permanently stamped by an agency."

Phillips, Biddle, ARIO and others who have worked on the problem have found that the very nature of intelligence work tends to condition an individual to accept the problem without complaint. That makes it difficult to measure.

RECENTLY, James V. Ogle, a former CIA officer in Saigon, gave the House Select Committee on Intelligence an account of his experience along with that of a colleague named "Joe":

"For a year Joe worked as a dispatcher for a security guard service in California. He now works as an accountant at half his old CIA salary. When I finally resigned, I worked for four months as a bartender in a pizza parlor while I found out how little a CIA resume is worth. I now work for a computer company at half my old salary."

Ogle said that he visited the CIA's "outplacement office," but didn't get much help in the way of job leads. "One day they called me and said 'How would you like a job as a legislative assistant?' I found out that they had no job in mind, someone just thought that would be a good idea."

Is it a matter of preju-

rights? Ogle, who has not joined ARIO, thinks that, primarily, it is not. "Oh, the older people, the ones who come out expecting management jobs, they may be discriminated against. But the younger ones who leave just don't have the skills. There is just no parallel to what they have done in the outside world."

ACCORDING to a spokesman for the CIA, the bad publicity the agency has been receiving and the debate over what to do about discrimination cases has not made a dent on CIA recruitment efforts. In fact, he said, job inquiries before the recent controversy over the CIA's domestic activities were running about 600 every two weeks.

BALTIMORE SUN
7 October 1975

\$3 billion intelligence goal hinted

Washington (AP)—James R. Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense, apparently let slip yesterday that President Ford's 15-month budget request for U.S. intelligence agencies this year was about \$3 billion.

Mr. Schlesinger told newsmen that \$344 million in intelligence cuts made by the House in a \$112 billion defense appropriations bill "went deeper than they did elsewhere, amounting to something in excess of 10 percent—approximately 10 percent—of our intelligence requests."

That would be a request of \$3.4 billion for the Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency and Army, Navy and Air Force intelligence units.

Congressmen who have seen the figures say it is difficult to compile a total of Mr. Ford's various intelligence requests, but that they seemed closer to \$3 billion than to \$3.4 billion.

Secretary Schlesinger's apparently inadvertent disclosure of intelligence costs came less than a week after the House had rejected an effort to dis-close the CIA's budget.

The Select House Intelligence Committee recently held closed-door hearings on all U.S. intelligence costs, and some members said the total cost was in the range of \$7 billion a year. One congressman said the \$3 billion figure Mr. Schlesinger disclosed is strictly for designated intelligence agencies.

WASHINGTON POST
28 September 1975

Jack Anderson

Daniel Ellsberg: The Other News Leaks

The Pentagon Papers weren't the first secret documents that the celebrated leaker, Daniel Ellsberg, slipped to the New York Times.

Three years earlier, he not only leaked other sensitive documents to the Times but was pinpointed as the source. Yet a flunky misunderstanding stopped an FBI investigation of Ellsberg, who never even lost his top-secret security clearance.

This made possible his later historic leak of the Pentagon Papers, the incident that began Richard Nixon's downfall. The former President, reacting wildly to the leak, ordered the notorious White House plumbers to go after Ellsberg and, thereby, to teach the leakers a lesson they would never forget.

As a former member of President Nixon's inner circle, William Safire, has put it: "The Pentagon Papers case led (Nixon) into an overreaction that led to his most fundamental mistakes."

The engrossing story of how Ellsberg was spared to leak papers another day is part of the unpublished memoirs of W. Donald Stewart, a burly ex-FBI agent, who directed Pentagon investigations for seven years before his retirement last June.

His account has been confirmed by Ellsberg, who acknowledged to us that he was responsible for the earlier New York leak. Some Pentagon insiders believe this leak prevented an invasion of North Vietnam.

The story goes back to the February 1968 Tet offensive, which badly jolted U.S. forces in Vietnam. Gen. William Westmoreland, then the U.S. commander, was eager to cut off North Vietnamese infiltration routes.

The only way he could accomplish this, he concluded, was to seize the Ho Chi Minh network of trails. This would mean invading and occupying parts of North Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.

Gen. Earl Wheeler, then the Joint Chiefs chairman, reportedly agreed with Westmoreland's strategy. It was in this context that Wheeler submitted a top-secret report to the White House on Feb. 28, 1968, calling for 206,000 more troops.

As Ellsberg now tells the story for the first time, he was one of the few who received a copy of the Wheeler report. He knew it would be impossible to recruit 206,000 more men without mobilizing the reserves.

He feared the President would continue increasing U.S. forces in Vietnam piecemeal until he had enough troops to invade North Vietnam and attack the Ho Chi Minh trail complex.

Never before, Ellsberg told us, had he even "dreamed" of leaking Pentagon secrets. But he was so upset that he decided to take the secret Wheeler report to the late Sen. Robert Kennedy (D-N.Y.), who had been

critical of the Pentagon's war policies. Not long afterward, on March 10, 1968, the secret request for 206,000 more men was reported in the New York Times. The story caused an uproar in Congress.

Ellsberg doesn't know whether Kennedy leaked the figure to the Times. "But I thought, wow, that's the greatest leak there ever was," he told us. Suddenly, he felt ashamed that he had permitted Congress to be manipulated for five years without divulging the facts that had been covered up.

"I decided that what was needed was a leak a day for awhile to show LBJ that the day of lying was over," Ellsberg said. So he gathered up some documents, which proved the Pentagon had underestimated Communist strength in Vietnam.

He sought out the authors of the March 10 story, Neil Sheehan and Hedrick Smith, who took him to see their bureau chief, Tom Wicker. There were several visits, Ellsberg recalls, as he helped them authenticate the facts.

This resulted in three explosive stories by Sheehan on March 19, 20 and 21. The stories set off alarms inside the Pentagon and, across the Potomac, in the White House. Lyndon Johnson was apoplectic.

Stewart was assigned to find out who had leaked the secrets to the Times. FBI agents were alerted to join in the search.

Stewart efficiently narrowed down the possible suspects to Ellsberg, then on loan from the Rand Corporation. On March 29, by secret memo to the late FBI chief J. Edgar Hoover, Stewart identified Ellsberg.

Stewart also wanted to prosecute Sheehan under the Espionage Act, but Defense Secretary Clark Clifford was eager to court the press. As

Stewart recalls it, a top Clifford aide told him bluntly: "The Secretary and the press are getting along fine, and this would upset relations."

This attitude was relayed to the CIA, whose secrets had been compromised. But somehow, a CIA official got the mistaken impression that the Pentagon wanted to kill the investigation of both cases, not just the probe of Sheehan. The CIA, thereafter, informed the Justice Department that it had no interest in pursuing the investigation.

So the Justice Department advised the FBI to drop the investigation of both Sheehan and Ellsberg. Thus the dovish Ellsberg was left, without so much as a question raised in his record, free to spring his Great Leak three years later.

One month before the Pentagon Papers exploded into the news, ironically, Stewart came upon Ellsberg's name in a State Department file as the suspect in another leak.

But meanwhile, Ellsberg had gone back to Sheehan with the fateful Pentagon Papers. President Nixon was beside himself with rage over the leak. He issued the orders that unleashed the plumbers and led to the burglarizing of the offices of Ellsberg's psychiatrist.

Stewart wrote one more secret memo about Ellsberg, this one addressed to then-Assistant Attorney General Robert Mardian. Stewart reminded Mardian that it was still possible to bring Ellsberg to trial for the 1968 leak. But Mardian ignored the suggestion.

Footnote: Clifford told us that he had not ordered the investigation of Sheehan dropped. "I have no recollection of it," he said. Sheehan had no comment. Wicker was traveling overseas and couldn't be reached.

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NEWSWEEK

20 OCTOBER 1975

Periscope

SPY SHIP FOR HIRE

The CIA is seeking non-espionage assignments for the Glomar Explorer, the \$250 million ship built by Howard Hughes to recover part of a Soviet submarine in the Pacific last year. The spy agency wants to lease the craft for private scientific and engineering jobs, with no military or intelligence connections. A major problem is that oceanologists have never forgiven the CIA for sending the ship to pick up the Russian sub and using as a "cover" the story that the ves-

sel was engaged in deep-sea mining. That mission, these potential customers charge, has given their industry a bad name.

CIA recruitment going well despite recent agency probes

By the Associated Press

Washington
William E. Colby, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) director, says the agency's program for recruiting new personnel is proceeding well despite current probes into alleged CIA misdeeds.

He told a gathering of college students that the CIA this year has been receiving "something like twice as many inquiries for jobs as we did last year."

"We are getting some very good people into the organization," Mr. Colby said, adding that the CIA also was making a "major effort" to increase its percentage of minority group employees.

Speaking at a conference on national secu-

urity issues sponsored by the United States Youth Council, Mr. Colby said he hoped the country had reached "the far end of the pendulum" of mistrust generated by Vietnam, Watergate, and disclosures about the spy agency.

The CIA director said, "I think the end result of the investigations will be better guidelines, publicly stated, instead of the old fuzzy charters" which date back to the CIA's inception in 1947.

Mr. Colby declined to comment directly on reports that the CIA within recent months has sought to offset Soviet influence by funneling millions of dollars to non-Communist political

parties in Portugal.

However, he noted that in Portugal "we have temporarily a situation in which the democratic forces seem to be in a position of resurgence."

Mr. Colby contended that CIA abuses such as domestic surveillance and opening of mail "were truly few and far between" and were being rectified internally before disclosure of them in the press.

During a lengthy question-and-answer session, there was little sharp criticism aimed at Mr. Colby and he was applauded several times by the group composed largely of Young Democrats and college Republicans.

THE WASHINGTON POST Friday, October 10, 1975

Stephen S. Rosenfeld

Intelligence-Gathering: Can the CIA Know It All?

The almost weekly revelations of the House Intelligence Committee that the CIA failed to predict this coup or that war are titillating but ultimately misleading.

The premise on which these revelations are offered is that the CIA should have known: the agency goofed in its primary mission of intelligence-gathering. This premise both overstates the capabilities of intelligence and understates the complexities of international reality. Of course there is good intelligence and bad intelligence. But to expect that an American intelligence agency can have precise foreknowledge of sudden, secretly planned acts of violence in foreign lands—acts which regularly surprise their direct victims—is absurd.

It is wishful thinking to imagine that we can effectively foretell the course of future violence. We are not the world's policemen, nor its prophets.

I wish that the House committee, instead of simply asking whether the agency accomplished one impossible task in one rather small corner of its work, had made an in-depth case study or two to illuminate the real problems and potentialities of intelligence-gathering.

Just such a study, of Israel's disastrous intelligence performance in the period leading up to the 1973 Mideast war, has been made public. It's in "The War of Atonement—October, 1973," a new book by Maj. Gen. Chaim Herzog, twice Israel's director of Military Intelligence and now its man at the United Nations.

Complacent and arrogant after its swift victory in 1967, Israel overlooked the political frustration pointing a desperate Egypt toward war; discounted Sadat's public statements that he was getting "everything" from the Russians and mobilizing "for the resumption of the battle"; failed to link Saudi Arabia's

decision to wield the oil weapon with the Egyptian-Syrian military buildup; mistook Syria's early 1973 quiet as the result of Israeli retaliatory strikes; and so on.

Herzog strongly suggests that Israel was taken in by phony leaked reports that negligent Egyptian maintenance and the exodus of Soviet technicians had destroyed the Egyptian missile force. Egypt carefully nourished, he says, the then-prevailing Israeli views that Egyptian-Soviet relations were deteriorating; that the technological and cultural gap between Egypt and Israel was growing; and that Arab leadership was unfit to decide to attack.

From January 1973 onward, Egypt mobilized reservists for training 20 times—to establish a lulling rhythm. At the end of September it mobilized three classes of reservists, saying they would be demobilized on Oct. 8. (The war was to begin Oct. 6.) "As opposed to previous occasions—and this was noted in Israel—the civil defense organizations in Egypt and Syria were not activated, and

again, as opposed to previous occasions, no atmosphere of imminent war was created."

Egypt's major mobilization of September, ostensibly for a canal-crossing exercise, was its fourth of Sadat's tenure. At the third the previous spring, Israeli intelligence had figured he was just bluffing. The chief of staff felt maybe he wasn't bluffing. When no attack came, the intelligence people felt vindicated. So in September they tended to figure Sadat was bluffing again.

The seizure of some Soviet Jews by Palestinians in Austria on Sept. 29 distracted many Israelis. Maybe it was planned as a diversion, Herzog thinks.

A lieutenant in intelligence read the Suez scene on Oct. 1 and saw a war coming but his warning did not get passed up the chain. The chief navy intelligence officer expressed the same view at the same time but "his appreciation was not accepted by GHQ."

Henry Kissinger told Abba Eban on Oct. 4 that "nothing dramatic can happen in October."

Egyptian soldiers continued to fish the canal and walk about without helmets.

Seeing planes flying toward Israeli lines at 2 p.m. on Oct. 6, an Egyptian colonel turned to a colleague and said, "What's all this about?"

I conclude that no country's intelligence service can be counted on invariably to pierce the double barrier of its own preconceptions and the adversary's deceptions. The Israeli record ought to induce some humility in us all.

TIME Magazine
13 October 1975

Elaine Steinbeck tapped virtually every source in her effort to gather the 5,000 or so letters written by her husband, Novelist John Steinbeck, to publish in her forthcoming book, *Steinbeck: A Life in Letters* (Viking; \$15). "There was one source we missed," says the author's widow. "We never thought of the CIA." John Steinbeck's name turned up recently on a list of prominent U.S. citizens whose foreign correspondence had been opened and copied by the agency. Even without the CIA's help, Steinbeck and Collaborator Robert Wallsten, a

family friend and writer, have put together about 700 chronological letters to friends, family, wives, girl friends, children—even Presidents. "John wrote about politics, sex, love, child rearing—just everything," reveals his widow. Mrs. Steinbeck, who will discuss the book with the ex-New York City mayor and rookie interviewer John Lindsay on ABC's *AM America*, says that the latter letters show a "mature and simple style." But the early stuff, written when Steinbeck was in his 20s, is "purple prose."

Los Angeles Times Sun., Oct. 12, 1975.

CIA Secrets Dispute Raises Legal and Political Issues

BY KENNETH L. KARST

For the moment, President Ford and the House Intelligence Committee have compromised their conflict over the committee's claim of access to secret intelligence data. The immediate issue apparently will not be taken to the courts.

But continued conflict between the President and Congress over the issue of "executive privilege" appears inevitable, as each branch tries to carry out its own constitutional responsibilities.

Kenneth Karst teaches constitutional law at the UCLA School of Law.

sponsibilities. At stake are not merely the political advantages suggested by the saying "knowledge is power," but some fundamental questions about the relations among the three branches of government in a system of separated powers.

Both the current conflict and its compromise follow a pattern set as early as George Washington's administration. Most Presidents (including all since Calvin Coolidge) have claimed the power to withhold confidential information from congressional inquiry. When Congress has insisted, however, the Presidents have yielded most of the information sought. President Lincoln, for example, turned over all manner of military and diplomatic secrets to his congressional antagonists, the Committee on the Conduct of the War.

Since World War II—precisely while our intelligence system has been mushrooming in size—Presidents have asserted executive privilege more and more frequently. President Nixon, until the very end, claimed an absolute and unreviewable privilege to deny Congress access to confidential information.

For the most part, the courts have avoided entering this dispute between the executive and legislative branches. Some commentators say that such disputes are not suitable for judicial resolution, because they are so bound up in politics that no legal principles can be developed to guide the courts' decisions.

For many years it was even claimed that the President, as the embodiment of the executive branch, was not only independent of congressional control but immune from the order of a court. The only remedies for a misbehaving President, President Nixon's lawyers argued, were the ballot box and the impeachment process.

Last year's decision in the Watergate tapes case, *United States vs. Nixon*, rejected the claim of presidential immunity as a matter of constitutional law. That case provided a political precedent as well: President Nixon's compliance with the Su-

preme Court's decision will be hard for future presidents to ignore.

The Nixon case, however, did not deal with executive privilege against a congressional subpoena, but rather with the President's refusal to comply with a subpoena issued by Judge John Sirica at the request of the Watergate Special Prosecutor. Furthermore, as the court carefully noted, the privilege asserted by President Nixon was based only on the general interest in confidentiality of presidential communications, and not on any concern about "state secrets" of a military or diplomatic kind.

The differences between the Nixon case and the current President-versus-Congress dispute are not merely formal; they are substantial enough to permit the executive branch to keep on arguing two positions regularly taken by President Ford's predecessors.

First, the President may argue that the courts should stay out of the conflict between the two political branches of the government.

Second, if the courts do decide to rule, the President may argue that "state secrets" are absolutely privileged, so that the mere claim of the privilege bars the other branches from reviewing the President's decision.

Both arguments are part of a larger question about the relationship between law and discretion in the governmental system. The question pervades our constitutional law. When a court holds a statute unconstitutional, it is saying that the legislature has crossed over the boundary of its discretionary power, a boundary defined by law.

Some questions are conceded to lie entirely within the discretion of one of the political branches, beyond a court's power to review. Thus no court will second-guess the President's decision whether to recognize a foreign government. Part of the reason for this deference to the Executive is a deliberate choice to let such decisions be determined by discretionary considerations rather than principle. A similar argument is heard from those who bid the courts to let Congress and the President work out their own disputes over executive privilege.

Consider, for example, the incident that President Ford used to justify demanding the return of material he had already supplied to the House committee. The committee published part of a Defense Intelligence Agency summary written in 1973 just before war broke out in the Middle East.

The CIA had objected to publishing four words in the document hinting that U.S. intelligence had detected Egyptian efforts to tighten communications security. The committee included the four words in its release. It is at least doubtful whether the intelligence system was damaged by this release, since the same fact had

been published last year in the book "Kissinger," by Marvin and Bernard Kalb. But is a court equipped to make such a determination in deciding whether to order the President to turn over material to Congress?

Of course not. But putting the question in this way is misleading. Practically everyone agrees that discretion, and not law, must govern the decision whether to keep military and diplomatic information secret. But whose discretion?

The courts can avoid exercising their own discretion in individual cases by recognizing that the Constitution requires the President to give Congress any information it seeks in carrying out its legislative responsibilities. That would be a ruling of law in the classical sense, drawing the boundary lines of the discretionary power of the two political branches.

The claim that military and diplomatic secrets are different, demanding an absolute privilege, is based on the idea that some powers are "inherent" in the Presidency. Claims of inherent constitutional power, since they rest on no textual base, are always claims of necessity—that the office cannot be performed without the power in question. The President does bear primary responsibility for dealing with other countries and for administering the armed forces. Some measure of secrecy undoubtedly is necessary in both functions. The President's task probably would be easier if "leaks" were confined to Executive officials. But to keep secrets from congressional committees is to deny Congress the power to fulfill its own constitutional obligations.

Merely providing money for the intelligence system is a weighty responsibility. Informed guessing places the annual budget for the CIA alone in the range of \$1 billion. Congress has a "need to know" how that money is spent.

Beyond the monitoring of efficiency, though, Congress has a duty that is even more critical. The Constitution empowers Congress to "declare War," to "raise and support Armies," and to "provide and maintain a Navy"—in other words, to make military policy.

If Congress has tended to abdicate that responsibility to the President during the last generation, one important reason lies in the very secrecy that Presidents have maintained, in the name of executive privilege. Control over the flow of information has been a major contributor to the growth of "the imperial Presidency."

No one should assume that this trend can be reversed by a Supreme Court decision against the President on the question of executive privilege against congressional inquiry. Presidents can bury congressional staffs under avalanches of trivia. And, as Vietnam and Watergate showed, Presidents can lie.

But a Supreme Court decision af-

Limiting congressional power surely would encourage Congress in its effort to reassert its responsibility, and would help all of us to reaffirm our responsibilities as citizens.

Beyond the issue of congressional access lies a basic question of self-government. No one has stated the point more eloquently than former President Nixon himself, just three months before the Watergate break-

in: "Fundamental to our way of life is the belief that where information which properly belongs to the public is systematically withheld by those in power, the people soon become ignorant of their own affairs, distrustful of those who manage them and—eventually—incapable of determining their own destinies."

NEW YORK TIMES
10 October 1975

WIDER ROLE ASKED FOR RESEARCH UNIT

By HAROLD M. SCHMECK JR.
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 9—A national commission that has already made an important impact on ethical research policy in the United States would be transformed into a permanent body with far broader membership and responsibility by H. bill introduced today by three Senators.

The purpose of the changes, Senator Edward M. Kennedy said, is to upgrade the importance and impact of the commission's work and also to bring secret government research, including research by the Pentagon and the Central Intelligence Agency, under scrutiny. The Massachusetts Democrat is the bill's main sponsor. Cosponsors are Senators Jacob K. Javits, republican of New York, and Richard S. Schweiker, republican of Pennsylvania.

The panel is named the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research. Congress established it last year to advise the Department of Health, Education and Welfare over a two-year period on the value, ethics and propriety of research involving humans.

The bill would establish a permanent Presidential commission to serve in the same advisory role concerning all federally funded research.

The present commission first met last December. Following recommendations the panel made in May, the H.E.W. Department lifted a ban on research on the living human fetus that had existed for almost a year.

The commission is now investigating psychosurgery and research involving prisoners and mentally retarded persons—subjects of considerable controversy.

Senator Kennedy said in a statement introducing the bill:

"The revelations of the past months concerning biomedical and behavioral research abuses in the Department of Defense

and the C.I.A. underscore the urgent need to expand the national commission's jurisdiction and to expand it now."

In addition to establishing the commission as a permanent body, the bill would almost double its size by adding, as members, the Secretaries of H.E.W. and Defense, the

Director of Central Intelligence and the administrator of the Veterans Administration, as well as four Representatives and four Senators.

The purpose in adding the Federal agency heads, Mr. Kennedy said, is "to provide a mechanism whereby top secret research can be reviewed by those members of the commission who have such clearance."

A Senate Health subcommittee, of which Mr. Kennedy is chairman, held hearings recently on secret drug experiments involving human subjects sponsored by the Defense Department and the C.I.A. He said it was known that research involving LSD had been carried out without the subjects' knowledge or consent and without proper medical supervision. He said at least one death and several suicide attempts resulted.

The present commission, appointed last fall by the H.E.W. Secretary consists of 11 members whose fields cover a broad range of subjects, including medical science, ethics, theology and law.

None of the members is a Government official. All of the commission meetings have been held in public, and all of its documents, including preliminary draft reports, have been made available to the press and to other interested individuals and groups.

The openness of the commission's operations in dealing with highly controversial matters has been its hallmark. Its mandate from Congress was to investigate issues that have troubled elements of the general public and have produced much angry debate—such questions as whether it is justifiable to give a drug to a fetus that was about to be aborted to study the behavior of that drug in the living body; and whether it is proper to destroy tissues in the human brain to alter human behavior.

It was also to study the question whether research can be done on children, on the poor, on prisoners or on the mentally incompetent without infringing on their basic civil rights.

The major issues before the commission are widely believed to be of major social importance and also vital to the gathering of scientific knowledge important to human health and well-being.

The commission has contracted for expert studies to gauge the extent and nature of research that has been done in fields that come within its purview as well as monographs on the ethical issues involved.

THE ECONOMIST OCTOBER 4, 1975

Privacy

Files fly open

"The list is endless" said President Ford at the dedication of the new law school building at Stanford University in Palo Alto, California. He was speaking indignantly about the mountain of files on individual citizens kept, quite legitimately, by agencies of the federal government and the "relentless invasion" of privacy which they represent. The files range from those on the Rosenbergs, executed 18 years ago for giving atomic secrets to the Russians, to those of the Export-Import Bank on applications for garage space.

Now the agencies are compelled to let the public know what files they keep and hundreds of civil servants have been busy for months compiling the lists. There are said to be at least 8,000 "record systems", perhaps many more, made possible by the computer revolution and containing 92 billion pages of records. Congress tried to prise these open in 1967 by passing the Freedom of Information Act, but it proved to contain too many loopholes and possibilities for delay and obstruction. Last year Congress adopted amendments, known as the Privacy Act, which came into force on September 27th. These give people the right to see the files kept on them, to challenge the information and demand its correction if it is inaccurate. But there are still exempt areas such as records kept by the Central Intelligence Agency, law enforcement agencies and the Secret Service. Whether the Rosenbergs' sons will ever see their parents' records is doubtful.

Curiously, in view of Mr Ford's anguish over the big brotherhood of the bureaucracy, the amendments were passed over his veto. But he was acting on the advice of the federal agencies. He himself, when vice president, had helped to forward the bill. Besides giving people access to their files, the act lays down rules for the collection and use of the information they contain. It also sets up the Privacy Protection Study Commission, which will concentrate on invasions of the privacy of individuals in the private sector.

In public. In the view of many who have observed the commission in action, its deliberations have been responsible and reasonable. There have been sharp differences of opinion among its members, but there has been a large degree of consensus among them on the recommendations made.

Tuesday, October 14, 1975

THE WASHINGTON POST

Marquis Childs

In Search of Colby's Successor

Wanted: A man of stature, poise, distinction, objectivity, experience in infighting in the jungle of Washington bureaucracy, to fill position of great responsibility. Salary: \$42,500 a year. While it has not gone so far as a want ad, the search is on for a successor to William E. Colby as director of the CIA.

A number of names are in the hopper, but the catch is finding the right man willing to take a post bound to be difficult and full of friction and animosity.

For the new man will have to carry out a restructuring of the intelligence agency, taking into account the amazing revelations coming from congressional committees poking into the vast internal darkness of an operation that ran wild.

One report is that the new man will not be picked until after the investigations are concluded. But that may be as long as a year hence and in the interval the CIA is plagued by doubts as to its mission and the nature of the eventual oversight to be imposed by Congress and the White House.

The new director will not come from within the agency. That much seems certain. He will be an outsider,

presumably with experience in the overall function of intelligence, but with no commitments to the past.

This greatly complicates the search. One name that cropped up briefly was Elliot Richardson, currently ambassador to Great Britain. Richardson served in the Nixon administration as Under Secretary of State, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare and the Department of Defense before he became Attorney General. He resigned a from the latter post after refusing to fire Archibald Cox on President Nixon's orders.

Richardson is said to have backed away from the CIA prospect as though he had been confronted with a summary request that he submit to trial by fire. He is reported harboring high political ambitions, although his base in his native Boston is eroded to virtual nonexistence.

John A. McCone, who came from the outside where he had had a successful career in business, is widely considered to have been the ablest director in the history of the agency. Serving from 1961 to 1965, he was the first to recognize the importance in aerial photographs of the missile installations in Cuba. This led to the confrontation with Moscow when President John F. Kennedy forced the Soviets to

remove the weapons that had a potential of destruction with nuclear warheads of at least one third of the United States.

McCone is known to have strong feelings about the responsibility of the director and his relationship with his subordinates. It is intolerable that free-wheeling operations should go on at the order of those two or three down the line without the knowledge of the head of the agency.

Colby, who served the CIA for a considerable stretch in Vietnam as boss of a pacification program, has been asked several times about reports he will be replaced. Each time he replies by pointing to his commission which states that he serves at the pleasure of the President. His resignation will be forthcoming whenever the President requests it.

Both in Defense and State, the feeling is strong that the CIA cannot be restructured and restored to the primary function of intelligence gathering so long as Colby is the director.

The complaint is that he has talked too much and that in an apparent effort to save his own skin he has thrown off on his predecessors and officials down below the directorial level. This is the bitter feeling of many longtime CIA staffers who feel they have been needlessly thrown to the wolves by the man in the driver's seat.

In this interval between appearances before Senate and House committees, Colby is carrying on as though he expected to be in his job until the end of time.

However, the rate of inquiries continues high and applicants with highly specialized training are under consideration. The CIA, if one takes Colby's word, is alive and well across the Potomac.

THE WASHINGTON POST

Thursday, Oct. 9, 1975

Walter Pincus

Congressional Response To the CIA Budget

On September 25, at a closed meeting of the powerful House Appropriations Committee, members voted 30 to 19 not to receive CIA and other intelligence agency budget figures. As a result, the full committee accepted without discussion a subcommittee recommendation for a cut of \$263.2 million in intelligence activities next year without knowing what the overall spending of CIA and other agencies would be or what operations would be curtailed by the cuts.

Rep. Robert Giaimo (D-Conn.), a member of the Defense Appropriations subcommittee that looked into intelligence agency spending, wanted the full committee in its closed sessions to discuss the CIA budget. According to Giaimo, Appropriations Committee Chairman George Mahon (D-Texas) told him at the September 25 session he could not mention intelligence figures to fellow committee members. "We then had a long discussion in secret," Giaimo said Monday, "with (Chairman) Mahon blocking from discussion the secret budgets of intelligence agencies."

Rep. David Obey (D-Wis.) finally requested a vote by the committee members on whether the CIA budget could be disclosed then and there at the closed

hearing. It lost. For Giaimo, the committee's action was indicative that, despite recent public disclosures, "these guys in the House just don't want to know" about intelligence activities.

Another sign to Giaimo that House members are uninterested in the details of intelligence is that "not too many" of his colleagues took the time to review the secret subcommittee testimony on CIA and other intelligence agency budgets once they had been made available by Mahon.

Mahon first made the offer to his own committee members at the September 25 meeting, then repeated it on the House floor five days later during the first day of debate on the defense appropriations bill.

To see the classified intelligence hearings and budgets, a Congressman had to sign for the material and refrain from taking notes. He also had to agree to disclose it only to "authorized people."

On October 1, Giaimo sponsored an amendment on the House floor that would have led to public disclosure of the CIA budget. It lost 147 to 267. The large vote against disclosure was attributed to Mahon's offer to individual members to look at the figure.

However, few members had walked from the House chamber across the hall to

the Appropriations committee offices to review the material. For some who did not go it was the secrecy pledge rather than a disinclination to know the facts.

Giaimo concedes a slow move toward greater disclosure—and perhaps increased Congressional oversight—is taking place. This was the first year the defense appropriations subcommittee, on which he serves, ever held hearings on intelligence spending. The directors of CIA, Defense Intelligence Agency and National Security Agency, plus other officials were questioned. In past years, only Mahon and a few ranking committee members reviewed intelligence budgets. This year, also for the first time, a detailed written understanding between the subcommittee and the intelligence community was drafted on the use of the approved funds.

Mahon also has set up a task force, chaired by Rep. Neal Smith (D-Iowa) to work out new rules governing distribution in the future of CIA and other classified intelligence material and testimony presented to the appropriations committee. Giaimo is on that task force.

With these steps, however, Giaimo and other leaders in the intelligence investigation, including Chairman Otis Pike (D-N.Y.) of the House Intelligence Committee, remain skeptical that as of today the House leadership and a majority of its members are interested in intelligence oversight.

As one of the advocates of investigation put it Monday, "When the hell did the House ever assume its responsibilities willingly without being pushed."

The Washington Star

Saturday, October 11, 1975

McCone Urges Tighter Rein on CIA

HOT SPRINGS, Va. (UPI) — Former CIA director John A. McCone said yesterday the intelligence agency needs closer White House and congressional supervision even though reports of its misdeeds have been exaggerated.

But he said CIA operations must still be wrapped in a "cloak of secrecy" for the protection of agents and because the intelligence mission is vital to national defense.

McCone, CIA director from 1961 to 1965 in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, spoke to reporters at a meeting of The Business Council, an association of top industrial executives which he addressed in closed session.

He recommended that the President's National

Security Council be put in direct charge of the CIA and that Congress also create a joint committee to assist in overseeing the agency.

BUT HE SAID the oversight, and intelligence secrets the CIA develops, should be restricted to a tight circle composed of the President, his chief national security adviser — currently Secretary of State Henry Kissinger — and a few members of Congress.

"The proximity of the CIA and its director to the President and the National Security Council should be made more conspicuous," McCone said.

He conceded the CIA had abused the law and its own charter in a variety of ways made public recently by a presidential commission and congressional committees.

But he said these abuses had been minor ones and the adverse publicity they generated had obscured the responsible and valuable services performed by the agency.

AMONG ITS violations, McCone said, the CIA had carried out surveillance of Americans and the illegal opening of mail long after those activities had ceased to serve a legitimate intelligence purpose.

"It was a natural outgrowth of a program to determine if there were foreign influences or financing of some of these dissident

groups" during the years of protests against U.S. involvement in Vietnam, he said.

McCone said he had expressed his views on CIA oversight to administration officials and had met privately on Thursday with Sen. Frank Church, Idaho, chairman of the Senate committee investigating CIA activities.

Asked whether the administration had made plans for closer CIA supervision, McCone said officials told him they were waiting to see what developed from the Church committee's investigations.

ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH
23 September 1975

CIA Under Law

Fortunately for the supremacy of law, the Justice Department, with the approval of Attorney General Edward Levi, has ended the recently revealed 1954 special agreement between the department and the Central Intelligence Agency under which the CIA handled investigations into criminal offenses of its own employees and their disposition. Under the arrangement, the CIA, on grounds that it would have compromised intelligence operations, did not refer some alleged criminal law violations for prosecution.

There is no way of knowing whether any valid intelligence basis existed for various neglected prosecutions. But it should be clear that a grant of such immunity would encourage lawlessness. Now Assistant Attorney General Richard Thornburg, the new head of the Justice Department's criminal division, has written to Senator Charles Percy that the CIA is now "unquestionably bound by the same requirements as other executive branch departments and agencies with respect to referral of allegations" of criminal violations.

This is as it should be in a nation whose Supreme Court has said the Constitution "is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and peace, and covers within the shield of its protection all classes of men, at all times, and under all circumstances."

Intelligence Advisory Board, the Office of Management and Budget and the National Security Council, rather than funneling his routine evaluations through the CIA director.

One White House official likened the proposed arrangement to that between the outside directors of a corporation and the company's independent auditing firm.

would be made available to a congressional oversight committee if Congress, as the President hopes, sets up a permanent joint committee on intelligence operations, this source said.

The White House official said the likelihood is that systematic evaluations of this kind would lead to a reshuffling of assignments among the CIA, the National Security Agency and other intelligence organizations.

WASHINGTON POST Tuesday, October 7, 1975

Ford Plans New Controls Over the CIA

By David S. Broder

Washington Post Staff Writer

President Ford's plan for reorganizing the intelligence agencies will include a strengthened, independent inspector general, whose appointment and evaluations will not be controlled by the director of the Central Intelligence Agency, a knowledgeable White House official said yesterday.

The proposal is also likely to include tightened guidelines on covert operations but no flat ban on their being pursued by the CIA, the source said.

He predicted that Mr. Ford would make his proposals public in a major speech "within a short time," and said 80 per cent of the recommendations could be carried out by executive order.

Mr. Ford is not likely to name a replacement for CIA Director William E. Colby at the same time he makes his reorganization proposals, these sources said. But he said a search has begun for a person "of commanding presence" with a background outside the intelligence community to take over the restructured agency within the next year.

The reason for that time sequence, the source said, is that "the President thinks it would be a disservice to both the country and to Bill (Colby) to pretend that the problems of CIA can be solved by replacing him."

The basic problem that has emerged from the Ford

Administration's review of intelligence operations is lack of a method to evaluate the cost and worth of these information-gathering functions.

The same criticism applies perhaps even more to the Federal Bureau of Investigation than to the CIA, the source said, but the President is expected to concentrate for now on the overseas intelligence operations.

A major recommendation is likely to be a considerable expansion in the staff and independence of the inspector general of the CIA, a post now held by Donald Chamberlain. The proposal drafted for the President's approval would take the appointment of that official out of the hands of the CIA director and give it to the President or his Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.

The new inspector general would be ordered to report regularly to the Attorney

ST. LOUIS GLOBE-DEMOCRAT
24 September 1975

Inquiries have hobbled CIA, Colby

By LES PEARSON
Globe-Democrat Staff Writer

Recent investigations of the Central Intelligence Agency have seriously hampered intelligence-gathering activities of the agency around the world, CIA Director William E. Colby says.

But the agency's work must continue for the good of the country, he said here Tuesday.

"THERE IS much intelligence that is accessible that we can't get now because the other side is aware of our method of operation," Colby told newsmen at a press conference in the St. Louis Club.

Colby said there is some loss of information because "they have been alerted to the fact that we're able to obtain it."

And he said foreign agents who have helped the CIA now are saying, "I'm sorry. I can't continue to do this," because of pressures produced by recent exposure of the agent's methods.

But, he said, "We live, even here in St. Louis, within 30 minutes of a nuclear missile,

and we have to know what kind of missiles to expect in the future."

COLBY SAID the CIA needs to maintain up-to-date information on such things as weaponry in order to maintain adequate U.S. defenses.

Colby refused to say whether the CIA has an annual budget of \$750 million.

"I have taken the position I can't comment on that. To do so would provide the starting information from which all other information could be obtained," he said.

On the need for secrecy, Colby said: "We don't take the position that nothing can be revealed, but we also don't believe that everything should be revealed."

Colby explained that his trip to St. Louis to meet informally with a group of St. Louis leaders was part of his responsibility to make sure Americans know the nature of the CIA's intelligence-gathering efforts and the importance of continuing them.

COLBY, WHO has taken a new, open stance as CIA director, said he has not done much traveling, and has been

out of his office in Langley, Va., perhaps 10 or 12 times during the last year or year-and-a-half.

(Richard M. Helms and other former CIA directors have been somewhat inaccessible to newsmen, and efforts have been made to mask the agency's budget and even the agency's physical location in the Washington, D.C., area.)

Colby said there are "many necessary secrets in our business," but added: "We have a lot of secrets in America and we respect them."

"We have secrecy of the ballot, secrecy in grand jury testimony. We are a lot like you newsmen. We must protect the sources of our intelligence just like a newsmen. If you expose those sources, you won't be able to use them anymore."

COLBY DENIED any knowledge of a report that E. Howard Hunt was ordered to assassinate syndicated columnist Jack Anderson when Hunt was a CIA agent.

"I never heard anything about that until Sunday morning when I read it in the Washington Post," he said.

Colby said he looked into the report within the CIA, but could find no one to substantiate the allegation.

Hunt reportedly told his former CIA associates that the order to kill Anderson was canceled at the last minute, but only after a plan had been devised to make the columnist's death appear accidental.

Colby, when asked about a CIA office in St. Louis, replied that it has two functions — to stay in touch with area informants and to "investigate applications of contractors who want to do business with us."

COLBY WOULD not say who the contractors were, other than to indicate they might be doing business with the government in an intelligence-gathering capacity.

He said the CIA's domestic activities, which have brought charges that the agency has been spying on citizens, have diminished considerably.

The agency has been doing "other things than pure intelligence" and all have been within federal laws governing the CIA, Colby said.

says

Fri., Oct. 3, 1975

Los Angeles Times

JUNE LAKE 'MYSTERY'

With the CIA He Is, a Spy He's Not

BY CHARLES HILLINGER

Times Staff Writer

JUNE LAKE, Calif.—Igor Vorobyoff has been a mysterious figure ever since he settled in this High Sierra hamlet a year ago.

"He's a spy for the CIA," insisted a merchant, echoing the suspicions of several townspeople. "But we can't understand what someone from the CIA would be doing in this place. What's there to spy on in June Lake?"

June Lake, population 460, is a Mono County mountain community clustered around a 7,650-foot-high lake by the same name.

"People try to look for more than there is," laughed Vorobyoff, a bearded, husky, 6-footer who often strolls through town in a Russian peasant shirt and trousers while walking his golden retriever Kazak.

"Those who don't know should ask me what I do. Sure I work for the CIA. I'm agent 004. But I'm no spy."

"I am a Russian translator. At the end of every book, paper or document I translate from Russian to English is my CIA identification number—11004. That's where I get the agent 004."

Vorobyoff, 32, is a translator for the CIA's Joint Publications Research Services, the official U.S. translation office which does work for many agencies of the government.

"As a translator I have tremendous freedom. I can live and work wherever I choose," Vorobyoff explained. "I moved to June Lake because I love to backpack in the mountains."

He translates unclassified Russian publications.

"I studied to become a doctor," Vorobyoff said. "But the draft got in the way and I went into the Air Force. After that I studied to become an ichthyologist at UC Davis."

While at Davis he worked part time as a translator for JPRS.

"I liked it so much on graduating I decided to become a full-time translator instead of working with fish," Vorobyoff noted.

Born in Chile of Russian parents, he moved to California when he was 4 after his father was hired as a Russian language instructor at the Army's language school in Monterey.

"I went to Russian elementary and high schools in San Francisco and I studied Russian in college. So, it was easy for me to become a translator," Vorobyoff said.

He translates a wide variety of Russian publications, especially scientific and medical journals.

Vorobyoff has a library of Russian dictionaries, medical and scientific books and journals as research sources to help him with his work.

"It's vital to be knowledgeable about the subject covered in publications you are translating," he explained. "And you must have good command of English as well as the foreign language because it's important to write readable copy."

Contract translators such as Vorobyoff working full time earn as much as \$20,000 to \$30,000 a year.

"On a good day I can do 1,200 to 1,400 words an hour for eight hours," Vorobyoff said. "Translator fees vary from \$10 to \$30 per 1,000 words."

"I use a dictaphone and employ three typists to prepare my transcripts."

He said 25% of what he earns goes to the typists.

When he isn't translating Russian publications for the CIA into English or isn't up in the high country backpacking, Vorobyoff spends his time as a woodcarver.

He plans to cover the outside of his June Lake home with 18th century peasant-style wood carving panels and house.

FORTUNE
October 1975

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GENERAL

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Heroin


A Political Fix

That old trouper hashish excluded, no drug has enjoyed lasting popularity among illicit users in Great Britain. There has instead been a series of fads, drugs which gained stylish prominence either because of new found availability or the novelty of their effect. Drugs like acid, methadrine, mandrax and cocaine flared briefly, gained a few permanent converts, and passed out of the mainstream of the drug culture. It would be a pity if all the signs that indicate heroin will be This Year's Drug are proved right, because heroin will be a little more difficult to shake off. Roger Hutchinson looks at the history, geography and politics of a drug that may become London's favourite. And makes a few modest proposals...

Contrary to official pendency, most soft-drug users do not take happily to narcotics. There was a time when it was not possible to force a beer down the throat of the acid head, and although those days have passed, a purist streak remains.

Ritual has always played a strong part in what the reference works define as 'the non-medical use of drugs'. Ritual in many forms: preparing the chillum, melting opium on heated silver paper and sucking its smoke through a straw, experimenting with the cardboard centre of a toilet roll or jam jars and sewing needles—all rituals with the purpose of getting one high, but all containing a certain fascination in themselves.

It was so with the banknote, blade and mirror. Although the ritual of chopping grains into powder with a razor on a mirror, carving the powder into lines and snorting (sniffing into the nostril) the lines through a rolled-up note is no new trick, it has only been practised widely among those who use illegal drugs for non-medical purposes over the last few years. It was introduced by cocaine or amphetamine sulphate, two powders which have enjoyed a similar popularity



The flow of illicit substances.

of late. These two are not phenomenally seductive drugs. They are indisputably hazardous in irresponsible hands, but unlikely to lure the careful user beyond the bounds of safety. They are answerable, however, for the introduction of a new ritual into the drug culture: a ritual which combined with the honourable tradition of sharing drugs, could have sorry consequences.

Because the banknote, blade and mirror can be used to snort any powder, once that powder is

in the sharing tradition—this is no longer a foreign ritual. Even if the powder is heroin. And these days it frequently is.

High in the hills

There is a mountain range that stretches more than 4000 miles along the southern rim of Asia. From the dull plateaux of Anatolia, through the rocky Toba and Kakar ranges on the Afghan/Pakistan border, to the beautiful jagged peaks of northern Laos, and reaching up high into the Himalayas, the mountain ranges of the World Vegetation will give the majority

of this range as being uncultivated by man. As indeed the majority is. But on a few strategically situated square miles from Anatolia to Laos is grown virtually 100% of the world's illicit opium.

It is grown by hill tribes, who grow opium because there is little else that they can grow. They do not make hugely comfortable livelihoods out of their crop, it simply provides a living. But the hills are their traditional terrain, and opium is their necessary crop.

The seeds of the opium poppy are scattered a few weeks before the rainy season, which comes at the end of every summer. As the shoots begin to show the weaker plants are pulled up, leaving the more promising ones about six inches apart. By maturity, the poppy's petals have fallen away, leaving a green egg-sized pod standing three or four feet from the ground on a thick stem. Inside this pod is the thick white opium sap. The pod is slit, and when the sap has oozed out and congealed (turning brown in the process), it is scraped off and parcelled. This dark, sticky residue is opium.

Each year Turkey illicitly produces 100 tons of opium; India, Pakistan and Afghanistan produce 525 tons (most of which is domestically consumed); and the Golden Triangle region of Burma, Thailand and Laos produces 1,185 tons.

As every ten tons of opium makes only one ton of morphine, and transport out of the isolated growing area is difficult, the morphine refineries are usually not far from the fields. Extracting morphine from opium is a simple operation, anyway. Native chemists simply dissolve the raw substance in hot water, add lime and then ammonia to separate out the organic waste, and filter out the chunky white kernels of morphine.

It is this morphine, packaged into bricks weighing roughly a kilo each and costing about £500 per kilo from its manufacturer, which is smuggled to the heroin laboratories of Asia and Europe by packhorse, boat, or aeroplane. When the morphine has left the growing area, the production of heroin is steady out of control.

Because it is not necessary to own much more than a junior chemistry set in order to process heroin from morphine base, heroin can be made—and is made—in kitchens, garages, and woodsheds by chemists whose strongest qualification is often the fact that they have memorised the four of five part recipe. There have been legendary maestro chemists, spoken of reverently in the trade, with the mythical ability to turn out 99.9% pure heroin, but the average chemist remains little more than a 'chef'.

The first four stages of manufacturing heroin are simply the binding of morphine with acetic anhydride (vinegar to you and me). These stages are elementary, and produce a heroin of about 40-50% purity, frequently sold as 'number 3 heroin'. A fifth process may then be added by the discerning chemist to purify the heroin 80-90%.

... rituals with a certain fascination in themselves...

This process involves alcohol, ether,

hydrochloric acid, and the possibility of a lethal explosion (such as occurs from time to time in Hong Kong tenement blocks). If the process is successful, however, and it usually is, a delicate white powder is resultant. This is 'number 4 heroin', the foie gras of junk.

The heroin history

It was first synthesised by C R Wright, an English researcher, in 1874. He called it diacetylmorphine, made it on a stove, and tested it on dogs. When the dogs exhibited 'great prostration, fear, sleepiness... and a slight tendency to vomiting', this sensible man dropped his project. Not so the German Bayer chemical cartel. Displaying something less than the highest regard for the public safety, Bayer decided that the drug they had christened 'Heroin' was a non-addicting panacea for most of the ailments in the medical dictionary. In 1898 they set out to inform the world of its great good luck by launching an advertising campaign in 12 different languages. Bayer's heroin was prescribed for most everything, from tuberculosis to housemaids' knee. Unbelievably, it was even sold in China as a cure for opium addiction.

Bayer sowed heroin and reaped profit unrestricted for twenty-six years. By 1924 there were 200,000 addicts in the United States alone. It is impossible that the chemical cartel cannot by then have realised the narcotic effects of their product. A large part of the world's population was inadvertently serving as guinea pig and manifesting the most appalling results, but Bayer (or any other pharmaceutical company with an interest in heroin sales) neither limited their sale nor appeared to show any great concern for their consumers. When voices are raised against the heartless pushers of narcotics, let not the international capital which profited from such as Bayer go unchastised.

Eventually, in 1924, the United States Congress outlawed the import and manufacture of the drug, and most of the world followed suit. But heroin is possibly the most consistently profitable commodity that capital ever bought and sold, and there was never a shortage of parties wanting a slice of the action. Heroin smuggling was a common crime.

... dogs exhibited "great prostration, fear and sleepiness..."

However, at the end of the Second World War, heroin smuggling (and consequently addiction in the western world) was virtually wiped out. The embargos on trade and strong national security that a state of war demanded had incidentally blocked non-martial illicit trade. The huge American addict population had fallen to less than 20,000. But the war had effected other 'incidental' changes, more worrisome to certain minds than heroin addiction. The European working classes showed signs of moving sharply to the political left; and the Asian peoples were beginning to suggest that the colonial party might be over.

As a sign of gratitude to the Mafia for assisting the allied effort in Sicily, America flew 'Lucky' Luciano out of

jail and home to Italy in 1946. Never one to stand on ceremony, Luciano wasted little time in starting to supply that skeletal force of 20,000 junkies back in the States. Initially he worked comfortably diverting the legal supplies of the Italian pharmaceutical company, Shiaparelli, to his own market. By the time this was stepped on in 1950, Luciano had built up enough laboratories of his own and contacts with the Middle East to import and process his own morphine base. But as the Italian police drew closer, Luciano decided to move his operation to another Mediterranean port.

Marseilles has a history of working-class militancy. During the war its communist *maquis* had been one of the best organised, most effective terrorist groups in Europe. After the war, as a political party and trades union movement, the communists looked even more powerful. But there was another group in Marseilles, lacking perhaps the left-wing's fanciful notions and high-minded politics, but compensating with quite a bit of strong-arm leverage and unity. The Marseilles Corsicans comprised about 10% of the city's population and over the years had developed an organisation for self-preservation and material gain that can only be compared with the Sicilian mafia. There was no love lost between Communist and Corsican—even during the war Corsican syndicate leaders had worked with the Gestapo against the *maquis*.

Heroin—a strikebreaker

1947 saw the first large post-war demonstration of communist power in France—80,000 workers came out on strike in Marseilles to protest a huge drop in living standards. Ordinarily, the Corsican underworld would not bother itself unduly with such disputes. But this time there was an incentive. The Central Intelligence Agency of the United States of America *did* bother itself with such disputes. The CIA contacted the powerful syndicate leaders, the Guerini brothers, and through them supplied arms and cash to Corsican gangs for use against picket lines and union officials. The Corsicans obliged, pitching into strikers and sympathisers with a will. By December the strike was broken.

In 1950 Marseille dock workers began to boycott freighters supplying the French Indochinese War zone. Such boycotts spread to the Atlantic ports, and to shutdowns in the metal industries, mines, and railways. The CIA once more moved into action. This time we have a convenient account of the Agency's strategy from a participating member: Thomas Braden, writing in the May 20, 1967 *Saturday Evening Post*:

'It was my idea to give fifteen thousand dollars to Irving Brown. He needed it to pay off his strong-arm squads in the Mediterranean ports, so that American supplies could be unloaded against the opposition of communist dock workers.'

... heroin was sold in China as a cure for opium addiction...

Again, within a few months the strike had petered out. In return for their assistance, the Guerini brothers got more than just money and arms. They

were granted a certain amount of legitimacy by any politician with a stake in seeing the communists weakened—and that camp contained people ranging from Gaston Deferre's Marseilles Socialist Party to the Gaullists, all of whom were to turn several blind eyes to the Guerini brothers over the next twenty years. The Guerinis themselves, far from basking idly in their new-found political favour, set about using it to create the largest apparatus for manufacturing and smuggling heroin in the West and possibly—outside Hong Kong—in the world.

As for the CIA, it is difficult to ascertain whether they acted out of brutal cynicism or simple stupidity. We can be assured of one thing at least, that they were faced with a choice between abetting the increasing flow of heroin into the States and stamping on Mediterranean communism, or ignoring Mediterranean communism and thus not giving their support to heroin smuggling. They chose the former, and Lucky Luciano had found himself a new wholesaler from whom to buy the heroin that he so efficiently exported to the USA.

The Marseilles laboratories contentedly processed morphine base (mostly from Turkey, filled out in the later years by some shipments from Southeast Asia) into heroin throughout the fifties and the sixties. The profits that they made are beyond calculation. But throughout that time—and this is important to note—the Guerinis had so tight a control over its manufacture and sale that they were able to prevent a French (and indeed European) epidemic.

By the early '70s, however, the fabled 'French Connection' was in disarray. After so many years of underworld peace, internecine war had finally erupted between the Guerinis and a rival. As a result of one skirmish in this struggle Barthelémy Guerini was sentenced to twenty years imprisonment in 1970. The political influence of their rivals was obviously growing as the Guerinis' declined. But even they could do little about the American pressure on Turkey to cease growing opium.

Despite obvious figures and evidence to the contrary, the American Federal Bureau of Narcotics under Harry Anslinger had insisted for years that American heroin was manufactured from opium grown in two main areas. The first area was supposedly Red China. There never has been a jot of evidence to suggest that Communist China even grows opium, let alone exports it, but Anslinger insisted otherwise for a decade.

The second area was Turkey. Turkey in fact does grow opium—albeit only 7-10% of the world's total crop. So America pressured the Turks into reducing their opium-growing provinces from 21 to four by early 1972, with a promise to eliminate production completely by 1973.

Although production never was completely eliminated (and is now on the increase again) the temporary cutting of supplies to Marseilles wreaked havoc with the heroin industry there, leaving a substantial gap in the international market.

...the CIA
curtailed the powerful
syndicate leaders...

This gap has been filled, over the last two or three years, by a section of the Indochinese community in Amsterdam.

Their trade is both in morphine base (from the Golden Triangle) and processed heroin (from Hong Kong, Bangkok, and more recently Kuala Lumpur). Despite the superior chemistry of the Southeast Asian manufactures, it is considered preferable to smuggle morphine base into Europe rather than processed heroin, because of the rumoured existence of customs dogs able to scent the acetic anhydride in the heroin.

Today the drugs are flown either directly to Amsterdam, or via such capitals as Paris and Brussels. There is no shortage of supply to these contemporary traders, for several reasons:

1. Their contacts with the growing area are obviously much more viable than those of, say, the few rather bumbling Corsicans who have tried to set up deals in Southeast Asia.
2. The withdrawal of the US Army from Southeast Asia has left a sizeable gap in the local heroin market, a gap which is widened still further by:
3. The succession of governments in South Vietnam and Cambodia pledged to eliminate opium and heroin use amongst their indigenous populations.
4. The current Turkish Prime Minister, Mr Ecevit, campaigned for office on the platform of allowing the peasants to recommence opium growing. Opium growth in Turkey has now recommenced and it seems most likely that a sizeable portion of the Turkish crop is finding its way to Amsterdam. There is also the fact that much opium was stockpiled in Turkey during the years when growth was supposedly forbidden, and that has recently been released in bulk.

The Amsterdam manufacturers, while their main market must be New York, appear to have few of the Corsicans' qualms about releasing heroin to the local populous. Amsterdam—where the maximum penalty for possession of any narcotic is four years imprisonment—has a large and growing junkie community. Heroin also finds its way out of Amsterdam to Heidelberg's hungry GI community, to Paris, to Brussels... and, in quantities that are reportedly increasing by the month, to London.

Deal gone down

Very little is understood by the Home Office and by the police force about the trends and fluctuations of dope dealing.

...by the early '70s, the "French connection" was in disarray...

Four or five years ago it was feasible to make a comfortable living out of selling hash, supplemented with a little LSD. Indeed, few dealers would consider buying or selling anything else. Hash was available in reasonable quantity at a wholesale price of between £100 and £150 per pound. Which meant that ounces of hash could be retailed for £10-£13, and still leave the dealer with a living wage. There were consequently many dealers in soft drugs, with a growing clientele, and the image of the 'community dealer' grew up—giving credit here and samples there, looking out for the quality of the hash he passed on, generally taking

conscientious interest in his work.

But, as anyone who uses the stuff these days knows only too well, the days of plentiful cheap hash seem gone for good. Apart from the obvious effects of increased police efficiency under Robert Mark, and less corruption (which means that confiscated dope is no longer finding its way back onto the market) there have been a number of small factors which, combined, add up to a shortage of hash. For a long time, London served as a kind of entrepot to the hash trade—the stuff would usually stop off here on its way to the States from Africa and the East, and English dealers would be given the opportunity of buying up reasonable quantities. This is no longer the case. The amount of hash coming from the Middle East has decreased since the 'troubles' there escalated, and what there is of it usually travels via Amsterdam. Also, it is possible that a shift has occurred in the use of dealing capital, away from the risky smuggling of bulky, heavily scented hash and towards the smuggling of easily transportable, difficult to detect powders.

Whatever the main reasons may have been, the effect of this hash shortage is indisputable. The price of hash has more than trebled since 1971. A pound can cost more than £400, which means that those who have the capital to buy it must sell an ounce for at least £27-£30 in order to profit. This has given most dealers a clear-cut choice: go out of business or expand your trade to encompass other drugs. A lot of dealers, certainly, opted for the former. Equally certainly, a lot began to subsidise their declining hash trade with other drugs—amphetamine sulphate, cocaine, barbiturate and amphetamine pills, and more latterly, heroin. As the rapid increase in illicit heroin imports has only really occurred since the early months of this year, the Home Office has seen little evidence to attract their concern. The only figures available at this stage indicate that the amount of illicit heroin seized by customs and police so far this year is more than double the amount seized throughout all of last year. But seizure figures can be interpreted to mean many things. They are about as accurate a guide to the number of heroin users in this country as the Home Office's official number of registered junkies is—which is to say, inaccurate. The Home Office will not learn of any heroin epidemic until the epidemic is thoroughly underway, and 'preventive' action is consequently impossible.

Awaiting addiction

It seems that two distinct social groups are in danger from illicit heroin abuse. The first is the (perhaps inaccurately named) 'sophisticated' drug users—that is, the people accustomed to relaxing with soft drugs, hash, LSD, occasionally cocaine, who are by and large well informed about the effects and perils of narcotics; but who are likely to be tempted into dilettantish use, and who are likely to allow their very sophistication to lull them into a blasé acceptance of heroin—"I know too much about these things to allow myself to get hooked". There is a popular myth among users of illicit drugs that only those who deeply and subconsciously want a habit develop one. This is rubbish. While some disturbed characters may be more

heroin itself has no favourites. *Anybody* who uses the drug frequently enough will develop a tolerance and subsequent physical addiction.

The second group, however, is more disturbing to people like Bob Searchfield of SCODA (the Standing Conference On Drug Abuse). He calls them the 'poly-drug' users, and defines them as being mainly young, certainly unsophisticated, and usually working-class:

"These young drug users are likely to be using a wide range of substances including illicitly obtained and ethically prescribed heroin and phsyseptone (methadone ampules) ritalin and other amphetamine-like drugs, barbiturates and non-barbiturate hypnotics, some major and minor tranquillisers, hallucinogens, patent-medicines, and alcohol. As such he is far less discriminating in what he uses, choices being governed mainly by availability and cost, and to a much lesser extent desired effect."

These kids inherited the illicit drug market created by the late sixties 'drug culture' without that culture's social pattern and conscious political direction. They resemble their Mod forbears of the early sixties in their unpretentious use of drugs to get as far out of it all as possible. But the difference between this generation and the Mods is the difference between heroin and purple hearts. Because, although there are as yet no figures to suggest that heroin has been added in any great degree to their usual intake of barbs, speed and alcohol, should it do so, the result would be catastrophic.

Heroin is a dangerous drug in any form. Illicit heroin, however, offers more potential for overdose than prescribed heroin simply because it is impossible to gauge its purity. It would be wrong to suggest that death is the inevitable fate of all junkies. A 'clean' habit, sustained with sterilised needles, pure heroin, and distilled water can last for decades, and there are many to testify to that. They could also testify to the incidental effects, such as personal neglect, social ostracism, waking after a string of restless nights with a cold grey fog around the brain, incapable, living on junk time . . . time that is measured by the hours between fixes. And if you develop a heroin addiction, that's likely to be the time you'll measure for the rest of your life, because there is no certain cure for heroin addiction. There are possible routes to cure, still to be explored, such as the Scottish doctor's acupuncture-based therapy which helped Eric Clapton, but these are underfinanced backwaters of medicine and seem likely to remain so for a good many years.

In fact, should a heroin epidemic of any size break out in this country, it will be almost totally uncatered for. Our underfinanced health service's notion of a drug abuser revolves around the anachronism of the mid-sixties Piccadilly junkie. But even that Piccadilly junkie would be in trouble today. The NHS makes little or no provision for cure or even understanding of addiction. The amounts that they prescribe are haphazard and often unrealistic, and their main answer to the problem seems to be: 'When in doubt, prescribe methadone'. The number of registered heroin addicts in this country fell between 1971 and 1973 from 375 to 322. The number of registered methadone addicts rose from 877 to 1121.

...the Turkish PM. Mr Ecevit, campaigned on the platform of recommencing opium growing...

But what of the day clinics, those independent bodies that see the junkie as a social being, not to be divorced from his community and day-to-day struggles? Well, during one of the weeks that this article was researched there was *not one* day centre open and available to addicts. Some were temporarily closed for 're-assessment'. Others had been forced into closure by a withdrawal of finance. CURE is one of the latter, and its story is worth telling.

CURE was founded in the late sixties as a day centre for junkies who were motivated to withdraw. Unlike the Health Service clinics, CURE did not believe that a transfer of dependency from heroin to another drug was any great achievement. So the drugs that they used to ease withdrawal pains were usually 'short action' drugs, and were always taken orally. Most importantly, the addict was not removed to an artificially trouble-free environment. He took his cure in the material world.

In late 1974 CURE found themselves rapidly running out of money. They asked the Department of Health for money. The Department offered to fund CURE's monthly deficit while an examination into the organisation was carried out. A doctor and a reader in social administration spent three days with CURE during a three week investigation, and finally filed a secret report which resulted in the refusal of the Area Health Authority to finance the operation. Only after this decision did CURE see the report. They found what they claimed to be a host of misrepresentations. A meeting was then held with the Probation Service, SCODA, Release, local GPs, the Blenheim Project, and many other concerned bodies.

This meeting agreed to start a CURE-type 'bridging' operation on May 1 to care for the dispossessed junkies. In CURE meetings a 22-year-old addict of six years called Sheila Lane stressed her need for support from some such bridging operation. She had been in daily attendance at CURE for seven months, and had surprised workers there by her fortitude during the setbacks.

Initially the Area Health Authority supported the bridging operation in principle, and preparations were underway. Less than a week later the AHA suddenly claimed that they could not provide medical facilities, and on May 23 the bridging operation folded. Ten days later Sheila Lane overdosed and died.

The story is a sadly realistic indication of the way that junkies are regarded by the British system. The NHS's record in treating addiction is not so impressive that they can afford to kill any competition. As one CURE worker said: 'The closure of CURE removed one answer from a field where there are a variety of questions.'

The modest proposals
Heroin itself is no more of a problem than gunpowder or the split atom. It's the human application of the stuff that causes trouble, and ultimately only a wiser humanity will learn to do away

with such pests. In the meantime, there are two or three measures which could be adopted by governments genuinely concerned with alleviating the suffering caused by heroin misuse.

Buying the bulk opium crop from its growers. This scheme, half-heartedly attempted by the US in Turkey, could be adopted with more conviction and success elsewhere. While Adrian Cowell was spending 18 months with the Shan State Army in the Golden Triangle filming 'The Opium Warlords' for ATV, he helped them draw up a charter of proposals to present to the US Government concerning the opium trade.

Being unhappy with the present situation, the SSA pointed out that at least one third of the world's illicit opium could be bought at its source for about twelve million dollars, chicken-feed to the US Government. They would guarantee delivery, and if the US didn't want to buy, then there were plenty who did. In 1972 Cowell delivered these proposals to the American Bureau of Narcotics representative in Bangkok, Fred Dick. After Cowell had left, Dick shredded the proposals, a fact which emerged when he was fired last year. However, all may not be completely lost.

Cowell testified before a Congressional hearing on the heroin trade, and was later approached by Congressman Wolff, who asked him to arrange a meeting with the king-pin of the Burmese opium trade for him. In January of this year, Wolff and another congressman flew to Southeast Asia to talk to a gentleman dubbed 'the Commander'.

They discovered that due to a shortage of world *legal* opium (even the US has been forced to release its emergency 'strategic stockpile'), the price had risen to between thirty and forty million dollars. It is possible that Wolff and Co. on consideration, decided to talk no more with Turkey, which would be a shame. Forty million dollars is still a small price to keep 600 tons of opium (60 tons of heroin) off the market every year.

Decriminalising soft drugs, particularly hash. The suggestion that cannabis use leads automatically to narcotic addiction is, of course, a laughable one. But there is little point in pretending that some narcotics users have not been introduced to hard drugs incidentally, through association with the illegal drugs trade. They came to buy cannabis, and they went away with . . . ? By classifying both heroin and hash as illegal, the law has forced them together in the same covert business. And while illegality has artificially forced the price of an ounce of mediocre hash as high as that of a gram of heroin, there is always the risk that indiscriminate users might just find the latter to be better value.

Educating the medical profession. The notorious Petro affair of the late sixties was less a case of cynical over-prescribing on that doctor's part than an example of the inadequacy of most GPs in coping with junkies' problems. Petro was pilloried because he associated with addicts whereas most self-respecting doctors would have nothing to do with them.

Many of today's clinics have little more sympathy or concern for their patients. Even the best intentioned tend to follow an ill-conceived plan

which SCODA's Bob Searchfield describes as "weaning from one drug to another on to another, with the supposed end result to be a totally drug-free state--the kind of state that hardly anybody in this country lives in."

That said, the theory behind the 'British System' for treating addicts, that their dependency should be recog-

nised, is a sound one. It is deserving of more imaginative practice.

...heroin
has no favourites...

The history of the heroin 'problem' is littered with well-meaning proposals

such as these. Perhaps an epidemic is necessary before they can be seriously discussed. If they are not, the problem will continue to be what it has been for 77 years--a direct result of governmental naivety, stupidity, and more than occasionally downright brutal cynicism.

DIE WELT

Hamburg, 12 September, 1975

HEROIN BUSINESS WITH GI'S BLOOMS IN GERMANY

In the U.S., agents infiltrate the heroin-traffic business. The number of addicts is levelling off. In Germany, however, the number of heroin addicts doubles each year. And a relatively large number of those are Americans -- GI addicts. After the U.S. dealers, most of the heroin ends up in German hands.

The Army newspaper, "Stars and Stripes" researched the following:

3500 of the U.S. soldiers in Germany (1.7% of 208,000) regularly take hard drugs, in most cases lethal heroin.

In the last year U.S. authorities confiscated 12 kilos of heroin in Germany; the German police seized 34 kilos.

Only 2% of all hard drugs on the market is ever confiscated.

Heroin dealers have sold 500 million marks worth in Germany; the sales to Germans are included in this figure.

For the past few years, European distribution center for heroin has been Amsterdam.

In the center of Amsterdam Chinese clans rule over the market; the five top managers are aware of all activities, but cannot be convicted because they will never be caught with heroin on their persons.

A kilo of Amsterdam heroin costs \$6000 wholesale. A kilo is then sold in Holland for quadruple the price. In Frankfurt a gram costs \$120. The seller divides the gram into 30 or 40 portions, which he takes himself or sells for \$10 a portion. That means that the total price per kilo works out to be \$300,000 to \$400,000. No other line of business makes as much money as the heroin trade.

However, no other line of business is so risky.

Robert L., 21, ex-dealer, complains: "When I first really started dealing, I got a revolver. The police didn't bother me, I was afraid of the other dealers."

Robert L. belongs to a corps of ex-GI's trafficking in narcotics. These discharged soldiers live, sometimes illegally, in cities where thousands of GIs and their dependents are stationed -- like Kaiserslautern, Stuttgart, Frankfurt, Nuremberg.

The war against the dealers is difficult. Americans chiefly rely on urinalysis, the method which is more than 99% foolproof. Since, February, urine tests have been taken from soldiers of all units without warning and under inspection.

The urine samples are sealed and sent under guard from German bases, bases in the Persian Gulf, Ethiopia, Iran, Spain, and England to Wiesbaden. There, in the U.S. Army testing laboratory, 55 technicians run tests on 3000 samples each day, each year 45,000 liters of urine -- two truck tanks full to the brim. If the analysis is positive, the surprised addict is honorably discharged from the Army.

told of a urine ring falsifying the tests. If an addict wants to stay in the Army, he buys a negative analysis. If he wants an honorable discharge, he buys a positive one. The price is the same -- merely \$40 per sample.

The business of urine is only the surface of the problem. The main concern of narcotics agents is a development coming this winter: This summer the Turks again planted poppies and harvested opium. In several months their heroin will flow into Europe. And presumably the demand will increase with the supply.

In Deutschland blüht das Heroin-Geschäft mit den GIs

Sp. Bonn

In den Vereinigten Staaten unterwandern Agenten das Gewerbe der Heroin-Händler. Die Zahl der Süchtigen stagniert. In Deutschland dagegen verdoppelt sich die Zahl der Heroin-Süchtigen jedes Jahr. Und verhältnismäßig viele davon sind allerdings Amerikaner — süchtige GIs. Über US-Händler gelangt auch das meiste Heroin in deutsche Hände.

Die Armee-Zeitung „Stars and Stripes“ hat recherchiert:

④ 3500 der US-Soldaten in Deutschland (1,7 Prozent von 208 000) nehmen regelmäßig harte Drogen, in den meisten Fällen das tödliche Heroin.

④ Im vergangenen Jahr konfiszierten die US-Behörden in Deutschland 12 Kilo Heroin, die deutsche Polizei beschlagnahmte 34 Kilo.

④ Nur 2 Prozent aller harten Drogen auf dem Markt werden konfisziert.

④ 500 Millionen Mark setzen Heroin-Händler 1974 in Deutschland um; die Verkäufe an Deutsche sind in dieser Summe enthalten.

Europäisches Verteilerzentrum für Heroin ist seit einigen Jahren Amsterdam.

Im Zentrum Amsterdam beherrschen chinesische Clans den Markt; die fünf Top-Manager sind aktenkundig, aber nicht zu überführen, weil sie nie mit Heroin angetroffen werden.

Ein Kilo Heroin frei Haus Amsterdam kostet 6000 Dollar. Verkauft wird ein Kilo in Holland dann für das Vierfache. In Frankfurt kostet ein Gramm schon 120 Dollar. Der Käufer teilt ein Gramm in 30 oder 40 Portionen, die er selbst nimmt oder für 10 Dollar pro Portion verkauft. Das entspricht einem Kilo-Endpreis von 300 000 bis 400 000 Dollar. In keiner Branche wird so viel verdient wie im Heroin-Geschäft.

Keine Branche ist aber auch so riskoreich.

Robert L., 21, Ex-Händler, klagt: „Als ich richtig ins Geschäft einstieg, be-

schaffte ich mir einen Revolver. Mich stört nicht die Polizei, ich habe Angst vor den anderen Händlern.“

Robert L. gehört zu der Kohorte von Ex-GIs, die mit Rauschgift handeln. Diese Entlassenen leben, zum Teil illegal, in den Städten, in denen Tausende von GIs mit ihren Angehörigen stationiert sind, wie in Kaiserslautern, Stuttgart, Frankfurt und Nürnberg.

Der Kampf gegen die Händler ist mühsam. Die Amerikaner stützen sich dabei vor allem auf die Urin-Analyse, eine Methode, die zu mehr als 99 Prozent sicher ist. Seit Februar werden von Soldaten aller Einheiten, ohne Warnung und unter Aufsicht, Urin-Proben genommen.

Die Fläschchen mit Urin werden versiegelt und unter Aufsicht aus den deutschen Standorten, von den Stützpunkten am Persischen Golf, aus Äthiopien, aus dem Iran, aus Spanien und aus England nach Wiesbaden geschickt. Dort untersuchen im US Army Testing Laboratory jeden Tag 55 Techniker 3000 Proben; pro Jahr sind es 45 000 Liter Urin — zwei Tanklastzüge, bis zum Rande voll. Ist die Analyse positiv, wird der betroffene Süchtige in Ehren aus der Armee entlassen.

Mißbrauch ist bei dieser Prozedur nicht zu unterbinden. Ein US-Sanitäter berichtete von einem Urin-Ring, bei dem Proben feilgeboten werden. Will ein Süchtiger in der Armee bleiben, kauft er eine negative Probe, ist er nicht süchtig, will er aber (in Ehren) entlassen werden, kauft er eine positive Probe. Der Preis ist gleich: schlichte 40 Dollar pro Fläschchen.

Das Geschäft mit dem Urin tröpfelt nur am Rande. Die Hauptsorge der Narkotik-Agenten gilt der Entwicklung im kommenden Winter: Die Türken pflanzten in diesem Sommer wieder Mohn und ernteten Opium. Ihr Heroin wird in einigen Monaten nach Europa fließen. Und mit dem Angebot wird vermutlich auch die Nachfrage steigen.

NEW YORK TIMES
9 October 1975

PENTAGON VOICING DOUBT ON DETENTE

Study Concludes Russians
Exploit Ties With U.S.

By DAVID BINDER

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 8—The Defense Department is circulating an intelligence estimate asserting that the Soviet Union

is using the policy of détente to gain dominance over the West in all fields, Administration officials said today.

The document, entitled "Detente in Soviet Strategy," carries the seal of the Defense Intelligence Agency and is believed by State Department officials to represent the views of Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger.

A high-ranking State Department official who is familiar with the 10-page study said it contradicted Secretary of State Kissinger's views of Soviet strategic intentions.

"I am very surprised they would put out what is a political estimate," the State Department official said. A Pentagon spokesman said the study, dated Sept. 2, was "not classified" but would go no further.

Document Was Classified

The State Department official said that when he read the study about a month ago it was classified in one or another category of confidentiality.

he copy made available to The New York Times was one of several given yesterday to reporters.

The official went on to say

that the study, written by Wynfred Joshua, Soviet Desk officer of the Defense Intelligence Agency, was "rather critical—suggesting that detente was, rather a charade the Russians are playing." He said he had "disagreements with it."

Dr. Joshua, a specialist in Soviet affairs, who was formerly at the Stanford Research Institute in California, declined to answer questions about her study.

The thesis of the Joshua détente is intended to facilitate their attainment of ultimate, over-all dominance over the West."

She explains "dominance" as "breakup of Western alliances, the eviction of military presence from Europe and the achievement of Soviet dominance there, and the establishment of Soviet political, military, technological and economic superiority worldwide." "So far, détente has served

Soviet purposes well," she continues. "For this reason the Soviets will not lightly jettison their détente strategy."

"Therefore, as long as the USSR is committed to détente, the U.S. can step up its demands in negotiations with the Soviets and need not hesitate to demand a clearly compar-

able price for every concession."

Asked to comment on this estimate, a State Department official said it was a good deal harsher than the position of Mr. Kissinger.

Last May in a speech in St. Louis, Mr. Kissinger defined the Administration's détente policy

in the following words:

"The United States is determined to maintain the hopeful new trends in U.S.-Soviet relations on the basis of realism and reciprocity. But it is equally determined to resist pressures or the exploitation of local conflict."

NEW YORK TIMES
16 October 1975

PACT WITH SOVIET ON MISSILE CURES REPORTED IN PERIL

U.S. Officials, Differing With
Kissinger, Doubt an Early
Resolution of Issues

By LESLIE H. GELB

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 15 — Several authoritative Administration officials say the talks with the Soviet Union on strategic arms limitations are in trouble.

The officials said in interviews that the Administration was waiting for a response from Moscow to its latest proposal and expected that the response would not move the negotiations, now stalled, along very much.

This estimate stands in contrast to Secretary of State Kissinger's public remarks on Sunday that "about 90 per cent of the negotiation is substantially completed." The officials said Mr. Kissinger was trying to be upbeat.

Differ on Significance

Some officials agreed that 50 per cent of the important issues had been resolved, but said hard political decisions still needed to be made on secondary matters. Other officials contended that the unresolved issues, concerning the Soviet bomber called the Backfire, the air-breathing American cruise missile and the defini-

tion of a large missile, were of primary importance and that the talks might well fail over these issues.

The consensus among officials is that if there is no agreement before the Presidential election next year is in full swing, the odds against a final settlement will increase sharply. Many feel that Soviet-American détente could not survive failure.

Problems in Accord

The officials attributed the difficulty to the three following factors:

①The complexity of reconciling Soviet strategic forces, weighted with large land-based missiles, with a more balanced American land, sea and air posture, along with the different directions being taken by the two sides in the development of new weapons.

②The many misunderstandings that the officials said had been created by sloppy and hurried negotiations between President Ford and Leonid I. Brezhnev, the Soviet party leader, in Vladivostok last November, coupled with several instances of Mr. Ford's and Mr. Kissinger's backing away from concessions previously made.

③Important philosophical differences between Mr. Kissinger and Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger over the significance of the Backfire bomber and over how necessary it was to conclude this particular arms agreement with Moscow.

The officials also talked about what they would not say publicly, namely that Mr. Ford would link any future concessions to Moscow to the strength of conservative opposition to détente in his own party.

As a result of all these prob-

lems, the officials said, the National Security Council in September presented the President with nine alternative proposals, and Mr. Kissinger gave Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko in New York a new proposal that he knew would be unacceptable.

At Vladivostok, it was agreed that neither side could exceed 2,400 strategic delivery vehicles defined as intercontinental land-based missiles, long-range submarine-launched missiles and long-range bombers. Within this ceiling, neither side could have more than 1,320 missiles with re-entry vehicles equipped with multiple warheads.

Four major problems soon appeared: on whether to count the Backfire and the cruise missile as part of the 2,400 ceiling, on the definition of a heavy missile and on how to verify whether a deployed missile contained multiple warheads.

The Backfire problem emerged because Mr. Kissinger never stated at Vladivostok that this new bomber should be included in the ceiling. When, at Pentagon insistence, he later raised the issue, Moscow contended that the Backfire was only a medium-range bomber and should not be included.

The issue of the cruise missile, was left ambiguous in Vladivostok. The Russians subsequently contended that they assumed that any missile with a range of more than 600 kilometers (360 miles) would count. Washington said it had assumed that missiles would be counted only if they were ballistic, that is, traveled outside the atmosphere. Cruise missiles fly in the atmosphere.

In Helsinki, last August, President Ford proposed to Mr. Brezhnev to include air-launched cruise missiles with a range of more than about 2,000 miles. This was not accepted. The United States has not offered any range limit on sea-launched cruise missiles.

The issue of how to define a heavy missile dates from the interim offensive missile agree-

ment reached in 1972. Moscow then agreed to limit its deployment of large SS-9 missiles to 309.

Bezhnev Wants Linkage

Since then, Moscow has continued to emphasize heavy missiles and wants to retain this advantage. The Pentagon wants it stopped.

The fourth major issue concerning verification of missiles with multiple warheads has been settled in principle. Moscow has agreed that if a missile has been tested with multiple warheads, all missiles of that kind shall be considered as counting against the 1,320 ceiling.

However, Mr. Brezhnev told Mr. Ford that he would make this concession only if Mr. Ford made concessions on the Backfire and cruise missiles.

After the National Security Council meeting, on Sept. 17, had considered nine alternative proposals, Mr. Ford asked Mr. Kissinger and Mr. Schlesinger to work out a new proposal between them.

Mr. Kissinger presented this proposal to Mr. Gromyko on Sept. 21 in New York. Some officials said it sought a balance between the number of Backfires that Moscow could deploy above the 2,400 ceiling with a roughly equal number of American cruise missiles above the ceiling.

From Mr. Kissinger's point of view, it is not a matter of importance that the Russians be allowed a 200 to 300 Backfires, given the thousands of delivery vehicles both sides already have. For him, the concessions are minor compared with the importance of having the agreement.

From Mr. Schlesinger's perspective, the benefits of détente are illusory and the advantages of concession suspect. Officials said he would not be alarmed if this agreement were not concluded.

THE ECONOMIST OCTOBER 4, 1975

Carry on cruising

If a missile deal makes the Americans give up the new weapon that counterbalances Russia's lead in megatonnage, it will be worse than no deal at all

The nub of détente is Salt. Make no mistake about it: grain sales, visas for journalists, grudging permission for Russian chess masters to marry French girls, even troop reductions in central Europe, desirable though

they may be, are peanuts compared with regulating the strategic nuclear systems of the superpowers. If the big nuclear weapons can be limited—or, better still, reduced—in a stabilising way, then there is détente. If they

cannot, then the cornerstone of detente has ceased to exist, and no number of toasts, documents and ballet dancers can make up for it. Since the Americans and Russians are still groping for a new agreement in the second round of their strategic arms limitation talks (Salt 2), it is important to get this straight.

Easier said than done. The results of Salt 1, when criticised as inadequate or worse, are often defended on the ground that, even if defective, they did something for detente; at the same time other people tend to excuse the inadequacies of detente in general by the idea that the other deals between Russia and America have somehow aided Salt. Clearly this cannot cut both ways. An equitable nuclear agreement is what it takes to make the world safer; but "equitable" is the key word, not "agreement," which is too often and too readily used with approval without asking whether a particular agreement is good or bad.

The best of a bad Mirv job

There are three main issues that must be settled as part of a new Salt deal: how to handle multiple independently-targetable re-entry vehicles (Mirvs), the Backfire bomber and the cruise missile. The Mirv problem is best-known. Salt 1 did not deal with Mirvs; the preliminary understanding President Ford and Mr Brezhnev reached at Vladivostok last year specified that 1,320 weapons on each side could have Mirvs, but it did not solve the problem that has skewered every arms control parley since the second world war: how do you check it? The Russians as usual refused to permit on-site inspection and would like the Americans to take their word for it. The Americans have searched high and low for a technical solution that will permit camera-carrying satellites to tell reasonably well which silos have the Mirvs, and which haven't, without being able to see inside the missiles themselves. They have also suggested that it might help if both superpowers physically grouped together their clumps of mirved missiles, in different places from the un-mirved ones.

But it seems certain that whatever is agreed upon will leave some room for cheating. The signs are that the Americans are now prepared to shrug their shoulders about this. The best that can be hoped for is to keep Russia's cheating within limits, while looking harder at the other two problems—which are likely to prove the sticky ones.

Russia has relied much more on missiles than on bombers for its intercontinental nuclear power. But the supersonic Tupolev bomber (codenamed Backfire by Nato) came along a couple of years ago and created a new roadblock for Salt. The Russians claim it does not have the range to reach the United States, and is thus a tactical weapon which should not count against the Vladivostok total of 2,400 offensive strategic systems allowed for each side. The Americans reply that range doesn't matter because bombers can refuel in the air—just as their own huge B-52s are equipped to do. One possible solution is to count the American FB-111 (the specialised American F-111 that is used as a strategic bomber) against the Backfire. But the reverse—counting neither—will not do at all. The Americans are

not going to build any more FB-111s; but it looks as if the Russians think they may have a winner in the Backfire, and plan to build a big fleet of them. So not counting either could leave the Russians with a large, uncounted, advantage.

But America's cruise missile may turn out to be the biggest problem of all. These missiles will be relatively cheap; they will fly low (under 200 feet, following the terrain), thus making radar detection extremely difficult, and they are slow, which gives them a long range but makes them fairly easy to shoot down if spotted. The Americans have been moving ahead rapidly in the development of these weapons, and it now appears certain that by the mid-1980s they will have cruise missiles that can be launched from aircraft, surface ships, or submerged submarines, will travel 1,500–2,000 miles and land within something like 30 feet of their target. (Yes, really.) The Russians are behind in the technology required to make such missiles, and consequently want to put severe limits on their numbers or their range. The Americans feel that they should not slow down or stop development of these weapons and sacrifice their technological supremacy in this field for anything less than a genuine and comparable self-denial by the other side.

There are other reasons against a deal to limit cruise missiles. Their small size, their ability to be launched from almost anything and their similarity to small unmanned aircraft would create almost insurmountable verification problems. And the extreme accuracy of the new missiles, combined with recent advances in conventional explosives, makes the cruise missile a useful weapon for conventional war (and would require fairly large numbers when used this way). So even a fairly mild Salt limitation on the cruise missile would amount to selling the same horse twice: not only would it restrict an American nuclear-war weapon, but it would probably rule out a conventional-war one as well.

It's the counterbalance

There is no good measure of the power of any strategic weapon, but the cruise missile is harder than most to fit into the usual pattern. Nobody knows what another war would be like, and how important the special features of the cruise missile might then be. Even if these things were not true, the Russians have little to offer in return. The main elements on which their power depends—numbers of missiles, and their capacity to carry heavy warheads—were set in concrete at Vladivostok, and the limit on numbers is so high that it represents almost no real restriction.

The Americans have in the past compensated for Russian pre-eminence in numbers and throw-weight by developing superior technology: such things as greater accuracy, and Mirvs. Now the Russians have Mirvs and are improving their accuracy to something near American standards. The cruise missile is a major element by which the United States can make up for Russian superiority in other areas. It is important that the Americans should not bargain away their lead here merely for the sake of having a Salt 2 document to sign. Something is not always better than nothing.

NEW YORK TIMES

30 September 1975

Helsinki Aftermath

Dr. Joseph Luns, Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, has become the first major Western official to offer an evaluation of the consequences to date of the signing of the Helsinki Declaration last summer. His criticism that Moscow is not living up to the agreement tends far more to support last July's skeptics than it does to back President Ford

and Secretary of State Kissinger, who defended the utility and importance of the Helsinki Declaration and its pretentious signing ceremony.

As Dr. Luns notes, "the emphasis placed on international ideological struggle by leaders of the Soviet Union has so far continued unabated, as have the restrictions on human rights in its own country." And the NATO leader correctly points to the vast difference in attitude indicated by his organization's action in notifying Moscow and its allies of Western military

maneuvers in Europe, while there has been no reciprocal action from Moscow regarding the current series of Warsaw Pact military maneuvers.

Meanwhile in the Soviet Union itself a series of spokesmen have made plain that Moscow will implement the Helsinki Declaration's provisions regarding increased civil rights as it sees fit. One of the latest of these dispellers of illusion is a Soviet Foreign Ministry official, Yuri Kashlev. Mr. Kashlev asserts that many bourgeois publications propagandize that which

is contradictory to Soviet legislation and to the morality of Soviet society." Charging that many Western media spread anti-Communist ideas as well as "racism and chauvinism, the cult of violence and pornography . . ." he then asks, "Is there really anyone in the West who seriously hopes that the socialist countries will sometime allow the 'free circulation' of such 'information' in their society?" In other words Soviet censorship and restriction of foreign publications remain essentially the same after Helsinki as before.

WALL STREET JOURNAL, Thursday, Oct. 16, 1975

REVIEW & OUTLOOK

SALT in Your Eye

Secretary of State Kissinger has been making public remarks about the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks that are optimistic on their face but certain to be interpreted pessimistically. His friends in the press are writing that the talks are in deep trouble. This is an almost certain sign that Mr. Kissinger has agreement with the Russians in view, and is now turning his attention to selling it to the Americans.

A false sense of urgency has been one of the hallmarks of the strategic arms negotiations, particularly in selling to Americans the series of agreements that have been milestones along the march toward eventual Soviet strategic superiority. We are now being told that a SALT agreement is needed to preserve detente. At other times we are told that the chief purpose of detente is to reach SALT agreements. And of course, that the agreements are needed immediately because this is our last chance to stop the "spiral" of the "arms race."

The facts are that while of course each side competes with the other, there is no "spiral" and no "race" toward some Armageddon. At least not on the U.S. side. In terms of real dollars, the budget for strategic weapons has now declined to less than a third of its peak total. The aggregate destructive power of deployed weapons has also sharply declined as the weapons have become more accurate. Technologies are now in sight that would allow replacement of nuclear warheads with conventional ones for many targets, but the agreement Secretary Kissinger has in view would probably curtail them.

This false sense of urgency has weighed heavily on the American

side of the negotiations. Despite Secretary Kissinger's preposterous claim that the Soviets have made "all" of the concessions, the only arms development any of the agreements has stopped so far is the antiballistic missile, in advanced development by the Americans but not the Russians. Similarly, the salient fact about the Vladivostok agreement-to-agree is that in terms of missile "throw weight," or the lifting power that determines the potential number and size of warheads, the Soviets codified an advantage of roughly three-to-one.

A further and more immediate example lies in the development of negotiations since Vladivostok. The ostensible purpose of these talks is to work out the technical details of the agreement in principle. In fact, the chief Soviet objective has become curtailing an American development not even mentioned in the Vladivostok communique. This is the cruise missile, a pilotless airplane with super-accurate guidance. This development is the best chance for the U.S. to offset the Soviet lead in throw weight, and also the opportunity to replace nuclear warheads with non-nuclear ones.

How this issue worked its way into the supposedly technical follow-on talks is itself an example of the hazards of haste. The agreement in principle stated that the agreed limitations on total weapons would apply to "air launched missiles" of over a certain range. The range itself is at issue, being variously described in Mr. Kissinger's statements as "600 miles" and "600 kilometers." But the bigger question is whether the term "missiles" means "ballistic missiles," as some American negotiators have privately said

they understood, or also includes the air-breathing cruise missile. Not so incidentally, there was not one military adviser in the American party to Vladivostok.

The one unambiguous thing about the clause is that it applies only to air-launched missiles. The clauses on land-based and sea-based missiles specify that the ceilings are on ballistic missiles. So the Soviets are now asking for an interpretation that would count against the ceilings both air-launched and sea-launched cruise missiles with ranges over 600 kilometers. First of all, we have the guidance technology within reach, they don't. Second, most of our major cities and many military targets are within 600 kilometers of the sea, theirs aren't. Third, there is absolutely no way to tell from looking at a cruise missile what its range is. On this point we would have to take the Russian word.

Obviously, American assent to such a proposal would be worth a great deal to the Soviet generals. They might even buy it by dropping some of their more outlandish positions on other outstanding issues, maybe even throwing in a cosmetic concession on throw weight to ease Mr. Kissinger's troubles with Congress. On past form, this is the kind of bargain we can expect, one that codifies Soviet advantages while foreclosing ours.

There is no urgent reason to accept such an agreement, no reason not simply to wait until the Soviets are willing to strike a more even bargain. The technologies now on the horizon point not to a vastly more dangerous world, but to a slightly less dangerous one. And no meaningful detente can be built except on the basis of true equality and true reciprocity.

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

Wednesday, October 15, 1975

Helsinki — A Soviet view

By Alexander Druzhinin

The Soviet public thinks highly of the part the United States played in preparing and conducting the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The Soviet Union was quite pleased with the statements made by U.S. spokesmen who highly assessed the results achieved in Helsinki.

However, alongside the positive assessments of the conference, voices can be heard in the U.S. questioning the value of the conference from the point of view of the interests of U.S. foreign policy. These people give the impression that because the Washington administration was not firm enough only Russia has benefited from the conference. The U.S. is being criticized for "having made concessions" to the Soviet Union in the final act signed in Helsinki, thereby recognizing the status quo in Europe without receiving anything in return.

Is this an accurate evaluation? The European conference set forth 10 principles of security and cooperation in Europe. In our eyes, they are all equally important for the relaxation of the tensions and for maintaining peace on the European continent. Since the American critics are particularly disturbed by the principle of the inviolability of European frontiers, let us consider whether the recognition of this principle is a "concession" on the part of the U.S. which does not meet its national interests.

True, the Soviet Union is vitally interested in keeping the existing European frontiers intact. The recognition of the principle is considered to be a summation of the political

results of World War II. Is there any need to reiterate that 34 years ago, our violated frontiers resulted in the loss of 20 million Soviet lives in the war against fascism — a system which sought to alter Europe's political map?

Fixing existing borders will be the most important guarantee that disastrous events of Europe's history will not be repeated.

The Soviet Union will not be the only country to benefit if this principle is put into effect. Are not France, Belgium, Holland, and Denmark, which also experienced the horrors of Nazi occupation, just as vitally interested in making their national frontiers inviolable? Doesn't this principle promote the security of Britain, Italy, and the Federal Republic of Germany as well? Most certainly, it meets the interests of all European nations.

Moreover, it meets, to the full extent, the basic national interests of the United States, as a country that has never been isolated from the dramatic developments in Europe.

Any major armed conflict in Europe would inevitably involve American interference. If this is so, what has the U.S. "lost" or "given up" by signing the final act of the European conference?

It is America's vital interest in maintaining peace and security in Europe that compels it to support the other principles laid down in the final act which form the backbone of peaceful coexistence between the European states: sovereign equality of states, renunciation of the use or threat of force, territorial integrity of states, peaceful settlement of

disputes, and nonintervention in internal affairs.

International cooperation in the fields of economics, trade, science, technology, and environmental protection are all questions discussed at the conference. The promotion of such cooperation is now justly regarded as something that will help to ease tensions among nations.

One will lose only when the principles of equality are violated, as was the case when the U.S. Congress tried to force the Soviet Union into making political concessions. By interfering in Russia's internal affairs, the U.S. desired an exchange for granting the Soviet side the most-favored-nation status in trade. As a result, the loser was not the Soviet Union, which is successfully developing non-discriminatory trade relations with other countries, but the United States.

If one is to speak of "concessions," all the participants in the European conference have made concessions to one another. The very results of the conference were made through compromise. However, this was a compromise for the sake of peace. The participants in the conference, by exerting cooperative efforts, have laid down a foundation for a new system of international relationships. We believe that these achievements are the best retort to those who are questioning the value of U.S. participation in the European conference and belittling the importance of the results of the conference for the U.S.

Mr. Druzhinin is a political analyst for the Soviet State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting. This article is supplied by the Novosti Press Agency.

NEW YORK TIMES, WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 8, 1975

Reciprocity After Helsinki

By Georgi A. Arbatov

MOSCOW—After the Final Act was signed at the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the West began making attempts to reduce the significance of the conference to two propositions: the consolidation of the postwar European frontiers (which the West claims is a great

concession to the Soviet Union for which the West expects repayment), and what is termed in diplomatic language the "third basket," covering questions of cooperation in the humanitarian and other fields.

It is this latter consolidation that is the payment that the Soviet Union must give to the West for the West's recognition of the existing European frontiers. In fact, this appears to be the only point of interest to the West in the entire document signed this summer.

Any suspected or real attempts to alter frontiers have always led to suspicion, an arms race, and ulti-

mately to war. To prevent these tensions is in the vital interests not only of the Soviet Union but of all other European powers as well.

It is a mistaken concept that the Soviet Union must "owe" something to someone for such a commitment. The Soviet people have already paid in full for the existing borders with what is most dear: twenty million lives. Death is a price paid by many other peoples as well.

It is a distortion to assert that now that the Soviet Union has obtained everything it wants, the future of détente will depend on the size of "smart-money" that it gives to the West through unilateral concessions in its internal affairs. Not only is this formulation wrong, but behind it one can easily discern attempts to undermine the effectiveness of this major achievement.

The notion of the "third basket" is generally applied to provisions pertaining to the intentions and readiness of states to cooperate in such areas as culture, science and education, and information. Also included are the interests in solving various humanitarian questions, including family ties and marriage between citizens of different countries. On signing the Final Act, the Soviet Union expressed quite clearly its intention to fulfill these provisions on a reciprocal basis and in strict conformity with the spirit of

the document.

The Soviet Union is consequently hard-pressed to understand the anguish with which this question is discussed in the West. As the Soviet people see it, all these are normal spheres of cooperation that will develop along with the deepening of détente and the growth of mutual confidence. This, in fact, is happening right now.

In terms of international scientific exchange programs, Soviet scientists know well that it is much easier for their United States counterparts to get an entry visa to the Soviet Union. For this purpose, United States scientists must simply apply personally to the Intourist Agency.

For a Soviet scientist to obtain entry into the United States he must receive an official invitation by an organization or a person who will vouch for the Russian's "good behavior." In several spheres, contacts are simply prohibited. For instance, if an official of a Soviet trade union visits the United States in any capacity, he gets an official warning, along with his entry visa, that any attempt to establish contacts with United States trade unions will be regarded as a violation of the law.

The Soviet Union intends to continue developing ties and contacts in conjunction with the Final Act and other signed agreements. It should be stressed that this is a reciprocal

matter. The implementation of the "third-basket" provisions, as well as other sections of the Final Act, will require efforts from both the Soviet and Western sides, especially because of the blocks set up against these ties.

The sponsors of the campaign directed against the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe expose their intentions eloquently by the fact that the full and true content of the Final Act has not yet been made known to the public in most of the Western countries.

In reference to the item in the Final Act on freedom of information, the Soviet Union intends to earnestly fulfill all provisions recorded. However, if some people regard them as an invitation to fling open the door to subversive anti-Soviet pro-violence

propaganda, or to fan national and racial strife, then they are laboring in vain. Neither the document signed in Helsinki nor détente will permit such occurrences.

It would not be superfluous to recall that, in establishing diplomatic relations in 1933, the Soviet Union and the United States undertook not only to refrain from interfering in one another's internal affairs, but pledged themselves to prevent all individuals and organizations under the Government's direct or indirect control, including organizations financed by the Government, from committing any overt or covert act which might do damage to the tranquility, well-being, order or security of the other side.

It is not clear, however, how this can square with the subversive activi-

ties conducted by the radio stations Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe, which have the official backing of the United States Government.

The organizers of the present campaign have intended to distort the agreements reached in Helsinki and, by laying more and more claims on the Soviet Union, to make it appear as if the Soviet Union is violating these agreements. This, in turn, will lead to a questioning of the validity of the agreements and of détente as a whole.

Georgi A. Arbatov is director of the Institute of United States and Canada Studies of the Soviet Academy of Sciences.

THE WASHINGTON POST

WEDNESDAY OCTOBER 15, 1975

Summit Possibilities

Joseph Kraft

Two cheers are in order for President Ford's decision to hold a summit meeting with leaders of the other main industrial countries in Paris next month. If nothing else, the principal countries can arrange to stop maximizing their problems of recession and inflation. As an added bonus, comparison with other leaders may cause President Ford to see how inadequate are the men and machinery he has put together for managing foreign economic policy in Washington.

Behind the coming summit is the increasing tendency of the major industrial countries to perform as a single economic unit. Because they have come to trade so much with each other, their economic activity has become synchronized.

Thus in 1972 and 1973, for the first time, the United States, Japan, Britain and the European Common Market countries all surged simultaneously into a boom and high inflation. In 1974 and 1975, the pattern was exactly reversed. They all suffered, and continue to suffer, high unemployment and recession.

In retrospect it is clear that the plight of all the industrial countries was worsened by the economic policies followed by each one. Thus in 1972, partially for election reasons, the leading governments were stimulating their domestic economies.

Business men sensing the boom ahead bid like crazy for raw materials and labor. The Russian grain shortage and then the oil boycott intensified the fever. Between June 1973 and June 1974, consumer prices in all the industrial countries, including the United States and excluding only Germany, were running at well over 10 per

cent a year.

With inflation rampant the policymakers in each country then moved in unison to apply the brakes of budget stringency and tight money. Money supply was cut by 50 per cent in France and the United States, and by more than 90 per cent in West Germany. Economic growth in all the industrial countries went suddenly slack.

As Sen. Hubert Humphrey put it in a remarkable speech in Chicago on Sept. 25: "Taken individually, these policies meant a slowdown in economic growth—not cessation. In combination...the result was worldwide recession."

Precisely because of the recession the two strongest leaders in the industrial world—Chancellor Helmut Schmidt of West Germany and President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing of France—have been pushing for an economic summit. After several months of fencing, Mr. Ford finally agreed, and the talks will be held in mid-November with Japan, Britain and perhaps Canada joining the United States, Germany and France.

The dominant agenda item will be coordination of economic policies to smooth out the rapid alternation between inflation and recession. That is the kind of subject which only the top political leaders—as distinct from finance ministers who stick to technical matters—can talk about with confidence.

But with any luck at all, the political leaders can organize their economic policymaking so as to smooth out the

turbulent ups and downs of the past few years. It may even be possible that the Germans, French and Japanese can persuade Mr. Ford that all countries will be better off if he puts a little more steam behind U.S. recovery.

Though less tangible, a second beneficial impact of the meeting will be the effect on President Ford. Three days with the likes of Helmut Schmidt, Harold Wilson and Valéry Giscard d'Estaing should show him that managing a modern economy is serious business—the most serious political business now going, and not one that yields to gladhanding trips through provincial crowds.

Moreover, comparison with the policymaking apparatus of other countries should drive home to Mr. Ford the weakness of his own system. Unlike the other leaders, he is not himself an economist, nor does he have a chief economic adviser to whom he can turn with confidence. He has to thrash out issues in a kind of guerrilla warfare with his secretary of state and his secretary of treasury. So the experience of the economic summit should point up for Mr. Ford a widely recognized point that was voiced with special force the other day by John Anderson, a highly respected Republican leader in the House.

"The United States does not have a coherent and comprehensive foreign economic policy," Mr. Anderson said. "The major obstacle to the formulation of such a policy is the lack of a White House mechanism for resolving policy disputes among administration officials."

Eastern Europe

NEW YORK TIMES
6 October 1975

For Which We Stand: III

By Anthony Lewis

BOSTON, Oct. 5—A leading Soviet authority on American affairs, Georgi A. Arbatov, recently deplored violations of human rights in the United States. He told the readers of *Izvestia* that Americans "suffer such abuses as wiretapping, the keeping of Government dossiers on individuals and 'shameful court reprisals against dissidents."

Those concerned about man's inhumanity to man, around the world, should probably be grateful to Mr. Arbatov for providing comic relief. A spokesman for a country where the scrutiny of individual minds is a major industry complains about imperfections in American freedom and privacy—it is deliciously brazen.

But my favorite is "shameful court reprisals against dissidents." In the Nixon years there were American prosecutions that amounted to official revenge against dissidents, but one after another the attempts failed. In the Soviet Union they never fail.

Consider, for example, the case of Vladimir Bukovsky—a heart rending one even by the standards of official cruelty in the Soviet Union. Bukovsky is a young scientist who most effectively brought to the outside world's attention the misuse of psychiatry in the U.S.S.R. to punish dissidents.

Bukovsky was first arrested at the age of twenty, in 1963, for having a copy of Milovan Djilas's "The New Class." He was declared insane and held for eighteen months in a psychiatric ward. After his release he demonstrated against the repression of others and in 1965 went back to the mental ward for six months. In 1967, after another protest, he was sentenced to three years in a labor camp. Out in 1970, he gave the foreign press copies of the psychiatric diagnoses of a number of dissenters—documentary evidence that aroused pressure by Western psychiatrists against the Soviet practice.

As a result, Bukovsky was arrested in 1971 and again held for psychiatric examination. After widespread protests he was declared sane, but he was tried and convicted for "anti-Soviet propaganda and agitation." His sentence was two years in prison, five in a labor camp, then five in exile. He is in a camp now, reportedly gravely ill.

A recent example of using the law in reprisal against those who are

tice is the case of Andrei Tverdokhlebov. It is not yet so well known as Bukovsky's, but in its way it is as important. For it indicates the Soviet fear of international efforts to protect human rights.

Tverdokhlebov is a physicist who joined Andrei Sakharov, the great Soviet nuclear scientist and defender of freedom, in forming the Moscow Human Rights Committee in 1970. For that and for defending others he lost his research appointment. In 1974 he helped to start a Soviet branch of Amnesty International, the respected, non-partisan organization for human rights.

On April 18, 1975, Tverdokhlebov was arrested. The same day two other members of the Amnesty branch had their homes searched. Another was arrested, eventually released, and expelled from the writers' union for belonging to a "bourgeois organization." Tverdokhlebov remains in custody, awaiting trial on a charge of slandering the Soviet system.

Inhumanity is so deeply imbedded in the Soviet system, that outsiders may well despair of having any effect on it. That is an understandable American reaction to a society—South Africa is another example—where law is an instrument of official oppression. But the feeling of helplessness is wrong.

The fact is that outside pressure can work. Valery and Galina Panov, the Leningrad dancers, were finally allowed to emigrate after boycotts and protests by Western dance and theater people, and finally direct intervention by Prime Minister Wilson of Britain, had made the case too embarrassing to the Soviets. Andrei Sakharov, in a book to be published soon, "My Country and the World," says the Panov episode "confirms" the need for "the strongest pressure" from outside.

There are realities that limit what we can do for the victims of totalitarian societies. It is necessary to have relationships with governments we dislike, in the interest of avoiding war. We must have a healthy sense of what is effective, avoiding empty gestures. Some would put Senator Jackson's amendment to the trade bill in that category, because it did not bring Soviet agreement on emigration, but Sakharov argues that it failed only because of Western disunity—other countries offered the trade credits that we withheld.

One shibboleth we must put aside is the notion that we must not intervene in the "internal affairs" of the Soviet Union and other countries. Secretary of State Kissinger says that, and so do the Soviet leaders, but neither pays the least attention to the supposed rule when it is inconvenient.

What the United States actually follows is a policy of selective non-intervention. The question is how we make the selection. Do we conspire against a left-wing government in Chile and shrug at right-wing tyranny in Spain? In the end, we come to our own values. What we do depends on what we are.

BALTIMORE SUN
6 October 1975
George F. Will

Britannica Taken In by Soviet Semantics

Washington.

Referring to one of the Encyclopedia Britannica's 15 articles on the 15 soi-disant republics of the Soviet Union, Warren Preece, editor of the new edition, says: "I've got eight people at universities in our article [who] were not all that egregiously false."

It seems fair to take Mr. Preece's statement as indicative of the editorial standards used when compiling the Britannica's new—15th—edition that cost \$32 million to produce and sells for \$600 a set.

All the articles on the Soviet "republics" were written by Soviet authors recommended to the Britannica by Novosti, a Soviet propaganda agency often but wrongfully referred to as a "news agency." Moreover, the article on Czechoslovakia, like the articles on Poland and Cuba, were written by members of the local Communist parties, which explains why there is not a syllable about unpleasant things like the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.

Writing in the "Slavic Review," Professor Romuald Misiunas of Williams College rather too politely suggests that "the policy of unqualified use of Soviet sources in future editions needs re-evaluation."

Charitable to a fault, Professor Misiunas notes that "the greater portions of the articles are devoted to geography, flora, and fauna" and these portions are adequate. Evidently not even the diseased imagination of the Soviet regime has yet contrived to breathe ideological content into a description of the Ural Mountains.

Mr. Preece clings to this as evidence that the Britannica's critics are making mountains out of molehills: "If you read the articles, what the hell, two-thirds of them are devoted to the topography of the area. Nobody's complaining about our facts there."

But critics are complaining about the Britannica's treatment of such fauna as the Communist party. The articles on the on the Soviet "republics" refer to the party as "the guiding political organization," "the most important political organization," "the

"the major political party," and—this is my favorite—the organization "through which political life in the republic is largely organized."

Professor Misiunas suggests that the reason why the articles "are replete with dubious statements or insinuations" is "the unawareness on the part of the editors of the Britannica of different Soviet and Western definitions of such key terms as 'democracy' and 'elections.'" But the problem is philosophic, not semantic. It pertains to perceptions of reality, not definitions of words.

The problem is that the Soviet Union has no democracy. Someone should remind the Britannica's editors of the example Lincoln used to give: If I call a tail a leg, how many legs has a dog got? Five? No, because calling it so doesn't make it so. The Soviet Union finds it useful to say it has democracy because saying so is enough to befuddle such Western institutions as the Britannica.

This does not mean that the folks at the Britannica are in the grip of a noxious ideology. They just don't know any better. That is why they accepted an article on Spain partially written by a former Spanish Cabinet officer in charge of promoting tourism.

A Britannica vice president has suggested that the new edition is "edited from a world point of view . . . as though we were looking at the earth from the moon." A point that seems to have eluded the Britannica's editors is that there are no writers on the moon. And there is no such thing as "a world point of view."

Presumably the Britannica wanted disinterested scholarship. But proper scholars do not need to go to the moon to acquire a disinterested point of view.

Here on earth, the last place a reasonable person looks for disinterestedness is from governments. Yet in their mindless pursuit of what they evidently think is cosmopolitanism, the Britannica's editors have published articles that are monuments to ax-grinding parochialism.

Western Europe

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

Friday, October 10, 1975

Spain gives communism a fresh opening

By Joseph C. Harsch

Washington

Spain's execution of five terrorists is disrupting the West and aiding communism more than any world incident since the American invasion of Cambodia.

The five have become martyrs in a protest movement which makes it possible for the communists throughout Western Europe to put themselves arm in arm with socialists, liberals, moderates, and intellectuals. It has ended their political isolation of recent years. In effect, it has put them back in business.

Peking seems to be appalled at the spectacle of an event which is so much to the advantage of Moscow. It is saying virtually nothing at all. Chinese foreign policy has been to encourage unity among Western democracies. That unity is being seriously damaged. American support for Spain is once again opening a rift between Washington and Western Europe. This is obviously regarded as bad news in Peking.

Moscow treats it in a calculated tone of "more in sorrow than in anger." Its press and radio avoid the shrill note of protest. It can afford to sit back quietly and watch as the local communist parties in the West again have a popular bandwagon which they can board and then attempt to control.

The worst immediate damage is in Portugal. There the political moderates and centrists were just getting a government formed and in operation with excellent chances of success when the Spanish incident gave the communists a golden opportunity to take to the streets again with a popular rallying cry. The once bright hope for a moderate solution to Portugal's political problems is in danger.

The damage inside Spain can become worse. There is a sudden political repolarization.

Many on both sides of the Spanish political divide begin again to think in terms of civil war. Spanish nationalism has been enflamed by the wave of anti-Spanish sentiment which has swept over the rest of Europe. It has been assumed for a generation that the memory of the Spanish civil war of the 1930s was a sure safeguard against another. That assumption now is in question.

An immediate casualty is the effort to end Spain's isolation from the rest of Western Europe. That has been a priority American project for a decade. Progress was impressive.

Suddenly, the rest of Europe is repelled by an act in Spain which — no matter how justified in many Spanish eyes — seemed unconscionable to the rest of Europe. The five were terrorists. But two of them were Basque nationalists for whom there is much sympathy in other European countries.

The Pope had urged the Spaniards to refrain from the executions. They plunged ahead. Travel and communication between Spain and the rest of Europe is down to a trickle. Spain has re-isolated itself.

Communists in Europe have had a poor time since the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and the beginning of the American withdrawal from Vietnam. Through all of Western Europe those twin events put them on the defensive. Mostly they lay low, went dormant, or concentrated — as in Italy — on making a new image for themselves as good citizens.

They themselves were in bad odor for the shameful deed in Czechoslovakia, even though most of them had publicly repudiated it. And Washington was doing nothing on which they could build a viable propaganda campaign. They have been long without any good propaganda vehicle.

There is, of course, a limit on how far they can ride this particular vehicle. After all, the executed five had killed policemen — and that is a crime in any society. Damage-control operations are under way.

Washington is doing what it can to try to prevent the re-isolation of Spain from settling into a fixed pattern. The wave of popular revulsion against Spain may subside as suddenly as it surged up.

But we have before us right now a startling reminder that there are communist parties in every Western European country, that these parties are always ready to seize a popular cause when one comes along, and that once seized they know how to make good use of it.

In this case they have already used it to delay a return to political stability in Portugal and to head off the American project of a reconciliation between Spain and the NATO allies.

The moral of the affair of course is: Don't give the Communists popular causes.

The reaction to the execution of the five (in Spain) has become one of those events which shakes the political pattern of every country in Europe. It is like the reaction to Soviet tanks surging into Budapest or Prague. Everyone feels it. Those events did untold damage to communism. In Western Europe no communist party ever really recovered from them. But now Spain provides a partial antidote. What a pity!

THE NEW YORK TIMES, FRIDAY,

OCTOBER 10, 1975

A New Communism?

By Tom Wicker

ROME—"I see no need in Italy for state ice cream cones," says Luciano Barca, a high-ranking economic planner in the Italian Communist party. He is only partially joking about the fact that much of Italy's food industry, including some ice cream production, is state-owned or shared.

The ironic fact is that the Communists are saying that their economic program might reduce the nationalization of private interests in Italy and even "reprivatize" some concerns that haven't worked well under state control. Actually, with 45 per cent of Italy's gross national product already being produced by state-owned or shared businesses, Mr. Barca and other Communist leaders say they are thinking more of "socializing consumption rather than socializing property."

This approach is also influenced by what Mr. Barca sees as the failure of Keynesian economics to produce in

NEW YORK TIMES, THURSDAY, OCTOBER 9, 1975

Moscow Links U.S. Silence Over Spain to Bases

By DAVID K. SHIPER

Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, Oct. 8—The Government newspaper Izvestia charged today that Washington cynically withheld criticism of Spain's executions of terrorists last week to obtain an agreement on American military bases there.

Over the protests of many European nations, the Madrid Government executed five terrorists who were convicted of killing policemen and civil guards. The incident provoked violent demonstrations throughout Europe, and six countries—Britain, West Germany, East Germany, Norway, Denmark and the Netherlands, withdrew their ambassadors from Madrid. The United States did not join the protests.

"While the whole world protests against the new malicious crime of the Madrid re-

gime," Izvestia wrote today, "they in the United States cynically weigh which position in this issue is profitable for them and which is not."

Contending that Spain had been reluctant to permit the retention of American military bases in the country, the paper wrote, "Over the past weeks, they became more accommodating. The special American position toward the executions in Spain was duly rewarded."

Criticism Muted and Veiled

Moscow has long criticized American bases in Spain and elsewhere abroad, but it has taken issue with Washington's foreign policy recently in only muted tones. The Soviet press, for example, has been generally aiming its criticisms at vaguely defined "imperialist circles" without naming the United States.

No such euphemism appeared today, however. "International public opinion condemns the new American-Spanish agree-

ment," Izvestia declared. "At the moment when the circle of political isolation around the regime is tightening it has got tangible support from across the ocean."

The Soviet Union also has capital punishment, and it is not only against those convicted of murder but also in certain other crimes such as corruption. In mid-September, for instance, the death sentence was ordered for a factory official in Kazakhstan who had been convicted of embezzling state property.

The Soviet press has not reported that the Spanish executions were carried out against men convicted of murdering policemen and members of the civil guard. The terrorists, part of a group of 11, included three members of a leftist guerrilla group known as the Revolutionary Anti-Fascist Patriotic Front, and two who belonged to a Basque nationalist movement.

any society a stable relationship between employment, the rate of inflation and the balance of payments. Italy, for example, has sharply improved its balance of payments—but only at the cost of a drastic cut in demand, brought on by declines in employment and production, now down to about 70 per cent of capacity.

The approach of "socializing consumption" envisions, instead, a state intervention to organize demand, not only in imports but internally, in such a way as to give priority to "social demand"—for schools, hospitals and housing, for example. New demands would also be created, Communist planners say, in such a way as to make it less important to nationalize companies like the privately owned Fiat automobile manufacturing plant.

"We don't even pose the problem of nationalizing Fiat," Mr. Barca said. Instead, the Communist program would call for major investment in public transportation—particularly intercity trains and urban mass transit—rather than on roads and trucks. Fiat would have little choice but to shift some of its production into railway rolling stock.

The idea, Mr. Barca says, is to avoid development of "bureaucratic socialism," with everything run by the state, but to influence entrepreneurs to choose the right options for the public

good. In agriculture, for example, overproduction of some crops—such as tomatoes—is perennial, but some other staples—beef, for instance—are produced in such small quantities as to make huge imports necessary.

The Communists propose that the state-owned food industries work out a five- or nine-year program of buying various farm products in guaranteed quantities. This would give farmers an element of security and greater ability to plan production; and they could be encouraged by such guarantees to diversify production, reducing—if the program worked—both surpluses and imports. Moreover, Mr. Barca believes, the plan would cost less than the current level of Government subsidies to farmers, many of whom are growing crops usually in surplus.

"Blocs of demand" to be newly organized, in addition to agriculture, would include housing, educational buildings, transportation, shipbuilding and energy.

Communist plans include a "restructuring of industry" in several directions—a drive, for example, against

ITALY

waste and the draining off of resources to pay salaries to a "non-producing bureaucracy." Heavy emphasis appar-

ently would be placed on research and development, so that the low level of Italian technology could be improved. Small businesses would be given access to Government "think pools" to aid them in necessary research and planning.

All of this seems carefully designed to avoid any hint of the kind of heavy-handed socialization of most aspects of the economy that is to be found in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. But it also seems well-tailored not only to Italian political realities but also to Italian economic needs. The Communists may not even have to take seats in the Government to get at least some of the program into effect.

A party that won 33 per cent of the votes in the June regional elections, Mr. Barca points out, should find it possible to "condition"—that is, to influence—a Government so shaky politically, and with such a record of ineptitude, as the present center-left coalition.

The Communists may be able to "get results" even without power because businessmen and industrialists as well as workers are looking for new approaches to Italy's problems; and because the regional and provincial governments are becoming more important in Italy, just as the Communists have greatly extended their power in those governments.

Christian Science Monitor
16 October 1975

Soviets send art, West sends 'porn,' Portugal lawyer says

By Takashi Oka

Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Blackpool, England

The major Western cultural contribution to Portugal since last year's revolution has been pornography, Professor Diego Freitas do Amaral told a British Conservative Party audience here recently.

The Communist bloc, by contrast (he said), has been sending operas, ballets, folk dancers, and other concert artists in a steady stream. The artists contribute their earnings to local Communist coffers, thus swelling the Communist war chest.

This was only one example among many, Professor do Amaral said, of the intense effort the Soviet bloc has been making in Portugal since the revolution. By contrast, Western help has been fitful and hampered by the law (which the Communists disregard) that no Portuguese political party may receive a financial contribution from outside the country.

(Western concerts and other cultural contributions have ceased mainly because of foreign exchange difficulties. Pornography slips through the loopholes caused by the lifting of censorship and illegal remittance of funds.)

Professor do Amaral, a lawyer in his mid-thirties, heads the CDS, the only Christian Democrat party permitted to function legally in Portugal. The CDS won a surprising 8 per cent of the votes in elections for the Constituent Assembly last April. It did so in the face of continual harassment and intimidation by the Communists.

Professor do Amaral's main concern in visiting Britain was to underline his contention that although the Socialists under Mario Soares have played a key role in the fight for democracy in Portugal, "they are not alone in the struggle." And as Dr. Soares appealed at the Labour Party's recent Blackpool conference for British help, so Professor do Amaral asked for the sympathetic concern of conservatives and Christian Democrats throughout Europe.

The major difference between Portugal and Spain, Professor do Amaral told his audience, is that Spain is still under a dictatorship, whereas in Portugal a democratic revolution overthrew the dictatorship, only to be threatened by dictatorship of another kind—that of the Communists and their allies.

The European Economic Community has recently voted to give Portugal \$130 million in economic aid. But Professor do Amaral opined that until the present acute phase of the struggle between the Communists and the military-led coalition government is over, there is no effective authority to see that the aid is wisely spent. He was hopeful about the outcome, but underlined that in the present context, "anything can happen—a Communist coup, an extreme right-wing coup, or civil war."

"Between the twin political poles of communism and fascism, the democratic parties are fighting a very difficult battle," Professor do Amaral concluded. "Your understanding, your friendship, your support is vital. If you decide to help us, please do it today. Tomorrow-

Near East

THE NEW YORK TIMES, SATURDAY, OCTOBER 11, 1973

Sinai Pact Stirs Misgivings Among Arabs

By HENRY TANNER
Special to The New York Times

BEIRUT, Lebanon, Oct. 3—Many Arab diplomats, scholars and journalists outside Egypt, believing that the Sinai agreement has crucially weakened the Arab side, are convinced that the pact will prove an obstacle to peace rather than a step toward it.

Despite disclaimers by Anwar el-Sadat, the Egyptian President, these critics—Syrians, Palestinians and Lebanese—contend that Egypt, the most populous and militarily powerful Arab country, has been broken out of the Arab front against Israel. They assert that, with American encouragement, a psychological and political demobilization will take place in Egypt, with the result that the average Egyptian will become inward-looking and no longer concerned with the fate of the Palestinians, which is at the heart of the Arab conflict with Israel. It will take another war to reverse this trend, the critics of the Sinai agreement say.

The critics in Damascus and Beirut also charge that neither American nor Israeli attitudes have changed as a result of the agreement. They insist that the publication of the secret American-Israeli understanding revealed that the United States remained totally committed to Israel, to the point of having given Israel veto power over any contacts between Washington and the Palestinians.

Advanced Arms an Issue

The critics note that Secretary of State Kissinger has promised Israel \$2-billion to \$3-billion worth of advanced weapons, and they contend that it will be a long time—especially in view of the coming American elections—before Mr. Kissinger or another Secretary of State will even think of interrupting the new flow of weapons as a means of persuading Israel to make further withdrawals from occupied Arab territory.

This goes to the heart of the problem, as Arab scholars,

journalists and politicians see it. These men are convinced that Israel will give up further ground in the occupied Syrian territory and the West Bank of the Jordan River only under sharp pressure from Washington.

Mr. Kissinger's reassurances to the contrary, they just do not see any such pressure before or soon after the American elections next year. And this, in their view, means another stalemate and therefore drift toward another war.

A Palestinian university teacher said:

"You are doing what you always did. You say that you are making Israel strong because only strong Israel can make concessions. But the opposite is true. How are you going to prod them now? You have made them immune to your pressure for the next 10 years."

For President Sadat the most important reason for wanting the Sinai agreement was that he thought—and still thinks—that it will lead to direct American involvement in the Middle East, on the Arab side as well as the Israeli.

The Egyptian leader had come to the conclusion that the Arab-Israeli conflict could not be solved and that Israel could not be induced to evacuate the territories she occupied in 1967 as long as one of the two superpowers—the United States—remained committed to the exclusive support of Israel while the other—the Soviet Union—gave more half-hearted backing to the Arabs.

It is also hoped that the mood resulting from the agreement will bring investors and industrialists from the West and the Arab countries into Egypt to help salvage her ailing economy.

Mr. Sadat's critics concede that their contention is based on the expectation that Mr. Kissinger will be unable to bring about another disengagement on the Syrian front.

Syrian, Palestinian and Lebanese critics fear that the agreement has isolated Egypt, neutralized President Sadat and muted the most effective

moderate voice in the Arab world for the time being.

Assad's Role Weakened

Egypt, this reasoning goes, could be an effective leader toward a peace settlement only if she maintained her credentials as a confrontation state, along with Syria, and if she remained in a position to influence policies within the Palestine liberation movement.

The critics further say that the Sinai agreement has weakened the position of President Hafez al-Assad of Syria in face of more unyielding officials in Damascus. This, in turn, has reduced his ability to enter into a disengagement agreement of his own, the critics add.

Specialists on Palestinian affairs moreover report that the Sinai agreement has strengthened the extremist leaders within the Palestine liberation movement and undermined the authority of such relative moderates as Yasir Arafat, who until recently had been working closely, if discreetly, with President Sadat.

Gain for Palestine Extremists

If the power struggle within the Palestinian leadership culminated now, those who reject negotiation might well win, specialists here say. This was not the case a few months ago.

Negotiations are reported to be under way between Mr. Arafat and such extremist leaders as George Habash. The extremists are understood to be demanding that Mr. Arafat denounce the Sinai agreement as "Egyptian treason" and that he publicly pledge not to attend any kind of Geneva conference no matter what the circumstances.

Arab critics of the agreement contend that American motives have once more become suspect among Arab nationalists. Extremists accuse Mr. Kissinger of deliberately seeking to split Egypt from the rest of the Arab world. Moderates say that whatever his intentions, this is the result by which the American action has to be judged.

A Syrian diplomat recalled

that Mr. Kissinger, on his last visit after the agreement had been signed, told President Assad that the United States would try to "get something" for Syria before the American election but that "he could not promise."

"What kind of step-by-step is that?" the diplomat asked.

West European diplomats in the area moreover express fear that the United States will not be able to meet the hopes of economic assistance and investment in Egypt that have been created by the agreement.

The needs of Egypt are astronomical. And if President Sadat fails to solve his economic problem because the Arab oil producers are not willing to give the money that the United States cannot provide, then the agreement would lose its justification even in the eyes of many Egyptians, these diplomats say.

They point out that the only Arab leader who has publicly endorsed the Sinai agreement so far is President Gaafar al-Nimeiry of the Sudan. King Khalid of Saudi Arabia was quoted by Mr. Kissinger as being in favor but has not said so himself, and others have been cautiously silent.

Alternative Suggested

A better approach to peace than the Sinai agreement, almost all critics say, would have been for the United States to start pushing for a final settlement, including Israeli withdrawal to the pre-1967 lines, in return for a real peace accord.

Informed diplomats here report that this actually was the approach chosen by Arabists in the United States Government earlier this summer, but that it was dropped as politically unfeasible because of expected opposition from Israel's supporters in Congress.

Criticism of the agreement is admittedly based on the assumption that Mr. Kissinger will not be able to bring about another disengagement on the Syrian front. If he did—and the chances seem slim—the great first obstacle would be surmounted and momentum toward peace would be achieved, even his critics concede.

Africa

NEW YORK TIMES, THURSDAY, OCTOBER 16, 1975

U.S. Seeks Rapid Aid to Zaire but Congress Is Wary

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 15—A behind-the-scenes effort by the State Department to shore up the Government of President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire with an emergency infusion of \$60-million has so far failed to win Congressional backing.

In an extraordinary move strongly endorsed by Secretary of State Kissinger, the department has sought to persuade key members of Congress to approve granting of the aid now bypassing the normal, time-consuming Congressional review process.

State Department officials informed Congress privately that foreign aid legislation allows the Ford Administration to start the economic assistance program without formal Congressional approval. But, fearing that such an action might nevertheless cause a flare-up with Congress, the Administration has pressed for informal assent from the chairmen of the authorization and appropriation subcommittees.

Reasons for Concern

Aides said that Mr. Kissinger was concerned with the problems of Zaire, though he normally displays minor interest in Africa.

Not only has General Mobutu displayed "moderate" positions in international forums at a time when the United States is being assailed by other third-world states, but his anti-Communism is also regarded by Mr. Kissinger as important, given the unsettled conditions in neighboring Angola, the aides said.

General Mobutu has reportedly been helping Angolan forces hostile to the Soviet-backed Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola.

Moreover, The New York Times, quoting official sources before it fell, said he was appealing to world powers and to

the United Nations to consider ways to help Cambodia.

In Washington, reported last month that American help for the anti-Soviet groups in Angola had been funneled through General Mobutu.

Influence in O.A.U.

The general also used his influence in the Organization of African Unity to block efforts to call for Israel's expulsion from the United Nations and, to a lesser extent, at a meeting of the nonaligned bloc in August.

In addition, it is reported, Mr. Kissinger agreed that the economic crisis in Zaire threatened General Mobutu's Government at a time when his help was most needed. These concerns led the State Department to give aid to Zaire high priority—to show General Mobutu that the United States was backing him at a time of crisis.

None of the Congressional chairmen interviewed has consented to the Administration plan, although they acknowledge Zaire's economic plight. They seem to feel that Zaire's needs should be considered in the normal way, as part of the overall security-supporting assistance bill for this fiscal year, that is scheduled to be submitted to Congress next week. Usually passage of such a bill takes months.

Senator Dick Clark of Iowa, chairman of the Foreign Relations subcommittee on Africa, has asked for a full-scale review of over-all American relations with General Mobutu's Government.

Although General Mobutu has long been regarded in Africa as a close friend of the United States, many Africans consider him unstable, a man Washington should deal with cautiously.

In June, apparently angered by American delays in helping

his country out of a crisis caused in part by a sharp drop in copper prices, General Mobutu shocked Washington by expelling its Ambassador, Deane R. Hinton.

At that time, the general, who has reportedly received strong backing from the Central Intelligence Agency ever since he took power in the early nineteen sixties.

Instead of reacting with irritation at Mr. Hinton's ouster, Mr. Kissinger sent Sheldon B. Vance, a former Ambassador to Zaire, and a reputed confidant of General Mobutu, to Kinshasa to see the general and assure him of continued American support. This was the result of a determination in Washington that Zaire was too crucial to be snubbed.

Aid Package Promised

From Mr. Vance's June trip—and subsequent ones in July and August—the emergency aid package was put together and promised to General Mobutu.

Key members of Congress were informed of it before the August recess. At that time, Mr. Clark and Senator Hubert H. Humphrey of Minnesota, chairman of the Foreign Relations subcommittee on aid, sent a joint letter to the State Department opposing hasty action.

Mr. Kissinger assigned Deputy Secretary Robert S. Ingersoll, Mr. Vance and the African bureau the job of getting informal Congressional approval of the aid package. Nathaniel Davis, the head of the African bureau, is resigning soon, in part because General Mobutu opposed his appointment. Mr. Davis has been accused of involvement in C.I.A. activity in Chile while ambassador there.

Related Components

The aid package consists of three separate but related components, each valued at about

\$20-million:

Export-Import Bank credits to help Zaire import spare parts and other critical items needed to keep her factories going.

Long-term credit at favorable rates to buy American agricultural products.

A loan from the Agency for International Development for a commodity-import program allowing Zaire to buy goods here, freeing her to pay off her heavy short-term debts.

The \$20-million A.I.D. loan has caused the most concern on Capitol Hill because such large security-supporting assistance in Africa is unparalleled in recent years. Last year, for instance, Zaire's total economic assistance was only \$4.5-million.

Consultation With I.M.F.

State Department officials said that France and Belgium had helped Zaire recently and that Zaire had agreed to consult with the International Monetary Fund on ways to bring her economy under control. The department has given much attention to the significance of Zaire's agreeing to I.M.F. help.

In a brochure supporting the request, distributed to key members of Congress, the Agency for International Development said the recovery of Zaire's economy was "of substantial importance to the United States." It said that the United States had \$750-million in investments in Zaire that would be jeopardized if she defaulted on her debts.

Zaire owes \$550-million in short-term notes. Because the price for copper, a major export, has fallen from \$1 a pound to 55 cents, Zaire's economy is in a precarious situation, the document said.

Tuesday, October 14, 1975

The Washington Star

Crosby S. Noyes

Moynihan's Amin blast no help in U.N. task

The fireworks that have enlivened the opening of the United Nations General Assembly session in New York are not helpful. The natural combativeness of a Daniel Patrick Moynihan may be stimulating. But it also tends to obscure a hopeful evolution taking place in the world

organization.

Not only that: the unseemly exchange of invective has set back the evolution to an appreciable degree. For it is one thing for the American delegate to respond with spirit to gratuitous attacks on the United States. But it is quite another to put on a show of

diplomatic manners as bad as those of the president of Uganda.

A double standard has always applied at the U.N. and it works to our disadvantage. African delegates and others expect to hear outrageous things from such as Idi Amin. But they

are genuinely shocked by displays of intemperance from the delegate of the United States — especially when it takes the form of a direct, personal attack which violates the most elementary diplomatic niceties.

Idi Amin, after all, is not the only racist murderer serving as a head of state. We have treaties of friendship and cooperation with quite a few of them. And despicable as he may be, Amin happens — in fact — to be an accident — to be

"the temporary head of the Organization of African Unity. To infuriate a whole continent in order to put down one more racist murderer is hardly worth it.

But let it pass. Apart from these diversions, serious things are going on in the United Nations. And in the evolution of thinking that is taking place, the change of attitude toward what has been patronizingly known as the "Third World" is the most important of all.

The Third World, of course, is just about everybody that is not a member of the Soviet bloc or the "Western" industrialized nations, including Japan. In this country, there has been

a tendency to regard the Third World as generally unimportant: a collection of mostly poor, weak, querulous states, increasingly unfriendly to the West. The fact that they represent a majority of sovereign governments — and hence a majority in the U.N. General Assembly — has been looked on here as a historical oddity, rather than a matter of real significance.

All this has changed in the last two years. The success of a handful of poor, weak, backward countries in holding up the industrialized world to ransom for a single commodity and thereby becoming rich and powerful overnight has pro-

duced some new thinking in this country.

Suddenly it is becoming clear that what a few oil-producing countries could do by an act of collective political will could be done by others as well.

The change was clearly signaled by the speech written by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and read by Moynihan at the special session of the General Assembly. The thrust of the message was that the United States — and by inference all of the industrialized nations — are ready to try to negotiate a new relationship with all of the underdeveloped world, with the aim of working out a more equitable distribution

of the available economic assets.

It will not be an easy job. Another speech by Mexico's President Luis Echeverria Alvarez was a fair example of just how ambitious and unrealistic the developing nations will be in demanding a "new economic order" and in insisting on a greater share in the political decision-making. Resolving these problems could be the major challenge of the coming decade. The tasks will not be made easier by indulging in verbal donnybrooks with the Idi Amins of the Third World.

WASHINGTON POST Tuesday, October 7, 1975

African Nationalists Unveil Bonn-Pretoria Nuclear Plan

By Peter Niesewand
Manchester Guardian

LONDON—A spy planted in the South African Embassy in Bonn has stolen a file of secret documents detailing cooperation between West Germany and the Pretoria government on the development of nuclear power.

Black nationalists believe that South Africa is backing the multimillion-dollar project in order to produce a nuclear weapon capability which would turn the country into an impregnable white bastion in Africa, manufacturing its own missiles, and nuclear devices and prepared to turn them against hostile black nations if the future of apartheid is threatened.

The stolen documents have now been published by the outlawed African National Congress of South Africa (ANC) in a glossy booklet entitled "The Nuclear Conspiracy."

In taking the lid off what is believed to be South Africa's best-kept security secret, the ANC has already caused the resignation of West Germany's representative on the NATO military committee, General Guenther Rall, who, the documents disclose, paid an incognito visit to nuclear installations in South Africa in August 1974, traveling as "Mr. Ball".

The ANC claims that South Africa's aim in developing its nuclear program is not confined to peaceful uses of atomic power.

South Africa is the Western world's third largest producer of uranium after the United States and Canada. The ANC maintains that a multimillion-dollar uranium plant, to be built with West German help, is a project which cannot be economically justified either in terms of the enormous capital required, nor in terms of its operating costs. It can only be explained in terms of military significance, the ANC says.

"The construction of nuclear power stations cost four times as much as coal-fed power stations. South African coal is cheap at \$3 per ton at pithead price compared to \$9 in the U.S. and \$60 in the Federal German Republic. Therefore the use of nuclear power stations in South Africa for generating electricity cannot be justified on economic grounds," the report says.

The ANC says this is underlined by the clandestine manner in which the project has been developed, the South African government's failure to subscribe to the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, and the country's repeated objections to placing its mines or ore-processing plants under international inspection.

"In Pretoria, the true face of (Prime Minister) John Vorster once again stands revealed. Whilst extending one hand in ostensible friendship and peace to free Africa, with the other hand, apartheid South Africa is

surreptitiously but deliberately building up sufficient military power as will devastate our continent," it said.

The ANC says that South Africa's nuclear development program is still dependent on outside assistance.

While for five years South Africa claimed to have developed a "unique" process for uranium enrichment, this has now turned out to be an adaptation of the jet-nozzle method produced in West Germany.

The ANC says that enriched uranium is currently sold by the governments of the United States and the Soviet Union at a subsidized price of \$38.50 per kilogram (2.2 pounds). South Africa, it adds, has announced a sales price of \$74 per kilo, nearly double the current rate.

South Africa's export of enriched uranium could only be profitable if South Africa operated a virtual black market, supplying enriched uranium to states which do not accept the safeguards of the nonproliferation treaty," the ANC says.

"With control of nuclear material, the Pretoria regime could consolidate its military links with the Western powers, while at the same time by operating outside international controls, it could buy 'friends' by providing nuclear materials and technology to nonsignatory states," the ANC says.

NEW YORK TIMES
14 October 1975

UGANDA NEWSPAPER ASSAILS MOYNIHAN

NAIROBI, Kenya, Oct. 13 (AP) — Uganda's Government-run newspaper has accused Daniel Moynihan, the United States delegate to the United Nations, of diplomatic insanity.

Mr. Moynihan, in a speech in San Francisco Oct. 3 after President Idi Amin of Uganda had addressed the United Nations General Assembly, endorsed a description of General Amin, as a "Racist murderer." The description had appeared in an editorial in The New York Times.

General Amin called in his New York speech for the extinction of Israel as a state.

The Voice of Uganda in its first editorial comment on Mr. Moynihan's remark, said in its weekend edition that "such open insults give the impression of madness and political or diplomatic insanity in America's social machinery."

"President Amin never seconded the extermination but recommended a pure coexistence of nation-h (frifysfnoence OO Oence of nationals," the newspaper said. "This would dissolve the edwish state of Israel, erasing the selfish and destructive machinery in Zionism. "One can't claim that the inevitable killings and sometimes necessary executions in Uganda match the mass destruction of the human race created by big countries like the United States."

East Asia

NEW YORK TIMES, THURSDAY, OCTOBER 16, 1975

U.S. Expects More Indochina Refugees

By DAVID BINDER

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 15—From 2,000 to 3,000 more Indochinese refugees are expected to arrive in the United States in the next two weeks, bringing the total destined for resettlement here to about 134,000 by Christmas, Administration officials said today.

Also, for the first time since the American resettlement program began last April, shortly before the fall of South Vietnam and Cambodia to Communist insurgents, some of the refugee traffic will be in the other direction.

Mrs. Julia Vadala Taft, director of the interagency task force on Indochina refugees, said that about 1,600 South Vietnamese quartered on Guam for the last six months were preparing to hop out for Saigon aboard a cargo ship.

Most of these Vietnamese have been seeking repatriation ever since they were brought out of Vietnam, the bulk of

them against their will, Mrs. Taft said.

U.N. Efforts Fail

Efforts of the United Nations High Commission on Refugees to persuade the authorities in Hanoi and Saigon to accept repatriates were to no avail, she noted, and so the Ford Administration decided to allow them to return on their own.

They will be sailing aboard the Truong Tin 1, a South Vietnamese freighter that carried evacuees to Guam last spring despite denunciation of the voyage by the North Vietnamese Foreign Ministry and the Provisional Revolutionary Government in Saigon.

Mrs. Taft said in an interview that the would-be repatriates had been scrupulously screened "to make sure that none were being coerced into returning to Vietnam." She also said that none had been associated with the Central Intelligence Agency at any time.

Some in Thailand

Of the continuing flow of refugees to the United States, Mrs. Taft said that "we hope the last will have arrived by Oct. 31."

Among those still under way from various points in Southeast Asia are 88 Vietnamese who had been quartered in the Philippines.

In addition, there are several thousand Cambodians, Vietnamese and Laotians awaiting transport to the United States from Thailand. They are eligible for entry as relatives of American citizens or of Indochinese refugees already in the United States.

They are also eligible for resettlement assistance under the legislative authority created last spring by Congress at the request of President Ford, which stipulated that the United States would accept about 130,000 Indochinese refugees.

The eligible refugees are among a total of 60,000 Indochinese displaced by the Communist take-overs in Phnom Penh, Saigon and Vientiane in

the last half year.

About 34,000 of these are Meo tribesmen from Laos, and 4,000 others are Laotian refugees. The rest are Cambodians and Vietnamese. Almost all of the 60,000 are living in makeshift camps in Thailand where, according to foreign observers, the conditions are generally "abominable."

Mrs. Taft said the United States would probably take in about 2,600 of the Laotians separately from the current Indochina refugee program.

"I expect we'll have refugees trickling in for years to come," she said, "but I would like to wind down this particular program around the end of the year."

The resettlement program has placed 114,854 Vietnamese and Cambodian refugees in American communities with American sponsors since it began six months ago. Mrs. Taft said there were 20,055 refugees "still in the system"—some of whom will be going on to other countries.

THE ECONOMIST OCTOBER 4, 1975

Thailand

Tending the roots

FROM OUR SOUTH-EAST ASIA CORRESPONDENT

Democracy, Thailand's prime minister has a habit of saying, is alive and well in his country. Mr Kukrit Pramoj has a point, of sorts. In an increasingly dictatorial part of the world, most people in Thailand can at least get their voices heard. The students, whose 1973 uprising first made the Thai experiment in democracy possible, demonstrate or battle with each other with monotonous regularity in the streets of Bangkok. The workers strike just as often. Recently the police expressed their disenchantment over what they considered to be the government's attempts to curb their powers of arrest and graft by sacking Mr Kukrit's teakwood home, destroying his furniture and antiques. The prime minister, whose seven-party coalition government is six months old, has failed to act strongly about all this not so much from weakness as because he fears that a showdown between the opposing forces of right and left would endanger the very roots of Thailand's democracy.

So Mr Kukrit, through this long, hot summer which saw the collapse of Indochina, has resisted the temptation to proclaim martial law. The question is how long he can pursue this policy of accommodation; playing off one faction against another in the greater interests

of preserving a spark of democracy, while something close to a polite anarchy reigns in Bangkok. Much will depend on the behaviour of the right wing. The remnants of the old military order, overthrown in October, 1973, have regrouped in the rather sinister form of "national protection" societies. The hand of these societies is thought to be behind much of the recent political violence, including the assassination of a number of people seeking a better deal for deprived peasants in the remoter countryside.

This could have the effect of driving frustrated leftists from the student-worker movements into the hills to join the insurgency of the Communist party—still a small affair, although its armed attacks have multiplied over the past couple of months. But it has long been Mr Kukrit's view, and that of his close entourage, that the chief threat to the survival of civilian rule in Thailand comes from the right rather than the left. Thailand's society is traditionally conservative, and Mr Kukrit's worry is that the forces of the right will grow so large that the government can no longer handle them, and will go under to a military coup.

No domino?

He is said to be convinced that Thailand will not be the next south-east Asian country to fall to the communists, because its problems are different

from those of Indochina. All the same, he does not doubt that Indochina's communists will become more involved in Thailand's domestic insurgency in the next couple of years. Meanwhile, his chief object seems to be to change the system and manner of government in Thailand so radically that there can be no return to the dictatorial methods of the past. He is trying to keep the decision-making apparatus as broad as possible; one project he has introduced is revenue sharing, by which the central government gives grants to local councils to dispose of as they will. This is an important innovation: one of the biggest failings of the past was that the government never shared its wealth with the farmers whose labour the country is built on.

Mr Kukrit intends to use the scheme as a lesson in democracy; he is organising local elections at which people will, in theory, be able to vote for those local officials who they feel spent the government's grants most wisely. It represents a brave attempt to plant grass-roots democracy in Thailand. But such plans are still very much in the embryo state, and many problems lie ahead. The latest is the savage blow to the economy from the new oil price increase. Thailand, which has to import virtually all its oil, will be particularly hard-hit; and the result could be more social unrest.

LONDON TIMES
19 September 1975

Bernard Levin

The credulity and folly of 'Mao's useful idiots'

Earlier this year, there was a visit to China by a group of British journalists and others connected with newspapers, and I must say that my much-hated profession acquitted itself handsomely. After all that has come out of China with the usual three-week visitors there were two reports from members of the British press party which demonstrated that it is not necessary for visitors to China to leave their judgment behind at the frontier.

One of the two was Peregrine Worsthorpe, who reported in a pair of articles in the *Sunday Another Newspaper* soon after the group returned. Perry at his worst can be seen in his article this week—a thousand words of brutal and useless stupidity on the subject of Ireland—but his Chinese reports were Perry at his very best, and they stood out from so much of what we have had these past few years precisely because he refused to fall into the relativist trap that has engulfed so many who have been on the road to Cathay; he asked, and went on asking, pertinent and searching questions, and, declining to make any allowances in China that he would not have made in the United States or Britain, he declined also to refrain, in his report, from showing his contempt for the intellectual poverty of so many of the replies he had received, and he declined even more resolutely to gloss over the ubiquitous evidence that China is a land of stifling and total thought-control.

This week, *The Observer's* man on the same trip, Donald Treford, gave his impressions in the paper's colour magazine. More instinctively sympathetic than Perry, he was equally impeccable in his pursuit of the truth, and in his refusal to be hypnotised into seeing things that were not there; the cool yet generous scepticism of his approach, and the vividness and balance of his portrait, made his "China without Prejudice" a model of what reporting should be but in these days of widespread pillorisation in which opinion increasingly replaces fact, too rarely is. If I were in the business of giving out journalistic awards, I would certainly split one this year between Treford and Worsthorpe.

Now normally I would not write in this vein about my brothers of the ink-stained finger; not because dogs shouldn't bite dogs (though on the whole I think dogs shouldn't), but because it would not normally be news when good journalists produce good journalism. In this case, however, it is news, because most—indeed practically all—of what we have read by visitors to China (I am not, of course, including resident correspondents, who are in a different business altogether, or the work of such genuinely learned sinologists as Richard Harris) has been couched in terms of unadmitted recollection that recall, and in

places recall word for word, the worst excesses of what Stalin called "my useful idiots" and what Mr Muzzeridge called, in rather more detail, Wise old Shaw, high minded old Barbusse, the venerable Webbs, Gide the pure in heart and Picasso the impure, down to poor little teachers, crazed clergymen and millionaires, drivelling dons and very special correspondents like Duranty, all resolved, come what might, to believe anything, however preposterous, to overlook anything, however villainous, to approve anything, however obscurantist and brutally authoritarian, in order to be able to preserve intact the confident expectation that one of the most thorough-going, ruthless and bloody tyrannies ever to exist on earth could be relied on to champion human freedom, the brotherhood of man, and all the other good liberal causes to which they had dedicated their lives.

Note that I am not talking about those who consciously devil away at their task of putting out propaganda on behalf of Chinese communism: the Felix Greenes and such. I am not even thinking of fellow-travellers with a sympathy, concealed or overt, for totalitarianism. I refer to those with no such predilections, who go to China, see one or more of the tiny handful of villages kept especially for the purpose, drink with their hosts to peace and friendship among all the peoples of the world, note the extraordinary width of the streets in Peking, and return to London or New York in a state of idiot ecstasy about the new civilization that has solved all the problems of mankind.

These have two things in common, and perhaps a third. First, they believe everything they are told, even if it is patently ridiculous. If they are told—they all are—that nobody in China is ever hungry, they come back saying so, and it never occurs to them that, however assiduous their touring, they could not possibly have seen in their few weeks more than—it is a generous estimate—about three millionths of the population of China, and not even that much of its area. Yet there is not so much as a vestige of scepticism, or even of a wish to present what they have been told as only what they have been told. China, they are assured, is paradise on earth, and all the Chinese people love the regime; and the visitors come back and say that China is paradise on earth and all the Chinese people love the regime.

The second quality that most visitors to China share is an apparently total inability to ask their hosts any serious questions about anything of any serious significance. Truly searching or embarrassing questions about the way the country is run would not, of course, be answered; but the evasion of them would in itself provide important information. Yet—no, I don't mean yet, indeed I rather think I mean so—no such questions are ever asked. Let me be specific: how China I have been describing

have ever asked their guide, interpreter or bear-leader why, if the whole Chinese people are so devoted to their beloved Chairman and to communism, they are never in any circumstances allowed to confirm their attitude in anything like a free election, which, after all, would result in a triumphant victory for the beloved Chairman and communism if the stories of their attitude are true?

What is most extraordinary about the display of deeply culpable naivety, amounting to a betrayal of our common intellectual duty to question received authority everywhere, is that the dreadful example of prewar Soviet Russia appears to have had no effect at all. In the thirties, the same sort of visitors (indeed, in some instances, the very same people, grown older but apparently no wiser) went to a country in which the greatest and most abominable terror in the entire history of the world was being practised, in which the population of the concentration camps was tens of millions and the evidence of totally pervasive fear was as clear as that of crushing and brutal poverty, and returned saying that they had been in a place where the Brotherhood of Man was universally practised, where an unbreakable bond of affection and admiration united the people with their rulers, where conditions of unprecedented freedom prevailed, and on top of that where the land was flowing with milk and honey.

Many such visitors, of course, were plain liars, but, comparing like with like, I am not holding those out as a standard by which to judge their heirs and assigns of the China trail. For many of them were not liars, but merely fools, and it is their heirs and assigns that I am thinking of today.

I am not saying that a Chinese equivalent of the Stalin Terror is raging at this moment; on the whole, I think it extremely unlikely (the Chinese communists appear to have done almost all their killing early and quickly). But I do not know; nor do any of those who have come back cooing with certainty and delight after being allowed a carefully-controlled glimpse of a few

people in a tiny corner of that vast country. And even if no large-scale terror is now practised, there is abundant evidence from official Chinese sources that mental and physical control of the whole population is practised to a degree literally unprecedented even by the standards of modern totalitarianism. And yet the procession of "Mao's useful idiots" never stops, and the song they sing never ceases to demonstrate that credulity and folly know no limits.

Which brings me to the third element common to many of the China-visitors. The song they sing is unmistakably a Pilgrims' Chorus, and it reveals more about them than about China. There is a yearning, in a certain kind of free man or woman, to be unfree, to sink all choice, all decision, all struggle, into a common pool of control and direction. Somewhere in their subconscious, the honest fools who went to Stalin's Russia knew perfectly well that it was a monstrous tyranny, and welcomed it for that very reason; somewhere in their subconscious, the equivalent visitors to China know perfectly well that it demands the total extirpation of the individual self, and welcome it for that very reason.

We have seen, at a simpler level, the mad rage that grips many in this country at the sight of freedom of speech, whether in Newham Town Hall or the inner councils of the National Union of Students. That rage stems, in many people, not from the desire to impose an unacceptable will on others, but from the fear of freedom in themselves, with the inevitable consequence that the fear turns to hate. Such riven personalities, offered a vision of a society which would douse the terrifying flame of freedom inside them, fling themselves upon it in desperate relief. I believe that many of them who have gone to China in the last few years, and come back eager to turn their *trahison des clercs* into a new Gospel, are just such flawed souls. It is just as well that we have such whole ones as Donald Treford and Peregrine Worsthorpe.

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China Seeking Advanced U.S. Computer

By LESLIE H. GELB
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 3 — China is seeking to buy an advanced American-made computer that would enhance her search for oil and could also strengthen her defense capabilities, according to Administration officials.

The decision on the sale of the Control Data Corporation's Cyber 72 or 172, as it is variously known, is now before the international coordinating committee known as Cocom that passes on sales of strategic goods to Communist countries.

Organized in 1949, Cocom is an informal group that maintains a list of agreed strategic items that can only be sold to Communist countries after a unanimous vote of approval by its members. The members are all of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries minus Iceland and plus Japan.

Secretary of State Kissinger is said to be disposed toward approving the transaction, even though the United States recently vetoed the sale of other advanced computers to the Soviet Union and despite the fact that Peking has not been as forthcoming as Moscow on permitting inspections of the uses to which these sophisticated instruments of this kind are being put.

The final decision is awaiting a technical review of possible military uses of the computer and a clarification of China's apparent new policy line that once again lumps Moscow and Washington together as equal threats to peace.

Of Other Items for China

If approval is given, this will not be the first time that possibly sensitive items have been sold to China. Some of the 10

Boeing 707's sold to China in 1973, officials said, included the inertial guidance system tangentially related to the system that guides American missiles to targets. The Administration's reasoning in this case was that China clearly would be unable to use the technology for military ends.

Administration officials also said that the Central Intelligence Agency had circulated reports on other low-key Chinese feelers to American corporations for high-technology equipment.

These include discussions with Lockheed about the C-141 cargo transport aircraft, with Itek about satellite cameras, and with RCA Global Communications about radar and communications equipment.

The officials said that they doubted that China would follow up on these feelers. Their judgment is that China will continue to prefer buying comparable items where they are available in West Europe and Japan, and that China will buy American only when the American product is unique.

This is also based on their estimate that the dominant group in China does not want to provoke new Soviet pressures. As one official explained it, the Chinese feel relatively safe from Soviet attack today as compared with 1969 and will only make their weight felt in Washington for specific tactical ends.

Mr. Kissinger is also said to consider Moscow the key variable in deciding what to do next regarding Peking. In the meantime, the officials said that M. Kissinger and President Ford would continue to give private assurances when they visit Peking in November that the United States remains concerned about Chinese security

and that Washington will do what it can to help equalize the Chinese-Soviet balance of power.

But the general estimate within the Administration now is that Chinese-American relations are just holding steady at best. The officials expressed concern about the recent Chinese promotion of Puerto Rican independence, and about Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua's speech to the United Nations. Departing from past policy, Mr. Chiao criticized Moscow and Washington equally.

As this situation sorts itself out, thinking is going on at all levels within the Administration about possible future United States-Chinese military ties. A C.I.A. study on the Moscow-Peking-Washington equation made available to The New York Times contends that Chairman Mao Tse-tung has been the main force behind Peking's opening-up to Washington, and that Washington must develop something in return. The study suggests various kinds of military aid to China.

A few officials interested in pushing thinking in that direction pointed to an article by Michael Pillsbury of the Rand Corporation in the current issue of Foreign Policy magazine. He wrote, "We should modify the spacious policy of 'even-handedness' which now governs exports of advanced defense technology" to China. He added: "China is not nearly as large a security threat to us as the Soviet Union is."

The Cyber computer now being discussed in Cocom and within the Administration under the terms of the export administration act is considered to be in the top-of-the-line category, above two other categories of computers on the re-

stricted lists.

It has been used to process geophysical data in oil surveys. Whether China can or is likely to use the main frame or memory part of the unit or its high-speed printing and micro-processing features for purposes of military air defense systems or antisubmarine warfare is what Cocom is studying.

Cocom's lists are kept secret, as are its studies and decisions. If the sale of the Cyber were to be approved, the only fact that would be made public would be that a computer had been approved for sale to China.

The information is kept confidential for competitive business reasons.

Some officials not in the State Department expressed surprise when the French branch of Control Data Corporation put the Cyber up for a waiver because Cocom had recently voted to deny the sale of lower category computers to China.

As all of the officials explained, China has been loath to specify the purposes for which the computers would be used and has refused to accept the regular conditions on inspecting use. One said, "I think they're getting better, willing to talk about 'visits' and allow regular servicing."

The officials said that the Soviet Union, on the other hand, would provide details on planned use and allow a regular presence by the seller for inspection. Nevertheless, they said that Moscow, which has received top-of-the-line waivers in the past, recently wanted to buy computers that would clearly have a military application as well, and were thus turned down.

Latin America

BALTIMORE SUN

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Avenue of the Martyrs

U.S. 'Zonians' lead sweet life across road from native squalor

By HENRY L. TREWHITT
Sun Staff Correspondent

Panama City—Call an American in the Panama Canal Zone after working hours and you may be told he's at the Elks Club, or watching a Little League game, or playing golf.

On the other hand walk across the street from Ancon Hill, headquarters of the Panama Canal Company, the Canal Zone government, and the Pentagon's Southern Command, and you're likely to be mugged.

Some of Panama's most noisome slums face Ancon Hill across Fourth of July avenue, which Panamanians call Avenue of the Martyrs, for those who died in the anti-American riots of 1964. Many Americans suspect the slums have been left there deliberately as a symbol of different life-styles while Panama has improved housing elsewhere.

The direct comparison is misleading, as most such comparisons are. But the exaggeration underscores a larger truth, that on any comparative terms, including conditions in the United States, the 15,000 American residents of the Canal Zone lead the sweet life.

That life-style, now is in jeopardy, as the United States and Panama negotiate with the common goal of a treaty under which Panama will move toward control of the zone and administration of the canal. But it is secure as long as more than one-third of the U.S. Senate remains on record against any change at all.

Or at least moderately secure. Panama already has served notice that its patience is limited, and the 1964 riots

and others of the past demonstrated that all things are relative.

The sweet life is not luxury, as Frank A. Baldwin, a second-generation Zonian points out. Much of the housing, managed by the government and assigned by job rank, is old and seedy.

But it is comfortable and protected. The zone has its own police force, school system, postal service, garbage collection, what one resident calls "excellent services." The court system too is its own, and a U.S. diplomat says Zonians can be "certain that they are dealing with a non-corrupt judicial process."

Another calls the zone "a company town operated by a benevolent, paternalistic company." There is no unemployment, and little crime—though the rate has increased recently—and the company operates commissaries that make shopping easy.

For the record, the stores charge prices based on a New Orleans rate plus shipping charges. None the less, they are lower than in most population centers in the United States and considerably lower than those in Panama outside the zone. Overall, the mood and service is that of a relaxed military base or of government towns of the past—such as Los Alamos, N.M., and Oak Ridge, Tenn., during the secret development of atomic weapons.

Zonians understandably don't want to give it up. Most often they frame their worries in terms of both personal job security—despite assurances from the Panamanian government—and national security. No one argues, in fact, that

the question of future strategic control of the canal is not a major one.

It is one of the ironies of life in the zone, however, that some residents see a communist plot in the negotiating positions of both sides. For the operation of the canal and the management of the zone are essentially by nature socialistic enterprises.

To some residents it is all too much. They have moved out. The company town aspect of zonal life is cited by Norman Werner, a 37-year-old canal pilot, one of the elite, as the reason for his building a house outside the zone.

"If I had known how much trouble it would be, I probably wouldn't have started," he laughs. "But inside it really is an artificial life."

Many Zonians have married Panamanians, without changing their views on continued U.S. control. And although some seldom leave the zone, others have developed a deep affection for Panama and have retired there once they had to give up their assigned housing.

From the Panamanian perspective, growing numbers—encouraged by the government of Gen. Omar Torrijos Herrera—are aware of and resentful of what they regard as the privileged position of the Americans. "They can't cope with the pressures of modern society," says a Panamanian diplomat scornfully.

The resentments are both economic and political. Of the 15,000 Canal Zone employees, roughly 10,000 are Panamanians. Increasingly the government management has hired on the local market. Special training programs are bringing more Panamanians into skilled positions, including

coveted assignments as pilots, who receive \$21,000 to \$50,000 a year.

But still there are two wage systems. One is based on skills available locally and the other on skills that must be imported. The second pay scale is double the first.

Some few Americans work for the local wage rate, and a growing number of Panamanians—now several hundred—draw the U.S. rate. Zone officials emphasize that the zone is the only place in the world where the U.S. pays local nationals on U.S. terms.

None the less, the reality is that far more Panamanians work in less skilled jobs for less money. And Americans who are heads of households receive a 15 per cent premium called a "tropical differential." General Torrijos, struggling to upgrade schools, modernize agriculture and reverse a sliding growth rate makes certain these differences do not go unnoticed.

Economically, also, many wealthier Panamanians and the growing middle class, with interests as suppliers to the zone or operators of corollary businesses, are content with the status quo. But politically the government has enlisted their support increasingly on the issue of sovereignty.

"Now," says Fabian Verlarde, an adviser to General Torrijos, "it is something that won't go away. There must be a resolution, and the time is limited."

How it will be resolved is still uncertain. So far Panamanian pressure and determination in the U.S. Congress appear as the irresistible force and the immovable object. In one of the two, the appearance is deceiving.

"Don't get things wrong," the head of a leading insurance company said in an interview. "All Panamanians—rich and poor, right and left—are united in wanting a new canal treaty. But there is not much they can do about it, so they worry more about their daily lives."

Slump Diverts Attention

The sharp deterioration of the Panamanian economy in the past year has more than anything else diverted the public's attention from the canal issue. Businessmen are worried by the recession that has reduced the

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Panamanians Cynical Over Canal Issue

By ALAN RIDING

Special to The New York Times

PANAMA CITY, Oct. 5—Despite the impatient and fiery rhetoric of Panama's military Government, delays in the conclusion of a new United States-Panama treaty on the Panama Canal appear to be generating

a mood of apathy and cynicism, 40,000 Americans in the Canal in the Panamanian population. "The Government keeps promising there will be a new treaty in a month or two, but nothing happens," one young officeworker said. "I don't have any faith in the negotiations. I don't think the Americans will ever leave Panama."

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

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U.S., Panama close to agreement?

By James Nelson Goodsell
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The Christian Science Monitor

New York

Although senior United States officials say that negotiations on a new Panama Canal treaty are basically on track, many Latin Americans feel that something is amiss in the talks between Panama and the U.S.

In fact, while Washington encourages a sense of optimism that the talks will soon produce a treaty to replace the 1903 accord, Panamanian sources here indicate that the two countries are still far apart on the terms of the treaty.

Other Latin Americans close to the Panama-U.S. talks agree with the Panamanians. A number of these Latin Americans, attending the United Nations General Assembly session here, add that Washington is deceiving itself if it believes that agreement is near or that the talks leading toward a new accord are making progress.

"They broke off Sept. 17," a Panamanian Government source noted. "While they will be resumed shortly, they will involve technical details rather than substantive issues."

Still, United States officials maintain their optimism. They admit there are pitfalls in reaching an accord — including the threat of hemisphere-wide reaction if substantial progress is not made quickly, and at home, the threat of a congressional refusal to ratify a new accord.

But they minimize these points as they suggest that the Panamanian Government has a far greater problem than Washington does in regard to leaks of material concerning the negotiations. To many hemisphere observers this suggestion with regard to leaks seemed a direct slap at the Panamanian Government concerning its publication in late September of a statement on the status of negotiations.

The Panamanian statement said the talks

were stalled by U.S. insistence on its right to continue defending the waterway indefinitely.

As far as Panama is concerned, its statement "was valid and perfectly in keeping with what Washington is doing," a high Panamanian official said. He was referring to an earlier statement by Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger that "the United States must maintain the right . . . to defend the Panama Canal for an indefinite time."

Dr. Kissinger quickly went on to say Sept. 16 that beyond defense and operating rights, the U.S. can make a variety of concessions on the canal and the 500 square-mile zone surrounding it.

All this may sound like a big storm over a little bit of semantics. But the issue looms large on both sides.

A United States source close to the negotiations said Washington is confronted with a major dilemma on the canal. On the one hand, the State Department, and that means the Ford administration, is willing to move toward some sort of new treaty. But it must be within limits that appear increasingly tight — limits imposed by the vocal congressional and conservative opposition to any change in the 1903 treaty. Those limits have always included defense of the canal, but now they appear to include operation of the canal.

This, says the U.S. source, is not the way Panama previously understood it. Hence, it is using all the weapons it has to push its position. Those include "leaks" as well as efforts to arouse wider Latin American support. That support already is extensive — and Washington knows it.

Thus, the U.S. would like an early conclusion to the present talks. But it looks increasingly unlikely that it will get it.

8 per cent in 1973 to around 2 per cent this year. People in the cities have been hit badly by high inflation and increased unemployment.

In the slum district of Chorrillo, where rows of rotting wooden tenements look across John F. Kennedy Avenue to the green slopes of the 533-square-mile Canal Zone, a lottery vendor complained loudly about the rise in food prices.

"The canal is just a pretext to divert our attention from the real problems," she went on, as a group of barefoot children gathered around her. "What's going to happen if we get the canal? The Government will keep the money and in no time the zone will be as filthy as Panama City."

Many conservative and left-wing opponents of Brig. Gen. Omar Torrijos Herrera, who seized power in a coup in October, 1968, believe that the Government's impatience to recover jurisdiction over the Canal Zone under a new treaty is largely attributable to the country's precarious economic situation.

"The longer we wait, the more concessions we'll get out of the Americans," a member of the Movement of Independent Lawyers said.

"But the Government desperately needs the money from a new treaty in order to stay alive. With stagnating economy and a foreign debt of over \$1-billion for a country with just 1.5 million inhabitants, where else is it going to get the money? So instead of the United States, Panama is making the concession in the negotiations."

The Torrijos administration, which remains a one-man regime despite formal elections three years ago, has responded to critics of the secrecy of the negotiations by publishing details of the United States and Panamanian positions in the talks.

Evidence that General Torrijos is willing to accept an American military presence here for 25 more years as part of a system of joint United States-Panamanian defense of the waterway has provoked new criticism from opponents of the regime.

Unlike the official Communist party, the pro-Moscow People's party, which backs the Torrijos regime—the independent Marxist parties are adamantly opposed to any United States military presence under a new treaty. Social democratic and conservative factions believe that a system of joint defense will merely insure indefinite military rule in Panama.

"More than anything, Torrijos wants to stay in power and, for that, he needs a new treaty for face-saving," Alberto Quiros Guardia, an outspoken Socialist, who is a radio broadcaster, said in an interview. "But a system of joint defense will strengthen Panamanian militarism in the name of defending the canal."